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Abstract 
 We analyze the impacts of globalisation on firm performance and firms‟ relative 
wage payments in an emerging economy context. Using a rich set of manufacturing firm 
census data for Chile, we study four specific empirical issues, (1) the impacts of foreign 
direct investment in services on firm total factor productivity (TFP) growth, (2) the 
heterogeneous effects of import competition on firm TFP, (3) the effect of import 
competition on firm product upgrading and, (4) the question whether trade had an 
impact on decreasing relative manufacturing wages. The analysis exploits the panel 
nature of the dataset, an exogenous measure of import competition – transport costs – 
and, most importantly, the availability of detailed information on firms‟ products and 
their prices to investigate these questions rigorously. Specifically, we use the latter 
information to compute improved TFP measures, analyze product upgrading with a 
direct quantitative measure - unit prices of firms‟ products – and assess the impact of 
price changes on wages not only by industry but equally at the firm level. We find an 
overall positive impact of import competition on firm performance – both on TFP 
improvements and product innovation. Moreover, results show a positive and significant 
effect of foreign direct investment in services on TFP growth.  However, our results also 
suggest that globalisation alone may not be sufficient a tool for development. While 
import competition has a strongly positive impact on product upgrading, we do not find 
that competition from developed countries stimulates such innovation. The gap between 
both types of economies may be too large. Also, the overall positive impact of import 
competition on firm TFP is lower for smaller firms; they will not benefit to the same 
extent as larger firms. Finally, we find that price effects of trade do not explain the 
observed reduction in manufacturing wage inequality.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Summary 
1.  Summary 
 Over the last decades many emerging countries have opened their economies to 
foreigners as trading partners as well as for direct investment. While many factors have 
contributed to these developments; the failure of previous protective policies in the case 
of many Latin American economies and the belief that competition as well as foreign 
know-how may facilitate development have certainly played a role. We analyze the 
impacts of globalisation on firm productivity, their potential for innovation and its 
outcomes for the firms‟ employees in an emerging economy context. Our objective is to 
understand the opportunities and limitations of globalisation as an option for 
development. In order to explore these questions we use very rich Census data on firms 
in Chile which are collected by the Chilean Statistical Office and have, for their quality, 
been widely used in empirical research. We formulate four specific empirical questions, 
the impacts of services FDI on manufacturing firm total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth, the heterogeneous impacts of import competition on manufacturing firm TFP, 
the effect of import competition on firm product upgrading and, finally, the question 
whether trade had an impact on decreasing manufacturing sector wage inequality in 
Chile.  
 Overall, our evidence highlights positive impacts of globalisation on Chilean 
firm performance, both in terms of total factor productivity improvements and product 
quality upgrading. We find, however, some limitations to the positive effects of 
globalisation. First, while import competition has a strongly positive impact on product 
upgrading, it seems mainly competition from other emerging economies that stimulates 
such innovation. Competition from developed countries does not have a similar effect. 
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Second, we find a general positive effect of import competition on firm productivity – it 
is a lot stronger for larger firms though and this potentially suggests that small firms face 
hindrances to improve processes to become more efficient. They also seem to suffer 
stronger productivity losses due to Chinese import competition. We interpret the latter 
evidence jointly with our evidence of product quality upgrading and product adoption as 
production adjustment costs.  
 The policy implications of our findings point to the importance of globalisation 
for firm development and at the same time suggest that globalisation may not by itself be 
sufficient. To be more precise, import competition may be insufficient to enable quality 
upgrading where the “technology gap” between foreign competitors and local producers 
is high. Other policy tools may be necessary for more radical innovations. Another 
concern that arises is that small firms benefit less from foreign competition and suffer 
more from adjustment costs from Chinese competition. This suggests possibly that they 
do not have the same possibilities bigger firms have to respond to the challenge of 
foreign competition. Policies offering support to “disadvantaged” firms may possibly be 
interesting to allow spreading the benefits of globalisation more widely among firms.  
2. Methodological Considerations and Contributions 
 A measure of central importance to our analysis is TFP as a measure of firm 
performance; they are the main measure of firm performance and used in all thematic 
chapters with the notable exception of Chapter 4 where firm product prices are used to 
evaluate innovation performance. Several introductory comments are well placed in the 
introduction to explain why different measures are used in the different thematic 
chapters. First of all, a central input required to obtain firm TFP measures is to obtain 
real firm output. This is usually obtained using nominal sales deflated by an industry-
  13 
level price deflator as firm price deflators are not available. In Chapter 3 we discuss 
shortcomings of these traditional TFP estimates and obtain improved measures in that 
we use firm-level output deflators to obtain real output measures for our production 
function estimates. This procedure avoids several biases that arise if industry-level 
deflators are used. Chapter 3 explains those shortcomings in further detail. We use these 
improved measures in both Chapters 3 and 5. Since we do not have firm-level price data 
before 1996, we can only use traditional TFP estimates in Chapter 2 where our analysis 
spans the 1992 – 2004 period.  
Second, the other important question is how firm production functions are 
specified to obtain TFP estimates. Two methods have been particularly popular in the 
applied empirical literature, the index method and semi-parametric estimation 
techniques originally proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). Both Chapters 2 and 3 select 
the method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), a modification of Olley and Pakes 
(1996), as their method allows including most firms in the production function estimates 
rather than only those with non-zero investments as is the case for Olley and Pakes 
(1996). However, the recent contribution by Ackerberg et al. (2006) puts that specific 
estimation technique in question. This topic is discussed in further detail in Chapter 2.  
Recognizing the validity of this recent critique, we estimate our main 
specification in Chapter 2 using the method proposed by Ackerberg et al. (2006). We 
find that results are robust; this suggests that in practice, the estimation technique is 
potentially not affecting the main conclusions. For future research the critique certainly 
suggests using the method proposed by Ackerberg et al. (2006). As for the index 
method, it is used to confirm results in Chapter 2 suggesting that for our findings, the 
estimation technique is not material. The index method is used as the main estimation 
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technique in Chapter 5 because in that chapter we seek to establish a comparative 
analysis of results produced by Haskel and Slaughter (2001) to compare performance of 
the Chilean sector. This is also facilitated since we do not find substantial differences 
across estimation techniques in Chapter 2.   
As to our methodological contributions, we are interested in whether improved 
TFP measures lead to different conclusions when applied to the discussion of specific 
questions.  We do the experiment looking at the question of the impacts of import 
competition on productivity. Moreover, we explore the use of an alternative measure, 
product unit prices, to investigate incremental product innovations. The major advantage 
is that we avoid using problematic qualitative variables for less radical innovations 
which are the most prevalent type of innovation measure in emerging economies.  
Furthermore, we explore the use of firm-specific weights of services uses to analyzse the 
impact of vertical FDI linkages and investigate whether there are differences caused by 
aggregation when analyzing mandated wage equations at the firm rather than the 
industry level.  
3. Data 
 Turning to the data, the main dataset used is the Encuesta Nacional Industrial 
Annual (ENIA), which is the annual manufacturing census of Chilean plants covering all 
plants with more than 10 employees. The dataset is an unbalanced panel reflecting plant 
entry and exit that has been collected annually since 1979 and used widely in a large 
number of analyses. We select the 1992 – 2004 period for the analysis of the impacts of 
FDI since it covers the period where significant investments took place, and otherwise 
work with the 1996 – 2003 sample.  Table 1 shows the number of plants across all years 
analyzed in our sample and their distribution across 3-digit ISIC (revision 2) industries. 
  15 
A second central dataset we use intensively provides information on the products 
produced by Chilean plants from 1996 to 2003. The products dataset includes 
information for each plant and year on the physical quantity sold and the sales value of 
each of 2,018 products at the 7-digit ISIC level (revision 2). Complementary datasets for 
our analysis are FDI inflow and outflow data for different services sectors from the 
Chilean Foreign Investment Committee and detailed information on freight costs of 
Chilean imports for each 8-digit Harmonized System (HS) code, exporting country, and 
year from 1997 to 2003 provided by the Latin American Integration Association 
(ALADI).  
4. Regulatory Changes and Macroeconomic Trends in Chile  
 It is useful to interpret the micro evidence in light of the macroeconomic context 
the Chilean economy faced over the past decade to situate the micro findings in the 
macro context. Starting with overall growth performance, Chile has been very successful 
over the past two decades achieving an increase in per capita income relative to that of 
the United States from 18% in 1986 to 31% in 2007 (OECD, 2010). The past decades 
have been marked by an overall very successful growth performance. Figure 1 shows 
growth rates for the Chilean economy illustrating high growth performance over the 
1990s and good performance from 2000 up to the current world financial crisis in 2008. 
The downturn in 1999 was due to spillover effects of the Asian crisis of 1998. As shown 
in Figure 2 the growth of the manufacturing sector largely followed the overall growth 
rate of the economy. This shows that there were no major shifts reducing or increasing 
the share of the manufacturing sector in overall GDP. As for overall employment 
dynamics, there has been a constant increase in employment over the past two decades; 
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the increase was by more than 2.5 million between 1987 and 2008. Downturns to 
economic growth have only had mild effects on employment.  
 Obviously, various factors contributed including the adoption of a good 
macroeconomic policy regime. One explanation is specifically important in our context 
– the liberalization of foreign trade and foreign direct investment. Results were a flat 6% 
multilateral tariff across all imports in place since the 1980s reforms, the removal of 
barriers to foreign direct investment. The efforts at strengthening openness have been 
intensified with the signature of several free trade agreements with key trading partners. 
This effectively means that the effects we study are impacts of trade liberalization 
subsequently to its initial implementation and initial effects.  
 In terms of trends, there has been a significant increase in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) starting in the 1990s - Figure 2. Most of the investment was investment in 
business services as is explained in further detail in Chapter 2. Investments remained 
significant up to 2006 reflecting that Chile has become an attractive source for foreign 
direct investment. For Chilean firms this means that both potential learning opportunities 
from foreign firms and competition effects may have changed significantly. This 
provides a strong motivation to study the effects of FDI on firms, the topic of Chapter 2. 
Moreover, as shown in Figure 5 imports (as well as exports) increased significantly 
subsequently to trade liberalization. This is also the case for 1992 – 2004 which is the 
period we study here. The question we effectively analyze here is whether this increase 
in imports shown here did have impacts on manufacturing firm performance. 
 In light of our discussion on wage inequality it is equally important to discuss 
labour market reforms in Chile. The military regime in place in Chile from 1973 until 
1990 implemented a series of reforms that shape the current labour market regulations 
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up to the present as the subsequent democratic governments did not reverse the general 
labour market regulatory framework. Edwards and Cox Edwards (2000) summarise 
those reforms into three major types: First, efforts were made to increase labour market 
“flexibility” by reducing the maximum length of serverance pay and imposing a ceiling 
on the amount paid. Second, collective bargaining was modified reducing the centralized 
power of unions as wage bargaining was decentralized to the level of the firm. Third, 
payroll taxes were reduced. A main characteristic of the democratic governments in 
place since 1990 up to the present is, however, a stronger concern for social policies, the 
most important being the increase in the limit to severance payment from 5 to 11 months 
in 1991 (Lima and Paredes, 2004). Subsequently to that date there was no significant 
labour market reform. However, due to the effects of the Asian crisis a previously set 
minimum wage increase (based on expectations of continued high growth rates) led to 
an unintended increase of almost 30% between 1998 and 2001 (Lima and Paredes, 
2004). To the best of our knowledge there is only one study that looks at the impacts of 
this change in minimum wages, their main finding is that this rise in minimum wages 
increased the share of workers receiving minimum wages or less pay and coincided with 
fewer workers having formal employment contracts (Infante et al., 2003). They do not 
study the impacts on wage inequality. The latter policy change is potentially significant 
for our analysis of wage inequality.   
  
5. Review by Chapter 
 We now review our analysis chapter by chapter. Chapter 2 is entitled ”Foreign 
Direct Investment in Services and Manufacturing Productivity Growth: Evidence for 
Chile.” During the 1990s, foreign direct investment in producer service sectors in Latin 
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America was massive. Such investment may increase the quality of services, reduce 
their cost, and offer opportunities for knowledge spillovers to downstream users of the 
services. This chapter examines the effects of foreign direct investment in services on 
manufacturing productivity growth in Chile between 1992 and 2004. We estimate an 
extended production function where plant TFP depends on a weighted measure of 
foreign direct investment in services. The novelty of the approach is that we are able to 
assess the intensity of usage of various types of services at the plant level and use that 
information in the estimation of the importance of foreign direct investment in those 
services for plants. The econometric results show a positive and significant effect of 
foreign direct investment in services on productivity growth of Chilean manufacturing 
plants which is robust to a multitude of tests. The economic impact of the estimates is 
that forward linkages from foreign direct investment in services account for almost 4 
percent of the observed increase in Chilean manufacturing productivity growth during 
the sample period. This evidence therefore suggests that reducing the barriers restricting 
foreign direct investment in services in many developing economies may help accelerate 
productivity growth in their manufacturing sectors. 
 Chapter 3 is entitled “Improved TFP Estimates and their Responsiveness to Assessing 
the Effects of Trade Competition.” Many studies find a positive effect of import competition on 
firm total factor productivity (TFP) estimates. In this chapter we contribute to the literature in 
two ways.  First, we make use of our data on Chilean firms and their products to compute 
improved TFP estimates and analyze whether these provide the same answer.  Second, we use 
transport costs as a measure of import competition which we argue avoids the problems of 
endogeneity. Our results suggest that import competition has a positive effect across all TFP 
measures. Better performing firms tend to benefit more. Import competition from China has a 
negative effect due to temporary efficiency losses as firms adjust production to face competition.  
  19 
 Chapter 4 is entitled “Does Tougher Import Competition Lead to Product 
Upgrading?” Over the last two decades globalization, and more specifically the 
increased exposure to competition from low-price producers in China and India, has 
created a new economic environment for other emerging economies. It is widely 
conjectured that the most advantageous way for manufacturing firms in those economies 
to position themselves in domestic and international markets is to offer upgraded and 
differentiated rather than “mundane” labor-intensive products. This chapter investigates 
whether increased competitive pressure from imports forces firms to improve the quality 
of their products. The econometric analysis relies on a rich dataset of Chilean 
manufacturing plants and their products. Product quality is measured with unit values 
(average prices) and industry-level transport costs are used as an exogenous measure of 
import competition. We find a positive and robust effect of import competition on 
product quality. This effect is found to be particularly strong for non-exporting plants. 
The results also show that increased import competition from less advanced economies 
is the major cause for the positive impact on quality upgrading. The overall evidence 
points to the benefits of trade openness for product innovation but demonstrates at the 
same time that competitive pressures alone will not enable local plants to catch up with 
leading world producers. 
 Chapter 5 is entitled “Technology versus Trade: What explains relative wage 
changes in Chile?” This chapter analyses the effects of trade and technological change 
on the decrease in wage inequality in the Chilean manufacturing sector for the 1996 -
2003 period. We establish the impact of trade by means of regressing product price 
changes on production cost shares of skilled and unskilled labour as well as capital. We 
do the same analysis for technological change which is measured by total factor 
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productivity growth. A novelty of our study is that we conduct the analysis both at firm 
and industry levels. We find that technological change rather than trade explains the 
decrease in relative wages. 
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Chapter 1: Table and Figures 
 
  Table 1: Sample Composition of the ENIA 
Panel A:  Across Years
Year Number of Plants Share in Total
1992 4394 7.71
1993 4497 7.89
1994 4586 8.04
1995 4583 8.04
1996 4872 8.54
1997 4670 8.19
1998 4252 7.46
1999 3875 6.80
2000 3994 7.00
2001 4038 7.08
2002 4366 7.66
2003 4332 7.60
2004 4566 8.01
Total 57025 100.00  
 
 
Panel B: Across Industries
ISIC Number of Observations Share in Total
311 Food Products 15959 27.99
312 Other Food Products 837 1.47
313 Beverages 1131 1.98
314 Tobacco 8 0.01
321 Textiles 3774 6.62
322 Apparel 3293 5.77
323 Leather Products 494 0.87
324 Footwear 1604 2.81
331 Wood Products 3967 6.96
332 Furniture 1761 3.09
341 Paper 1052 1.84
342 Printing 2604 4.57
351 Industrial Chemicals 723 1.27
352 Other Chemicals 2149 3.77
353 Petroleum Refineries 52 0.09
354 Petroleum and Coal Products 202 0.35
355 Rubber Products 693 1.22
356 Plastics 3161 5.54
361 Ceramics 186 0.33
362 Glass 277 0.49
369 Nonmetallic Minerals 1898 3.33
371 Iron and Steel 457 0.80
372 Non-ferrous Metals 444 0.78
381 Metal Products 5365 9.41
382 Nonelectrical Machinery 2021 3.54
383 Electrical Machinery 805 1.41
384 Transport Equipment 1102 1.93
385 Professional Equipment 295 0.52
390 Other Manufacturing 711 1.25
Total 57025 100.00
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Figure 1: GDP Growth in Chile, 1987 - 2009 
 
Note: The graph reports annual percentage growth rates of GDP.  
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database 
Figure 2: Manufacturing Sector Growth in Value-Added in Chile, 1987 - 2007 
 
Note: The graph reports annual percentage growth rates of the value-added of the manufacturing sector. 
Source: National Accounts Estimates of Main Aggregates, United Nations Statistics Division 
 
Figure 3: Total Employment in Chile 
 
Note: The graph shows employment in million.  
Source: Labor Statistics Database, International Labor Organization 
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Figure 4: Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Chile, 1987 – 2006 
 
Note: The graph shows foreign direct investment flows to Chile measued in constant 1990 billion USD. 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics  
 
Figure 5: Chilean Exports and Imports, 1987- 2007 
 
Note: The graph shows Chilean exports and imports from Chile in constant 1990 billion USD  
Source: National Accounts Estimates of Main Aggregates, United Nations Statistics Division 
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Chapter 2: Foreign Direct Investment in Services and Manufacturing 
Productivity Growth: Evidence for Chile
*
 
(Co-authored with Ana M. Fernandes, The World Bank) 
 
Abstract 
This chapter examines the effects of substantial foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows 
in producer services on the total factor productivity (TFP) growth of Chilean 
manufacturing firms. The novelty of our approach is the reliance on a service FDI 
measure where plant-level time-varying measures of the intensity of service usage are 
used as weights for FDI penetration in service sectors.
 
We find a positive and significant 
effect of FDI in services on plant TFP growth that is robust to a variety of tests. These 
effects are neither driven by any specific industry nor are they restricted to certain types 
of plants only.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Total Factor Productivity Growth, Services Liberalization, Foreign Direct 
Investment, Chile. 
JEL Classification codes: D24, L8, L9, F21, F23. 
                                                          
*
 This chapter is based on Fernandes, A. and C. Paunov (2008), Foreign Direct 
Investment in Services and Manufacturing Productivity Growth: Evidence for Chile, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4730. 
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1. Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into the service sector experienced a boom 
during the 1990s. By 2002, services accounted for 60% of the world stock of FDI, a 
four-fold increase since 1990 (UNCTAD, 2004). The main recipients of FDI have been 
profit-seeking producer services which range from network-intensive services such as 
electricity, telecommunications, and transport to finance and business services. These 
services are characterized by the facilitating and intermediating role which they play for 
downstream user firms (Francois, 1990). Thus, better performing producer service 
sectors would strengthen a country‟s business environment. A potentially powerful 
means to achieve such improvements is FDI which can lead to increases in the quality 
and variety of services available and lower their cost. Manufacturing firms may also 
benefit from their interaction with foreign services suppliers through spillovers of 
management, organizational, marketing, or technological knowledge.
1
  
Despite the relevance of this topic, the effects of vertical linkages resulting from 
the openness of producer services to FDI on manufacturing firms have not been widely 
documented (Hoekman, 2006). This chapter attempts to fill this gap by addressing the 
following question: did the increased penetration of FDI into producer service sectors in 
Chile benefit total factor productivity (TFP) growth of manufacturing plants between 
1992 and 2004? Chile is an interesting economy to study as its service sector received 
large FDI inflows during the 1990s. Our empirical framework obtains plant TFP 
estimates and the corresponding TFP growth following the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
method which corrects for the endogeneity of input choices - including the choice of 
service inputs - with respect to productivity. Then our main specification consists of a 
                                                          
1 See Markusen (1989) and Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (1992) for a theoretical discussion of the benefits from FDI 
in services.  
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regression of plant TFP growth on a service FDI linkage measure. The following 
intuitive argument is made in defining that measure. If FDI in services affects TFP 
growth, then one would expect plants that use services more intensively to benefit more. 
Thus, our service FDI linkage measure is defined as service FDI penetration weighted 
by the intensity of service usage at the plant level. To identify a causal effect of service 
FDI on plant TFP growth, our regressions include the two-period lagged service FDI 
linkage measure, control for the potential endogeneity of services usage and for 
unobserved fixed differences in TFP growth across plants, for observable plant 
characteristics, for industry-level and region-level time-varying heterogeneity.  
We find evidence of a positive and significant effect of service FDI on the TFP 
growth of Chilean manufacturing plants that use those services more intensively. Our 
results are robust to the use of alternative measures of plant TFP growth based on 
production function estimation following Olley and Pakes (1996) or Ackerberg et al. 
(2006), and to a growth accounting index measure of TFP growth. Variations in the 
definition of the service FDI penetration and the plant-level weights, and other 
robustness checks confirm our evidence. By exploiting regional differences in FDI, we 
demonstrate that the estimated effect of the service FDI variable is capturing the benefits 
from FDI rather than those from contemporaneous regulatory reforms in service sectors. 
Interestingly, we also show that our estimated effects are not driven by any specific 
industry and that there is only weak evidence that those effects are stronger for plants in 
differentiated product industries. Finally we find no evidence of differential effects of 
FDI in services on TFP growth across small and large plants and across domestic and 
foreign-owned plants.  
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Our preferred estimate suggests that the average increase in the service FDI 
linkage between 1992 and 2004 added 1.1 percentage points to annual plant TFP growth 
in Chile, all else constant. The corresponding economic impact is that forward linkages 
from service FDI accounted for almost 4% of the observed increase in manufacturing 
users‟ TFP growth in Chile during the sample period. This economic impact is quite 
meaningful in light of the finding by Haskel et al. (2007) that spillovers from 
manufacturing FDI explain a roughly similar share of manufacturing TFP growth in the 
U.K. during the 1973-1992 period. Since a large fraction of service FDI inflows in Chile 
consisted in the acquisition of incumbent firms - many of which were privately-owned 
since the late 1980s - our impact is likely to be an underestimate of the potential impacts 
in countries where FDI inflows are directed at the privatization of service providers or at 
the creation of new service providers. The positive effects of service FDI on TFP growth 
of manufacturing plants may capture to some extent an unmeasured decline in quality-
adjusted services prices but also the spillover of managerial and organizational 
knowledge from service providers to manufacturing users. Notwithstanding, there are 
several alternative interpretations that could explain our results as will be discussed in 
the conclusions.  
The microeconomic evidence provided by our study contributes to the emerging 
literature on the impact of services liberalization on growth and on the performance of 
services users. At the macro level, Mattoo et al. (2006) and Eschenbach and Hoekman 
(2006) show that countries with liberalized service sectors grow faster, once all standard 
growth correlates are controlled for. Based on computable general equilibrium models, 
Konan and Maskus (2006) and Jensen et al. (2007) argue that business services 
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liberalization could bring large GDP gains to Tunisia and Russia, respectively.
2
 The 
main mechanism for these gains is the increase in the number of services available for 
manufacturing users as a result of FDI.
3
 At the industry level, Francois and Woerz 
(2007) show that the increased openness of business services through exports and FDI 
has strong positive effects on exports, value added, and employment of manufacturing 
industries in the OECD while Fernandes (2007) estimates positive and significant effects 
of liberalization of finance and infrastructure on labor productivity of downstream 
manufacturing industries in Eastern European countries. At the firm-level, Arnold et al. 
(2007a) show significant positive effects of services liberalization in the Czech Republic 
on manufacturing firms‟ TFP while Arnold et al. (2007b) find significant positive effects 
of banking, telecommunications, and transport reforms on Indian manufacturing firms‟ 
TFP. Finally, Javorcik and Li (2007) estimate a positive effect of FDI in Romania‟s 
retail sector on the TFP of manufacturing suppliers to that sector. By exploiting plant 
heterogeneity in service usage, our study differs from these studies which capture the 
dependence of manufacturing firms on services using industry-level coefficients from 
input-output tables. The advantage of using plant-level time-varying measures of the 
intensity of service usage is that these enable us to better identify the heavy users of 
services within manufacturing and to account for the substantial increase in the usage of 
services by manufacturing plants in Chile over the sample period. 
By considering the potential role of knowledge spillovers from service providers to 
manufacturing users, our study also relates to the literature on vertical spillovers from 
                                                          
2 Markusen et al. (2005) also show important GDP gains from services liberalization based on general equilibrium 
simulations for a hypothetical country. In their model, the presence of foreign-owned service providers allows final 
goods producers to rely on more specialized expertise. 
3 This increase in the number of services increases the TFP of manufacturing firms through a Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier 
framework (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Ethier, 1982). 
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manufacturing FDI, which are shown to be more important than horizontal spillovers by 
Javorcik (2004), Kugler (2006), Blalock and Gertler (2008), and Marcin (2008). A 
rationale provided in this literature for vertical forward linkages is that foreign suppliers 
provide assistance and complementary services to local buyers. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes recent trends 
in FDI in services in Chile. Section 3 discusses the expected effects of FDI in services 
and the available evidence. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 describes our 
empirical specification. Section 6 discusses our main results and the robustness checks. 
Section 7 discusses extensions to our main results. Section 8 concludes. 
2. Trends in FDI in Services in Chile  
Over the last three decades, liberalization, privatization, and deregulation reforms 
in Chile opened its economy to trade and investment more than any other country in 
Latin America (Moreira and Blyde, 2006).
4
 In the 1980s, most FDI inflows were related 
to Chile‟s comparative advantage in the extraction and processing of natural resources. 
However, during the 1990s, FDI inflows into service sectors take on a leading role.
5
 
Electricity and water, transport and telecommunications, and business services represent 
about 60% of net FDI inflows into Chile during the 1996-2001 period. Figure  shows 
that these substantial FDI inflows resulted in a growing FDI stock in the main service 
sectors in Chile. Also, the ratio of FDI to output increased substantially in most Chilean 
service sectors over the 1990s, as shown in Figure.
6
 
                                                          
4 FDI in Chile is governed by Decree Law 600 in place since 1974 which regulates conditions for market entry, 
capitalization, and foreign capital remittances (ECLAC, 2000). The decree law grants equal treatment to foreign and 
domestic investments in mining, manufacturing, and most service sectors, the exceptions being professional services 
such as engineering, or legal services (Moreira and Blyde, 2006). 
5 FDI inflows achieved a peak in 1999 in the electricity and water sector due to the purchase of Enersis and Endesa-
Chile by the Spanish electricity firm Endesa-Spain (ECLAC, 1999). 
6 The computation of the variables shown in Figures 1 and 2 is described in Section 4 and in the Appendix. 
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The large FDI inflows in Chile during the 1990s reflect first and foremost the 
worldwide increase in FDI in services mainly motivated by the interest of multinationals 
(MNCs) in becoming global service providers by gaining access to domestic and 
regional markets, particularly in the developing world (UNCTAD, 2004). In sectors such 
as electricity, Chilean firms were privatized before 1990 and later acquired by foreign 
players. Global MNCs identified Chile‟s largely privately-owned firms as an attractive 
investment opportunity to consolidate their positions in Latin America (ECLAC, 2000).  
3. The Effects of FDI in Services  
FDI in services can provide various benefits to the host country: price changes, 
quality improvements, increased variety, and knowledge spillovers.
7
 Next, we describe 
each benefit and the evidence of their presence in Chile or in developing countries more 
generally. 
3.1 Effects on the Service Sector 
First, FDI in services is likely to increase competition in local markets and result in 
price reductions. The reason is that incumbent firms - particularly in electricity and 
telecom sectors - no longer retain the rents they obtained from being previously 
monopoly providers. The available evidence confirms price decreases for Chile. In the 
telecom sector, Stehmann (1995) argues that FDI led to more competition, particularly 
in the long-distance market where MNCs entered early. In the electricity sector, Pollitt 
(2004) shows price declines during the 1990s. For a group of 80 countries including 
                                                          
7 Note that FDI in services can also entail potential costs: (1) foreign ownership in inherently monopolistic sectors 
such as electricity or telecom may result in higher prices unless the regulatory system is very well defined and 
managed by the government, and (2) foreign ownership may crowd out domestic firms for example in the banking 
sector (UNCTAD, 2004). 
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Chile, Claessens et al. (2001) find that increased foreign equity shares in the banking 
sector led to stronger competition and reduced margins from 1988 to 1995. 
Second, FDI in services may lead to service quality improvements. These may 
result from increased competition and the superior technological, organizational, and 
managerial know-how of foreign service providers.
8
 The superiority of services MNCs 
is akin to that of manufacturing MNCs and is based on their ownership of intangible 
assets such as management or marketing techniques (Dunning 1993). In the electricity 
and telecom sectors, quality relates also to the reliability of service provision. FDI can 
provide the necessary finance for the major investments required for upgrading and 
expanding existing networks. UNCTAD (2004) provides evidence of a positive impact 
of FDI on the reliability of services in Latin America during the 1990s. World Bank 
(2004) shows improved service quality in the electricity sectors of Latin American 
countries as a result of privatization often to foreign MNCs and of deregulation. 
Third, FDI in services may result in greater variety of services being provided, 
including new and technologically advanced services or services provided to new 
regions or new types of clients. Evidence of an increased number of innovative financial 
products available and of electronic banking techniques as a result of FDI in the banking 
sector is provided e.g., by Cardenas et al. (2003) for Mexico. ECLAC (2000) shows that 
FDI in the Chilean telecom sector led to the provision of a wider range of products and 
services in addition to an increase in the number of telephone lines. 
Fourth, FDI in services may result in leaking of managerial, marketing, and 
organizational know-how and best practices (e.g., linked to the environment or to labor 
codes) from foreign to domestic providers.
 
Miroudout (2006) documents these 
                                                          
8 For a set of developing countries, Shelp et al. (1984) describe the process of technology transfer from MNCs parents 
to their affiliates in the insurance and engineering and consulting service sectors. 
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knowledge spillovers for the banking, telecom, and transport sectors across developing 
countries. 
The four potential effects from FDI in services - price reductions, quality 
improvements, increased variety, and knowledge spillovers - are likely to stimulate 
productivity growth within the service sector, for both foreign and domestic providers. 
The fact that MNCs may have acquired the best performing services firms (some 
privatized since the late 1980s) instead of opening new subsidiaries could reduce the 
potential for positive effects of FDI on the performance of Chilean services firms. 
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that those positive effects materialized for example 
in the Chilean electricity sector which exhibits significant improvements in labor 
productivity due to FDI during the 1992-2002 period (Pollitt, 2004).  
3.2 Effects on the Manufacturing Sector 
The crucial hypothesis that we test in this chapter is whether the aforementioned 
FDI-induced improvements in service sectors benefit the TFP growth of downstream 
manufacturing users. If present, these dynamic benefits could be classified as pecuniary 
(rent) spillovers which are a by-product of market transactions (Griliches, 1992). 
Manufacturing plants benefit from pecuniary spillovers if they use services and the 
increases in quality or variety as a result of FDI are not fully appropriated by service 
providers.
9
 For service sectors which tend to be characterized by imperfect competition, 
providers may not appropriate the full surplus from better and more diversified services 
because of their inability to perfectly price discriminate. If FDI increases the degree of 
competition in service sectors, then competitive pressures may prevent service providers 
                                                          
9 Moreover, increases in the quality or variety of services may not be incorporated in services price deflators. 
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from appropriating that surplus. In both cases, service providers charge a price that is 
lower than that corresponding to the quality of the services provided. 
FDI in services can also benefit manufacturing plants through spillovers of „soft 
technology‟ linked to managerial, organizational, or marketing know-how and technical 
skills. Learning by manufacturing plants could result from demonstration effects, 
personal contacts, manager or worker turnover.
10
 Griliches (1992) distinguishes 
knowledge spillovers from pecuniary spillovers since in principle only the former allow 
manufacturing plants to use that knowledge to advance their own innovation 
capabilities. While this is a conceptually clear distinction, in practice pecuniary 
spillovers may become knowledge spillovers if downstream users of better services 
apply the embodied knowledge to improve their own TFP growth (Branstetter, 2001). 
First, for knowledge-intensive business services such as marketing, technical, and other 
consultancy services (e.g., information technology (IT) related), the actual service 
provided is a knowledge-intensive input upon which manufacturing plants may rely to 
improve their innovation capabilities and TFP growth (Kox and Rubalcaba, 2007).
11
 The 
capability of routine problem-solving as part of everyday project work and the 
instructions and know-how for installing and using new equipment and systems 
exemplify knowledge flows between a business services provider and its manufacturing 
client (Den Hertog, 2002). Second, the usage of newer services (e.g., internet banking) 
may embody technological knowledge which allows manufacturing plants to improve 
their production and operations (e.g., by increasing the efficacy of their IT investments). 
Third, the aforementioned increased reliability of service provision resulting from FDI 
                                                          
10 See Malerba (1992) on interactions with suppliers as a spur for incremental technical change by plants. 
11 The providers of knowledge-intensive business services can act as facilitators of innovation for manufacturing 
plants by sharing with them experience and ideas on best practice solutions for technological and business problems 
based on their observation of localized tacit knowledge across their clients (Muller and Zenker, 2001). 
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may allow manufacturing plants to optimize their machinery usage (e.g., production 
processes are less disrupted due to electricity outages) and provide incentives for plants 
to use technologically more advanced production processes which depend on telecom or 
internet/data connection. These possibilities capture multiple dimensions of 
technological change thus motivating a positive effect of FDI in services on plant TFP 
growth and also epitomize the overlap between pecuniary and knowledge spillovers 
which will characterize our main results.  
4. Manufacturing Plant-Level Data 
The main dataset used in our analysis is the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Annual 
(ENIA), which is the annual manufacturing survey of Chilean plants with more than 10 
employees. The dataset is an unbalanced panel capturing plant entry and exit covering 
the 1992-2004 period and including an average of 4913 plants per year classified into 4-
digit ISIC revision 2 industries.
12
 The Appendix provides details on how the final 
sample of 57025 observations is obtained. The ENIA survey collects plant-level 
information on sales, employment, raw materials, investments (buildings, machinery and 
equipment, transportation, and land) which are used to construct output and inputs for 
the production function discussed in Section 5. All nominal variables are expressed in 
real terms using appropriate deflators and capital is constructed applying the perpetual 
inventory method formula, as described in the Appendix.  
A particularly interesting feature of the ENIA survey is that it collects information 
on plant-level expenditures on a variety of services: advertising, banking commissions 
and interest payments, communications, insurance, legal, technical, and accounting 
                                                          
12 The ENIA dataset has been widely used in research e.g., by Pavcnik (2002), Alvarez and Lopez (2005), and 
Bergoeing and Repetto (2006). While the dataset provides information by plant according to Pavcnik (2002) more 
than 90% percent of Chilean firms during the 1979-1986 period were single-plant firms. Thus plant data corresponds 
to a large extent to firm data.  
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services, licenses and foreign technical assistance, rental payments, transport, other 
services, electricity, and water. This information allows us to include a bundle of 
services (excluding electricity) appropriately deflated as inputs in the production 
function discussed in Section 5. For electricity, the quantity consumed is the input 
included. This information also enables us to construct plant-specific time-varying 
weights representing the intensity of service usage, as detailed in Section 5.2. 
5. Empirical Specification  
5.1 Basic Framework 
In this section we present the reduced form framework used to estimate the impact 
of FDI in services on the TFP growth of Chilean manufacturing plants. We consider a 
Cobb-Douglas production function in logarithms for plant i in industry j at time t as in: 
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j
it  is materials, E
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electricity, S jit  is services, K
j
it  is capital, and A
j
it  is a plant-specific index of Hicks-
neutral TFP measuring the plant‟s efficiency in transforming inputs into output. 
The crucial hypothesis tested in this chapter is whether FDI in services affects 
plant TFP growth. This effect could result from pecuniary spillovers showing up in 
measured TFP growth through unaccounted for increases in services quality and variety. 
Equally important is the possibility that FDI in services generates knowledge spillovers 
for manufacturing users, and pecuniary spillovers can result in knowledge spillovers. 
Thus, we allow plant TFP growth itAd ln  (ignoring the industry subscript j) to depend 
on a service FDI linkage measure jitFDIsl 1  as: 
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ititZitsfdiit ZFDIslAd    11_ln ,      (2) 
where 1itZ  is a vector of control variables discussed in Section 5.3, and it   is a 
stochastic residual. A positive sfdi_  indicates a beneficial impact of FDI in services on 
plant TFP growth. Before discussing the econometric issues associated with the 
estimation of Equation (2), we present our service FDI linkage measure.  
5.2 Service FDI Linkage Measure 
To estimate the effects of FDI in services on manufacturing TFP growth, we make 
the working hypothesis that Chilean plants that are relatively heavy users of services 
should (ceteris paribus) benefit disproportionately more from increases in FDI in 
services than plants that are less heavy users of services.
13
 To capture the intensity of 
service usage by plants, we compute the ratio of plant expenditures on four categories of 
services (henceforth designated as four service sectors) - (1) electricity and water, (2) 
transport and communications, (3) financial, insurance, and business services, and (4) 
real estate - to plant sales.
14
 Information on a plant‟s usage of foreign-provided services 
as separate from domestic-provided services would be the ideal measure to use. 
However, to the extent that domestic service providers increase their quality and variety 
and lower their prices due to the presence of FDI in their sector - through increased 
competition or knowledge spillovers - total service usage adequately captures the 
benefits which a Chilean manufacturing plant may derive from service usage for its TFP 
                                                          
13 This assumption is inspired by that made by Rajan and Zingales (1998) in the estimation of the benefits of access to 
finance for industry growth. Our assumption implies that cost is the only limitation to purchase services and that there 
are no other restrictions preventing the access to certain services by certain users. 
14 Business services encompass advertising, legal, technical, and accounting services, licenses and foreign technical 
assistance, and other services. These four groups of services are dictated by the availability of sectoral GDP from the 
Chilean Central Bank used below. 
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growth beyond the contribution that the services input per se generates for the plant‟s 
output.  
To capture the presence of FDI, we compute for each service sector net FDI 
inflows based on data from the Chilean Foreign Investment Committee by subtracting 
from annual FDI inflows the corresponding annual FDI outflows (i.e., foreign investors‟ 
repatriation of capital, profits, and dividends). Net FDI inflows however do not 
adequately capture the importance of FDI in a service sector and year because they 
neither account for past investments nor for the sector‟s size. Thus, we cumulate net FDI 
inflows using the perpetual inventory method formula to construct an FDI stock for each 
sector, as described in the Appendix.
15
 Our measure of FDI penetration in a service 
sector is given by the ratio of the sector‟s FDI stock to the sector‟s output (GDP) 
obtained from the Chilean Central Bank.  
 Our final plant-level time-varying service FDI linkage measure that captures 
both the presence of FDI in services and plant usage of those services is computed 
as: 


K
k
kt
k
itit FDIFDIsl
1
* , where ktFDI  is the FDI penetration ratio in service sector k 
in year t which is weighted by kit  the intensity of usage of services from sector k by 
plant i in year t. The sum is computed over the four aforementioned service sectors. 
More details on the construction of the service FDI linkage measure are provided in the 
Appendix. 
Our service FDI linkage measure is inspired by the measures used by Javorcik 
(2004), Blalock and Gertler (2008), and Arnold et al. (2007a), but differs from those by 
relying on a plant-level time-varying intensity of service usage instead of service usage 
                                                          
15 Our approach is similar to that followed to construct R&D stocks (Coe and Helpman, 1995). 
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measures based on input-output coefficients. A first shortcoming of measures based on 
input-output tables is that they provide information on average industry usage which 
does not identify the heavy users of services within the industry. Panel A of Figure  
shows a large degree of heterogeneity in the average intensity of service usage across 2-
digit industries in Chile. Unreported variance decomposition results suggest, however, 
that almost all of the variation in the average intensity of service usage is due to 
variation across plants within industries rather than across industries. A second 
shortcoming of measures based on input-output tables is that they provide information 
for a single year which is particularly restrictive for service usage during our sample 
period when the linkages between services and manufacturing resulting from processes 
of outsourcing or splintering increased dramatically (Francois and Woerz, 2007). 
Panel B of Figure  confirms this trend for Chile by showing that the average intensity of 
service usage - especially business services - increased substantially over the sample 
period. 
5.3 Econometric Issues and Final Specification 
First, to address the potential endogeneity between input choices - particularly the 
choice of service inputs - and plant unobserved productivity, we estimate our production 
function (Equation (1)) following the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology 
(henceforth LP). The estimation is performed separately for each 2-digit industry to 
allow for differences in production technology across industries. Based on the consistent 
LP estimates, we obtain plant-level time-varying logarithmic TFP measures as residuals 
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from Equation (1) and the corresponding first differences are our dependent variable in 
Equation (2).
16
 
Second, it is possible that plant unobservables such as managerial ability may 
affect both plant TFP growth and the service FDI linkage measure through an impact on 
the intensity of service usage component of that measure. To address this possibility, we 
allow the residual it  in Equation (2) to include a plant-specific component if  such that 
itiit uf  , where itu  is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) disturbance. 
Hence, our final specification is estimated by plant fixed effects.  
Third, two issues could raise the possibility of endogeneity of the FDI penetration 
component of the service FDI linkage measure with respect to TFP growth. One issue is 
that manufacturing industries experiencing fast TFP growth may lobby the government 
for services liberalization. However, since Chile‟s FDI regime was liberal since the 
1980s, lobbying by manufacturing industries for services liberalization would have 
occurred well before our sample period and is thus unlikely to be a source of bias for our 
coefficient of interest.
17
 Another issue is that the TFP growth of manufacturing plants in 
Chile in the 1990s may have been a driving force for service MNCs to invest in Chile in 
expectation of strong demand for services. While ECLAC (2004) argues that foreign 
investors were attracted by the sound performance of recently privatized services firms 
in Chile, there is no clear evidence that the performance of the manufacturing users of 
those services was a driving force for FDI. Nevertheless, strong TFP growth in some 
manufacturing industries in Chile may have provided an additional incentive for MNCs 
to invest in the country‟s service sectors. Our final empirical specification includes the 
                                                          
16 For brevity we do not report the LP estimates but they are available in Fernandes and Paunov (2008). They are 
generally significant and have magnitudes in line with those in previous studies. 
17 In fact, one may even question whether such lobbying played any role given that the privatization of service firms 
starting in the late 1980s was partly motivated by the need to solve a public deficit problem (Bitran and Saez, 1994). 
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service FDI linkage lagged two periods, instead of being lagged one period as in 
Equation (2). The question that arises is whether the two-period lagged service FDI 
linkage is exogenous to current plant TFP growth. This would not be the case if plant 
TFP growth was serially correlated over time. While plant productivity levels tend to 
exhibit strong serial correlation in micro datasets, this is not expected for plant 
productivity growth. Indeed, our tests for first-order autocorrelation in plant TFP growth 
based on the Baltagi-Wu locally best invariant (LBI) test show no evidence of serial 
correlation. We therefore argue that the use of a service FDI linkage measure based on 
FDI stocks and lagged two periods is a reasonable way to mitigate potential reverse 
causality problems.  
 Fourth, time-varying plant- or industry-level observable factors could be correlated 
with the service FDI linkage and with plant TFP growth and their omission could bias 
our coefficient of interest. The service FDI linkage in Equation (2) could be proxying for 
the effects of FDI in manufacturing or mining. To address this possibility, we include in 
our final specification FDI linkage measures for manufacturing and mining whose 
construction is described in the Appendix. The coefficient on the service FDI linkage 
could also pick up differences in service usage by foreign-owned, exporting, or larger 
plants, which in turn may exhibit different TFP growth than other manufacturing plants. 
Hence, we include in the vector 1itZ  dummies to control for foreign ownership, 
exporter status, and plant size.
18
   
Finally, certain manufacturing industries may experience faster technological 
progress or changes in their market structure relative to other industries, with potential 
                                                          
18 Three size categories are considered: small plants (1-50 employees), medium plants (50-200 employees), and large 
plants (200 or more employees). But the results are robust to the use of alternative size categories. 
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consequences for plant TFP growth. Chilean regions may also exhibit differential 
growth rates over time due to the evolving nature and importance of agglomeration 
economies. To account for these possibilities, we add 2-digit industry-year interaction 
effects and region-year interaction effects to Equation (2).  
The considerations above lead to our final empirical specification: 
itiregind
itzjtrfdijtifdiitsfdiit
ufyearregyearind
ZFDIresFDIndlFDIslAd

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, (3) 
where 2itFDIsl  is the two-period lag of the service FDI linkage, 2jtFDIl  and 
2jtFDIres  are the two-period lag of the manufacturing and the mining FDI linkages, 
ind*year and reg* year are 2-digit industry-year and region-year interaction fixed 
effects, respectively, and itu  is an i.i.d. residual.
19
 The vector 1itZ  includes dummies 
for foreign ownership, export status, and size. 
6. Results 
6.1 Main Results 
Our main results are shown in Table 1. Column 1 presents the results from a plant 
fixed-effects specification that follows previous studies in weighing service FDI 
penetration by 4-digit industry-level service usage measures which are based on 
industry-level expenditures in services relative to sales, as detailed in the Appendix. We 
find positive but insignificant effects of that measure of weighted service FDI 
penetration on plant TFP growth. In Column 2, we estimate a variant of Equation (3) 
including only the one-period lag of the service FDI linkage measure. We find a strong 
                                                          
19 The mining and manufacturing linkage measures are indexed by the industry subscript j instead of i since they are 
constructed based on coefficients from the 1996 Chilean input-output table, as described in the Appendix. 
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positive effect of FDI in services on plant TFP growth. Since the specification in 
Column 2 does not take into account potential endogeneity, the effect of FDI in services 
on TFP growth is likely to be over-estimated. Indeed, the use of the two-period lag of 
the service FDI linkage measure in Column 3 reduces substantially the magnitude of the 
effect. However, the estimated coefficient on the service FDI linkage is still positive and 
significant at the 1% confidence level. In Column 4 we add the manufacturing and 
mining FDI linkage measures and find the coefficient on the service FDI linkage to be 
unaffected. Finally, Column 5 estimates the complete empirical specification in 
Equation (3) which controls for plant-level observables, industry-year and region-year 
interaction effects and is our preferred specification. The standard errors in Table 1 and 
all subsequent tables are robust and clustered at the plant-level to allow for possible 
correlation across observations belonging to the same plant.
20
 The plant fixed effects are 
found to be jointly significant in all our specifications. Our choice of plant fixed effects 
estimation is driven by the results from Hausman tests which reject random effects in 
favor of fixed effects for our specifications.  
Our findings indicate that increased FDI in services in Chile during the 1992-2004 
period led to a significant increase in TFP growth for the plants that use services more 
intensively. Our preferred coefficient in Column 5 (0.149) implies that the average 
increase in the service FDI linkage over the sample period (0.073) added 1.1 percentage 
points to annual plant TFP growth in Chile, all else constant. To quantify further the 
economic impact of FDI in services, note that, based on our estimates, TFP growth 
                                                          
20 The use of non-clustered robust standard errors or other levels of clustering - at the year level, at the 3-digit industry 
level and at the 3-digit industry-year level - does not affect the significance of our results. 
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increased by about 29% between 1992 and 2004 in the Chilean manufacturing sector.
21
 
Thus, our preferred coefficient implies that the forward linkages from FDI in services 
explain almost 4% of the observed increase in Chile‟s manufacturing users‟ TFP growth. 
This economic impact is quite meaningful in light of the finding by Haskel et al. (2007) 
that spillovers from manufacturing FDI explain 5% of manufacturing TFP growth in the 
U.K. between 1973 and 1992. Moreover, in Chile, a large fraction of inflows of FDI into 
service sectors consisted in the acquisition of incumbent service providers, some of 
which were privately-owned since the late 1980s, thus our impact is likely to 
underestimate the potential impacts in countries where FDI inflows are directed at the 
privatization of service providers or at the creation of new service providers. 
One may argue that the estimated effect of the service FDI linkage measure on 
Chilean manufacturing plants‟ TFP growth captures not only the benefits from the 
openness of service markets to FDI but also those from contemporaneous regulatory 
reforms affecting those sectors. To address this concern we exploit regional differences 
in FDI. Specifically, we construct a regional service FDI linkage measure following the 
same approach as in Section 5.2 based on regional FDI inflows data and output data and 
making use of each plant‟s location, as described in the Appendix. Column 6 of Table 1 
shows the results from including this regional service FDI linkage measure in Equation 
(3). Since regulatory reforms are applied uniformly across Chile while FDI in services is 
unevenly distributed across regions, the positive and significant coefficient on the 
regional service FDI linkage measure in Column 6 demonstrates that our main effects 
capture to a large extent the impact of FDI. 
                                                          
21 To obtain TFP growth for the manufacturing sector over the sample period we proceed in two steps. First we 
compute for each year a weighted average TFP growth which weighs each plant‟s TFP growth by the plant‟s share in 
total sales of the manufacturing sector in that year. Second, we sum this weighted average TFP growth from 1994 to 
2004 to obtain a measure of manufacturing sector TFP growth over the estimating sample period.  
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6.2 Robustness Checks 
While we believe that our service FDI linkage measure captures the importance of 
FDI in services in Chile, we verify whether our results are robust to modifications in that 
measure‟s definition. We modify the two components of our linkage measure: the 
service FDI penetration (either the numerator or the denominator) and the plant-level 
weights. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 report the results from computing the numerator of 
the service FDI penetration - FDI stocks - using depreciation rates of 0% and 10%, 
respectively, which differ from the rate used in our main measure. Columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 2 report the results from modifying the denominator of the service FDI penetration 
- time-varying sectoral GDP - to be either replaced by the time-varying economy-wide 
GDP (column 3) or dropped (column 4).
22
 Each of these alternative service FDI 
penetration measures is interacted with the same plant-level weights as in our main 
measure. Across all specifications, we find the coefficient on the service FDI linkage to 
be positive and significant. The last two columns of Table 2 report the results from using 
service FDI linkage measures based on alternative measures of the intensity of service 
usage by plants. In Column 5 we subtract from the plant-level weights the time-varying 
median service usage in the plant‟s 3-digit industry. In Column 6, we define plant-level 
service usage relative to total revenues instead of total sales. The coefficient on the 
service FDI linkage remains in both cases positive and significant. 
As an additional check on the validity of our working hypothesis - that relatively 
heavy users of services should benefit disproportionately more from service FDI 
increases - we generate 1000 groups of random plant-level time-varying services 
intensity weights, recompute our service FDI linkage measure using those random 
                                                          
22 In column 4 the service FDI penetration measure is therefore simply the log of the service FDI stock. 
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weights, and estimate Equation (3) 1000 times, following the simulation exercise in 
Keller (1998).
23
 The average coefficient on the recomputed service FDI linkage is 
negative and insignificant suggesting that that the intensity of service usage by plants 
does matter for the estimated impact of the service FDI linkage measure on the TFP 
growth of Chilean plants. 
Table 3 shows the results from additional robustness tests. First, given the inherent 
difficulty and controversy associated with the estimation of production functions (Bond 
and Söderbom, 2005) and to ensure that our strong positive effects of FDI in services are 
not due to the use of a particular TFP growth measure, we consider four alternative 
measures. In Column 1, we estimate a specification which differs from Equation (3) in 
that plant output growth is the dependent variable and growth in each of the six inputs 
(shown in Equation (1)) are additional independent variables. We allow the coefficients 
on growth in each of the six inputs to differ across 2-digit industries. The estimated 
effect of the service FDI linkage on plant productivity growth (i.e., output growth 
controlling for input growth) is still positive and significant and close in magnitude to 
that in column 5 of Table 1. In Column 2, we estimate a production function separately 
for each 2-digit industry following the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology and use the 
first difference in the corresponding residual plant TFP as dependent variable in 
Equation (3). The results show a positive and significant effect of the service FDI 
linkage on plant TFP growth which is smaller than that estimated in Column 5 of Table 
1.  
It is important to discuss that recently important shortcomings in the 
methodologies of the popular semi-parametric production function estimation techniques 
                                                          
23 We follow Keller (1998) in drawing the random plant-level time-varying services intensity weights from a uniform 
distribution with support [0,1] using the pseudo random number generator of the GAUSS software. 
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proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and specifically the one proposed by Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) have been unveiled that seriously put their use in question. Ackerberg et 
al. (2006) propose on the grounds of those shortcomings an alternative estimation 
method we will use here to see whether our results may have been driven by the 
estimation problems of the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Olley and Pakes (1996). 
Before outlining results we will explain the main principles of each and the 
methodological problems and solution proposed by Ackerberg et al. (2006) to obtain 
valid production function estimates:
24
 The major concern the semi-parametric estimation 
techniques proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
address is potential endogeneity. To explain their proposed solution, let us specify the 
following Cobb-Douglas production function:  
itititlitkit lky           (4) 
where y is log of output, k is log of capital input and l is log of labor input of firm i at 
time t. The problematic element of this equation is ω as it represents shocks that are 
observable to the firm but unobservable to the econometrician and will, if they impact 
firm input decisions, lead to biased estimates of βk and βl if estimated using OLS.  
Olley and Pakes (2003) specify a model of firms that maximize the present 
discounted value of profits. Shocks ωit are assumed to evolve exogenously following a 
first-order markov process, i.e.  )|()|( 11 itititit pIp    where Iit is firm i‟s 
informations et at t. They further assume that labor decisions taken at t do not impact 
future profits of the firm while the capital stock, determined by past investment 
decisions (i.e. ),( 11  ititit ikk  ), is a dynamic input. According to this formulation the 
                                                          
24
 The description of major methodological problems follows the excellent explanation provided by 
Ackerberg et al. (2006). More detail is provided in their paper.  
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capital stock at t is, therefore, an outcome of decisions taken at t-1. The allows 
addressing the endogeneity problem with respect to capital using the fact that kit is 
uncorrelated with ωit between t-1 and t.  
The same logic cannot be applied to identify βl as the decision on labour inputs is 
taken at t and thus potentially correlated with ωit. If firm‟s optimal investment level is a 
strictly increasing function of current shock ωit, i.e. ),( itittit kfi  , then given strict 
monotonicity of the investment function in ωit we can obtain the following: 
),(1 itittit kif
          (5) 
The idea is to use this function to control for unobserved ωit to obtain unbiased estimates 
of βl.  The production function obtain by substituting ωit then becomes:  
ititittitlitkit kiflky  
 ),(1        (6) 
 ititittitl kil   ),(  
This is the first estimation stage for Olley and Pakes (1996) that obtains an estimate of 
coefficient βl. and an estimate of ),( ititt ki . The inverted function 
1
tf is treated non-
parametrically to avoid complicated dynamic programming problems. This, however, 
has the downside that βk cannot be obtained as kit is collinear with the non-parametric 
function. The estimate of coefficient βk is obtained in the second stage using the 
exogtenous variation of kit conditional on wit-1 as mentioned above. More detail is 
provided in Caves and Olley and Pakes (1996).  
The method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) is very similar with the 
main difference that they use an intermediate input demand function to “invert” out ωit. 
The main motivation is that investment is in practice very lumpy and many firms will 
have zero investment in several time periods. Olley and Pakes (1996) could then only be 
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applied if zero investment cases are discarded which could lead to sample biases in 
production function estimates. Their baseline production function is specified as:  
itititmitlitkit mlky          (7) 
where mit is an intermediate input. The intermediate demand function takes on the same 
role investment holds (based on the same assumptions as) in Olley and Pakes obtaining 
),(1 itittit kmf
 . The term will then included in the first stage obtain estimates of βl. 
The second stage is roughly similar to Olley and Pakes (1996) with the additional 
complication that an additional coefficient has to be estimated. More detail on the 
method is provided in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).  
 The crucial problem Ackerberg et al. (2006) identify for both methodologies as 
originally specified is the first stage estimate of coefficient βl. A consistent estimate of  
βl would require the labour input decision to vary independently of ),(
1
ititt kmf
 or 
),(1 ititt kif
 depending on which of the two methods is used. Focusing for the purposes of 
exposition on the former case, since both input and labour decisions are taken 
simultaneously and similarly do not affect future profits directly they are likely 
determined in very similar ways, i.e. as ),( itittit kfm  we likely have ),( itittit kgl  . 
It follows that ),()),,(( 1 itittitititttit kmhkkmfgl 
 . This means that there is a serious 
collinearity problem in the first stage making it impossible to obtain an estimate of both 
βl and of a non-parametric function as both are function of the same variables ),( itit k . 
This casts serious doubt on both methods at least the way they were originally 
proposed.
25
 The approach by Ackerberg et al. (2006) proposes is similar to the methods 
proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) in that it uses 
                                                          
25 Ackerberg et al. (2006) discuss alternative specifications for both Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) methods that would solve the collinearity problems of the original specifications.  
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investment/intermediate inputs as “proxies” for investment shocks. The main difference 
is that the first stage is not used to obtain estimates of the labour coefficient. Further 
detail on how the second stage is used to obtain those coefficients can be found in 
Ackerberg et al. (2006).  
In Column 3, we estimate a production function separately for each 2-digit 
industry following Ackerberg et al. (2006) methodology which addresses potential 
collinearity problems from which the LP methodology may suffer.
26
 Using as dependent 
variable in Equation (3) plant TFP growth based on the corresponding residual TFP 
levels we find again a positive and significant effect of the service FDI linkage. Column 
4 shows the results from using as dependent variable in Equation (3) a growth 
accounting index measure of plant TFP growth as advocated by Van Biesebroeck (2007) 
where the contribution of growth in each input to output growth is given by a two-period 
moving average of plant-level shares of each input in total sales, as described in the 
Appendix. This approach has the advantage of allowing the technology to change over 
time and within industries. The coefficient in Column 4 shows a positive and significant 
effect of the service FDI linkage of a larger magnitude than those in other columns and 
tables. Note that when we consider a translog functional form for our production 
function, the results show a positive and significant coefficient on the service FDI 
linkage of a similar magnitude as those discussed above.
27
  
Second, to address further the potential reverse causality between service FDI 
linkage and TFP growth estimate Equation (3) including the three-period lag of the 
service FDI linkage and show in Column 5 that it has a positive and significant effect on 
TFP growth. Third, despite being confident in the appropriateness of the data cleaning 
                                                          
26 The Olley and Pakes (1996) and Ackerberg et al. (2007) production function coefficients are available upon request.  
27 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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procedures applied to the Chilean data described in the Appendix, we impose a much 
more stringent criterion to guarantee that our results are not being driven by remaining 
potential outlier observations.
28
 In Column 6 we drop from the sample plants whose TFP 
growth is in the top or bottom percentile of the distribution and find that the estimated 
effects of the service FDI linkage are still positive and significant.  
Fifth, while the industry-year interaction effects included in our preferred 
specification account in a general way for industry-specific technological progress and 
competition, we replace those by an observable measure of the degree of competition, 
the normalized Herfindahl index of plant market shares at the 3-digit industry level in 
Column 7. The estimates show a positive and significant effect of the service FDI 
linkage on plant TFP growth. The effect of competition on TFP growth is found to be 
positive but insignificant.
29
 
Finally, one concern for the interpretation of our main results relates to the 
composition of the service FDI linkage measure. One could argue that the stronger usage 
of services by some plants is what is driving up their TFP growth (and thus producing 
our estimated positive effects in Tables 1 to 3), rather than the presence of FDI in those 
service sectors. We should recall that our plant TFP growth measures are obtained 
correcting for the simultaneity bias between service input choices and TFP, and our 
specifications are estimated by plant fixed effects to control for further problems of 
endogeneity between plant service usage and plant TFP growth. Anyway, to address this 
issue further we estimate a variant of Equation (3) and perform a simulation exercise. 
The variant separates the service FDI linkage into its four components listed in Section 
                                                          
28 Note that we obtained qualitatively similar results to those in Table 1 when estimating Equation (3) using plant 
fixed effects or robust regression for a sample where outliers (as described in the Appendix) were not excluded.  
29 The results are also robust to the use of the market share of the top 4 plants in each 3-digit industry as the measure 
of the degree of competition. 
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5.2. The unreported results show positive effects of FDI in transport and 
communications, in financial, insurance, and business services, and in electricity and 
water with the strongest effect being that of financial, insurance, and business services. 
This finding on the importance of FDI in knowledge-intensive business services 
suggests that knowledge spillovers may be the major channel through which FDI in 
services is leading to TFP growth increases in Chilean manufacturing plants. Our 
simulation exercise follows Keller (1998) and consists of generating 1000 random time-
varying FDI penetration ratios for the four services, recomputing our service FDI 
linkage measure using those random ratios, and estimating Equation (3) 1000 times.
30
 
The average coefficient on the recomputed service FDI linkage measure is positive 
though smaller than our estimate in Table 1 and it is insignificant suggesting that our 
estimated effect of FDI in services on the TFP growth of Chilean plants is not driven 
only by the stronger usage of services by some plants. 
7. Heterogeneity in the Effect of FDI in Services 
Our main findings concern the average impact of FDI in services on plant TFP 
growth across the Chilean manufacturing sector. However, the strength of that impact 
may differ across industries. First, we examine whether our results are driven by any 
particular industry. Table 4 shows the results from estimating Equation (3) excluding 
one 2-digit industry at a time. The estimates show that the positive effects of FDI in 
services on plant TFP growth are not driven by any industry, not even by food, the 
largest industry in Chile. However, they also show that the strength of the effects varies 
across industries.  
                                                          
30 We draw random time-varying FDI penetration ratios for each of the four service sectors from a uniform 
distribution whose support ranges from 0 to the maximum FDI penetration ratio observed in our sample using the 
pseudo random number generator of the GAUSS software. 
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Second, we focus on one particular dimension of heterogeneity across industries: 
the degree of product differentiation in the industry. One can argue that differentiated 
product industries are characterized by stronger product complexity (Berkowitz et al., 
2006).
31
 As such, it is likely that service needs are greater for differentiated product 
industries. Thus, the TFP growth of plants in industries producing differentiated 
products may benefit more from FDI in services. To test this hypothesis, we use the 
differentiated product definition proposed by Rauch (1999).
32
 We estimate our main 
specification allowing the effect of the service FDI linkage to vary across differentiated 
and non-differentiated product industries. The results in Column 1 of Table 5 suggest a 
stronger effect of FDI in services on the TFP growth of plants in differentiated product 
industries. However, the F-test shows that the difference in the effect of FDI in services 
across the two types of industries is not statistically significant. 
Next, we allow for plant heterogeneity in the impact of FDI in services on TFP 
growth. First, we examine whether domestic plants benefit more from FDI in services 
than foreign-owned plants which may rely on the parent MNC for some services and 
thus have less to gain from FDI-related improvements in the domestic service sector. 
Column 2 shows the results from estimating Equation (3) for a sub-sample that includes 
only domestic plants. The magnitude of the service FDI linkage coefficient is unchanged 
relative to Column 5 of Table 1, suggesting that domestic and foreign plants benefit 
equally from FDI in services.  
                                                          
31 The authors argue that differentiated products have many characteristics that are difficult to stipulate in a contract, 
thus trade in such products benefits more from good dispute resolution and enforcement institutions. 
32 Differentiated products are defined to be those that are neither (i) homogenous products traded in organized 
exchanges (e.g., steel) nor (ii) reference-priced products which have listed prices in trade publications (e.g., some 
chemical products) and require a more important degree of buyer-seller interaction. To apply Rauch‟s definition, we 
establish a correspondence between his classification of products based on 4-digit SITC rev. 2 codes and our 4-digit 
ISIC rev. 2 codes. For the printing industry (ISIC 342), we are unable to establish an unambiguous correspondence 
and thus drop the corresponding plants from the regression in Column 1 of Table 5. 
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Second, we ask whether the impact of FDI in services on TFP growth differs by 
plant size. On the one hand, larger plants may be able to internalize some services and 
have less to gain from FDI-related services improvements, relative to smaller plants 
which outsource most services due to scale indivisibilities. On the other hand, larger 
plants may be technologically more advanced and thus require stronger usage of highly 
specific and complex services. It is an empirical question whether smaller or larger 
plants benefit more from FDI in services. We estimate a variant of Equation (3) that 
allows the effect of the service FDI linkage measure to differ across small and large 
plants and show the results in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. In Column 3 we consider the 
plants with less than 25 employees as a median across their sample years to be small. In 
Column 4 we split the sample between plants with less than and more than 25 employees 
in their first sample year. The evidence is mixed depending on which criterion is used. 
Moreover, the corresponding F-tests show that the difference in the effects of FDI in 
services across smaller and larger plants is not statistically significant. Therefore, our 
findings in Tables 4 and 5 highlight the interesting fact that the positive effects of FDI in 
services in Chile are universal within the manufacturing sector across industries and 
types of plants. 
8. Conclusion 
This chapter examines the effects of FDI in services on the TFP growth of 
manufacturing plants in Chile between 1992 and 2004 by estimating a specification 
where plant TFP growth depends on a weighted service FDI penetration measure. The 
novelty of our approach is the reliance on measures of plant-level time-varying intensity 
of service usage as weights for service FDI penetration.
 
Our results provide evidence of 
a positive and significant effect of FDI in services on the TFP growth of manufacturing 
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plants that use services more intensively. Our findings are robust to alternative measures 
of TFP growth and to a variety of tests and are neither driven by any specific industry 
nor restricted to certain types of plants only.  
Notwithstanding, it is important to highlight several caveats to our findings the 
reader should be aware of. Importantly, while introducing a two-period lag to our 
variable of interest helps address some endogeneity concerns – specifically the concern 
that foreign investment will be the more intensive as firms have stronger productivity 
growth (as it is hard for foreign firms to know growth two years ahead) - there is still a 
remaining endogeneity problem due specifically to the fact that we employ information 
on firms‟ use of services.  If it is the case that firms with higher productivity growth tend 
to purchase more services, then it might be the case that our coefficient captures this 
reverse relationship rather than positive impacts of services. Moreover, a measure that 
arguably tells us more about the impact of foreign firms within a given industry is based 
on employment numbers in foreign companies to total employment rather than the stock 
of FDI to sectoral GDP ratio we use in this chapter. This type of information is, 
however, not available in the Chilean case. Finally, we do not have information on 
whether firms purchase services from foreign or local service providers. To the extent 
that we are interested in the overall impacts from foreign competition it is equally 
interesting to include local services uses. This is because one would not only expect 
foreign providers to contribute improved better quality products but also to lead to better 
services provisions by local firms. While we report evidence that such improvements 
took place, more quantitative information on the services sector would be helpful   
While governments spend large sums to attract FDI inflows in expectation of 
spillovers, the literature focusing the manufacturing sector has provided mixed evidence: 
  55 
relatively weak for horizontal spillovers and strong for vertical spillovers. Our study 
suggests that researchers may need to focus on the service sector to find strong positive 
spillover effects from FDI. Our findings also suggest that reducing the barriers that still 
protect FDI in services in many emerging and developing economies may help 
accelerate TFP growth in their manufacturing sectors. 
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Chapter 2: Figures and Tables 
Figure 1:  Stocks of FDI in Chilean Service Sectors 
 (in mi l l ion 2000 US$)
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Source: Author‟s calculations based on data from the Chile Foreign Investment Committee. 
Note: FDI stocks 
FDIS for each service sector k in year t are computed using the perpetual inventory 
method  
formula as
FDI
kt
FDI
kt
FDI
kt SNIS )1(  , where NI denotes net FDI inflows and δ is the 
depreciation rate.  
 
Figure 2:  Average Ratio of Sectoral FDI Stocks to Sectoral 
GDP 
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Source: Author‟s calculations based on data from the Chile‟s Foreign Investment Committee and the Central Bank. 
Note: The figures show the average ratio of sectoral FDI stocks to sectoral GDP in each of the two time periods. 
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Figure 3: Intensity of Plant-Level Service Usage  
Panel A. Averages across Industries   
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Panel B. Averages across Years  
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Source: Author‟s calculations based on ENIA survey data. 
Note: In Panel A, the figure shows the average ratio of service usage to sales computed across plants over the sample 
period in each of the 2-digit industries. In Panel B, the figure shows the average ratio of service usage to sales computed 
across plants in all industries in each of the three time periods.  
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Table 1: Effect of FDI in Services on Plant TFP Growth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Service FDI Linkage Industry 0.204
(0.280)
Service FDI Linkaget-1 0.567***
(0.078)
Service FDI Linkaget-2 0.142** 0.142** 0.149**
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Regional Service FDI Linkaget-2 0.105**
(0.042)
Plant Controls Yes No No No Yes Yes
Manufacturing and Mining FDI Linkages Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Plant Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region*Year Fixed Effects Yes No No No Yes Yes
2-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes No No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 38308 46439 38185 38185 38185 34803
R-Squared 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03
Dependent Variable: Plant TFP Growth (Levinsohn and Petrin (2003))
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the plant level in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Plant controls include exporter, FDI, and size dummies. The service FDI linkage 
measure in Column 1 is based on industry-level weights computed aggregating the plant-level data to the 4-digit industry 
level (as described in the Appendix) while that in Columns 2 to 5 is based on plant-level weights given by ratios of 
services expenditures to sales.  
 
Table 2: Robustness to Changes in the Definition of Service FDI Linkage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Service FDI Linkage - Deprec. Rate 0%t-2  0.142***
(0.054)
Service FDI Linkage - Deprec. Rate 10%t-2 0.154**
(0.067)
Service FDI Linkage - Den. GDPt-2 1.792***
(0.660)
Service FDI Linkage - No Den. Logt-2 0.006***
(0.002)
Service FDI Linkage - Wgt. Diff. to Ind. Mediant-2 0.150**
(0.060)
Service FDI Linkage - Wgt. Revenuest-2 0.151**
(0.073)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing and Mining FDI Linkages Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 38185 38185 38185 38185 38185 38185
R-Squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Dependent Variable: Plant TFP Growth (Levinsohn and Petrin (2003))
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the plant level in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% confidence levels, respectively. The various service FDI linkage measures are described in the text. Plant 
controls include exporter, FDI, and size dummies. 
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Table 3: Additional Robustness Results 
 
Plant Output 
Growth (Input 
Growth 
Controlled 
For)
Plant TFP 
Growth (Olley 
and Pakes 
(1996))
Plant TFP 
Growth 
(Ackerberg et 
al. (2007))
Plant TFP 
Growth Index 
Plant TFP 
Growth 
(Levinsohn 
and Petrin 
(2003))
Plant TFP 
Growth 
(Levinsohn 
and Petrin 
(2003))
Plant TFP 
Growth 
(Levinsohn 
and Petrin 
(2003))
  
3-Period Lag 
of FDI Linkage
Excluding 
Top/Bottom 
1% 
Including 
Control for 
Competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Service FDI Linkaget-2 0.153*** 0.105** 0.135** 0.196*** 0.069* 0.142**
(0.050) (0.053) (0.054) (0.063) (0.035) (0.060)
Service FDI Linkaget-3 0.137**
(0.060)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing and Mining FDI Linkages Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Number of Observations 38185 38185 34852 34852 31759 37467 38185
R-Squared 0.43 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02
Dependent Variable:
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the plant level in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Plant controls include exporter, FDI, and size dummies. The specification in 
Column 1 includes also growth in each of six inputs: skilled labor, unskilled labor, electricity, services, materials, and 
capital. The specification in Column 7 includes the normalized Herfindahl index instead of industry-year fixed effects. 
 
 
Table 4: Effect of FDI in Services on Plant TFP Growth Excluding Industries 
 
Excluding    
Food                
(ISIC 31)
Excluding 
Textiles 
Apparel              
(ISIC 32)
Excluding 
Wood 
Furniture 
(ISIC 33)
Excluding 
Paper 
Printing (ISIC 
34)
Excluding 
Chemicals 
(ISIC 35)
Excluding 
Nonmet. 
Minerals 
(ISIC 36)
Excluding 
Basic Metals 
(ISIC 37)
Excluding 
Machinery 
(ISIC 38)
Excluding 
Other 
Manuf.    
(ISIC 39)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Service FDI Linkaget-2 0.155* 0.144** 0.170** 0.178*** 0.104* 0.131** 0.147** 0.131** 0.148**
(0.079) (0.063) (0.069) (0.061) (0.060) (0.064) (0.061) (0.064) (0.061)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing and Mining FDI Linkages Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 25916 32017 34395 35730 33193 31575 37502 31575 37641
R-Squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
Dependent Variable: Plant TFP Growth (Levinsohn and Petrin (2003))
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the plant level in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Plant controls include exporter, FDI, and size dummies. In each column, the 
2-digit industry whose name is reported in the column heading is excluded from the estimating sample.  
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Table 5: Extensions  
 
 
Sample of 
Domestic-
Owned Plants
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Service FDI Linkage*Differ.t-2 0.207**
(0.087)
Service FDI Linkage*Non-Differ.t-2 0.110
(0.073)
Service FDI Linkaget-2 0.153**
(0.061)
Service FDI Linkage*Smallt-2 0.221** 0.156*
(0.088) (0.091)
Service FDI Linkage*Larget-2 0.096 0.145**
(0.069) (0.068)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturing and Mining FDI Linkages Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value for F-Test of Equality of 
Coefficients on Service FDI Linkage
0.32 0.20 0.91
Number of Observations 36476 35763 38185 38185
R-Squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Dependent Variable: Plant TFP Growth (Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003))
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the plant level in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Plant controls include exporter, FDI, and size dummies. In the specification 
shown in Column 1 the 3-digit industries classified as differentiated product industries are: Textiles (ISIC 321), Apparel 
(ISIC 322), Leather Products (ISIC 323), Footwear (ISIC 324), Wood Products (ISIC 331), Furniture (ISIC 332), Rubber 
Products (ISIC 355), Plastics (ISIC 356), Ceramics (ISIC 361), Glass (ISIC 362), Metal Products (ISIC 381), Non-
electrical Machinery (ISIC 383), Transport Equipment (ISIC 384), Professional Equipment (ISIC 384) and Other 
Manufacturing (ISIC 390). In the specification shown in Column 3 plants whose median employment over their lifetime 
in the sample is less than 25 employees are considered small while other plants are considered large. The specification in 
Column 4 uses the same threshold of 25 employees but classifies plants into small and large according to employment in 
their first year of presence in the sample. 
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Appendix 
A. Sample Details 
From 1992 to 2002, the ENIA survey gives each plant a unique identifier that 
allows us to link plants over time to generate a panel dataset. In 2003, the plant identifier 
changed. We established a correspondence between the old and the new plant identifier 
by merging two versions of the 2001 dataset (one including the pre-2003 identifier and 
one including the post-2003 identifier) according to more than 100 variables. We 
confirm the correspondence by merging two versions of the 2002 dataset (one including 
the pre-2003 identifier and one including the post-2003 identifier). Thus, we are able to 
create a panel of plants from 1992 to 2004. In cases where the correspondence between 
the old and the new plant identifier was ambiguous, we kept the plant with the old 
identifier and the plant with the new identifier in the sample as separate plants.  
The ENIA survey data is judged to be of high quality and has been widely used in 
research. Thus, only minor data cleaning procedures are applied. First, we exclude from 
the analysis plants with missing identifiers, missing output or input variables, or missing 
industry affiliation. Second, we impute output and inputs to correct for non-reporting by 
a plant in a single year (occurring in fewer than 30 plant-year observations). Third, we 
exclude from the analysis plants whose output growth is larger than (smaller than) 400% 
and those whose output growth ranges between 100% and 300% (-300% and -100%) but 
is not accompanied by corresponding high (low) growth rates of inputs. The sample 
includes some plants with discontinuous data over the sample period. For those plants, 
we consider only the observations across consecutive years for which yearly growth 
rates can be computed. After applying these data cleaning procedures our final sample 
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consists of 57025 plant-year observations. The distribution of the sample across years 
and industries is shown in the working paper. 
B. Production Function Variables 
Output is measured by deflated sales. The output price deflator is based on 
information on indexes of total sales and indexes of physical production for each 3-digit 
industry from the Chilean Statistical Institute. Based on the equality total sales=physical 
production * price, one obtains growth in total sales=growth in output + growth in 
prices. Using this formula we compute an industry output price deflator using 2002 as 
the base year. For years 1992-2002, the price deflator is obtained for 3-digit ISIC Rev. 2 
industries while for 2003-2004 it is obtained for 3-digit ISIC Rev. 3 industries.  
Skilled and unskilled labor are measured by the number of workers in the following 
occupational categories: (a) skilled: owners, managers, administrative personnel, and 
specialized production workers, and (b) unskilled: workers directly or indirectly 
involved in the production process, and home workers.  
Materials is measured by deflated materials expenditures. The materials price 
deflator is based on a weighted average of the aforementioned 3-digit output price 
deflators where the weights are given by the share that each 3-digit industry‟s output 
represents in total manufacturing intermediates used by all 3-digit industries based on an 
input-output table. For years 1992-2002 [2003-2004], the weights are based on the 1986 
[1996] Chilean input-output table. 
Electricity is the quantity of electricity bought plus the quantity of electricity 
generated minus the quantity of electricity sold in thousands of kilowatts.  
Services is measured by the deflated sum of expenditures on advertising, banking 
commissions and interest payments, communications, insurance, legal, technical, and 
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accounting services, licenses and foreign technical assistance, rental payments, transport, 
other services, and water. The services price deflator is based on GDP deflators for 4 
groups of services from the Chilean Central Bank: (i) electricity and water, (ii) transport 
and communications, (iii) financial services, insurance and business services, and (iv) 
real estate. We calculate a weighted average of these GDP deflators where the weights 
are given by the share that each of these 4 groups of services represents in total 
intermediate expenditures (manufacturing plus services) for each 3-digit industry based 
on the 1996 Chilean input-output table.  
Capital is computed using the perpetual inventory method (PIM). The ENIA survey 
provides information on four types of capital: buildings, machinery and equipment, 
transport equipment, and land. For each type of capital we compute net investment flows 
as the sum of purchases of new capital, purchases of used capital and improvements to 
capital minus the sales of capital and deflate these by an investment price deflator 
constructed as the ratio of current gross capital formation to constant gross capital 
formation (in local currency units) from the World Development Indicators with base 
year 2002. For each type of capital, the PIM formula Kit+1 = (1 – δ) Kit + Iit is applied, 
where Iit are real net investment flows and δ is a depreciation rate. Since detailed studies 
of depreciation rates in Chile are unavailable, we use the following rates proposed by 
Pombo (1999) who studied the same type of capital goods in Colombia: 3% for 
buildings, 7% for machinery and equipment, and 11.9% for transport equipment. Land is 
assumed not to depreciate. We also experimented with alternative rates of depreciation 
but did not find this to make a substantial difference to the final capital stock values nor 
to our main results. The initial value of the capital stock needed to apply the PIM 
formula is given by the book value of each of the four types of capital in the first year of 
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plant presence in the sample. Whenever the book value is available only in a latter year, 
we back out that value until the plant‟s first year in the sample taking into account the 
investment price deflator and the corresponding depreciation rate.  
Summary statistics for the production variables are shown in Appendix Table A.1 for 
the final sample and for the estimating sample which includes a smaller number of 
observations given that we use growth rates and two-period lags. 
C. FDI Linkage Measures 
The main service FDI linkage measure and the regional service FDI measure are 
obtained based on the following five steps. Where needed we describe (in italics) the 
differences in obtaining the regional service FDI linkage measure. 
1) For each service sector k net FDI inflows NI are given by FDIkt
FDI
ktkt OINI  , where I 
are sectoral inflows and O are outflows for each year t between 1974 to 2004, obtained 
from the Chilean Foreign Investment Committee.  
1 regional) FDI outflows are not available at the regional level for each service sector 
thus the net FDI inflows are simply FDI inflows. Regional FDI inflows are available 
only from 1989 to 2004 thus this period is what is used for our calculations. 
2) Using the PIM formula, we compute an FDI stock FDIS  for each service sector k in 
year t as FDIkt
FDI
kt
FDI
kt SNIS )1(  , where δ is the depreciation rate assumed to be 
equal to 5.65%, which is the average of the depreciation rates for the capital goods 
machinery, buildings, vehicles, and land used in the construction of the capital stock for 
Chilean manufacturing plants. The initial value of the FDI stock needed to apply the 
PIM formula is given by the net FDI inflows in 1974 for each service sector k. Using 
these inflows as initial value is reasonable given that FDI inflows into service sectors 
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prior to 1974 were minor. While FDI stocks are calculated for the 1974-2004 period, 
only the values for the 1992-2004 period are used in Steps 3 and 5. 
2 regional) The initial value of the regional FDI stock needed to apply the PIM formula 
is given by the regional FDI inflows in 1989 for each service sector k. While regional 
FDI stocks are calculated for the 1989-2004 period, only the values for the 1992-2004 
period are used in Steps 3 and 5. 
3) For each service sector k, we calculate a measure of FDI penetration (or regional FDI 
penetration) in year t as kt
FDI
ktkt GDPSFDI / , where GDP is total sectoral output (or 
regional sectoral output)_obtained from the Chilean Central Bank.  
4) For plant i the intensity of service usage in year t is given by it
k
it
k
it salesspending /  
i.e., plant expenditures on services from sector k as a ratio to sales.  
5) We use FDI penetration from Step 3 and plant intensity of service usage from Step 4 
to construct the weighted sum which gives the main service FDI linkage measure 
as: 


K
k
kt
k
itit FDIFDIsl
1
* , where the K=4 services are (1) electricity and water, (2) 
transport and communications, (3) financial, insurance, and business services, and (4) 
real estate. 
5 regional) To construct the weighted sum which gives the regional service FDI linkage 
measure, regional FDI penetration from Step 3 is allocated to each plant according to 
the plant’s location. This weighted sum is computed over 3 service sectors (rather than 
4) since FDI in real estate is included in the financial, insurance and business services 
category.  
 The service FDI linkage measure used in Column 1 of Table 1 is based on 4-digit 
industry weights obtained as follows. For each 4-digit industry m and year t, we compute 
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total expenditures in each service sector k and total sales by summing across all Chilean 
plants in that year. We obtain industry m‟s intensity of usage of services k in year t as the 
ratio of total expenditures in service sector k by the industry to total sales of the industry. 
Then we take the average across all years of those ratios to obtain km  which is 4-digit 
industry m‟s intensity of usage of services k. We use the FDI penetration from Step 3 
above and km  to construct the weighted sum which gives the service FDI linkage 
measure used in Column 1 of Table 1 as: 
k
ktkmmt FDIpebFDIsl *_  .  
The manufacturing and mining FDI linkage measures included in our preferred 
specification based on input-output weights are computed as follows. First, we compute 
FDI penetration ratios for manufacturing and mining sectors as described in Steps 1 to 3 
above for service sectors. Second, for example for manufacturing, we calculate the share 
that each 4-digit manufacturing industry j represents in total intermediate inputs (mining 
plus manufacturing plus services) jm  used by a 4-digit manufacturing industry m based 
on the 1996 Chilean input-output table. We interact each manufacturing industry‟s share 
with the corresponding manufacturing FDI penetration to obtain the FDI linkage 
variable as: 
j
jtjmmt FDIpeFDIl * . The mining FDI linkage measure is obtained 
analogously.  
D. Index Number TFP Growth Measure 
In Column 4 of Table 3 we use a plant TFP growth measure obtained following a 
growth accounting index number approach: 

 
6
1
1 ln*)
2
(lnln
m
m
it
m
t
m
t
itit Xd
ss
YdAd , 
where itYd ln  is output growth, 
m
itXd ln  is growth in input m (which can be skilled 
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labor, unskilled labor, electricity, services, materials, or capital), and mits  is the share of 
expenditures in input m in total revenues of plant i in year t. This index number approach 
assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale, thus for each plant the 
average share of capital is equal to 1 minus the average shares of the other 5 inputs. 
Also, note that we exclude from the calculation of these average shares plants whose 
input shares exceed 1. We experimented with using median input shares based on all 
plants instead of average shares and obtained similar results. 
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Chapter 3: Improved TFP Estimates and Their Responsiveness to 
Assessing the Effects of Trade Competition  
 
Abstract 
Many studies find a positive effect of import competition on firm total factor 
productivity (TFP) estimates. In this chapter we contribute to the literature in two ways. 
First, we make use of our dataset on Chilean firms and their products to compute 
improved TFP estimates and analyze whether these provide the same answer. Second, 
we use transport costs as a measure of import competition which we argue avoids the 
problems of endogeneity. Our results suggest that import competition has a positive 
effect across all TFP measures. Better performing firms tend to benefit more. Import 
competition from China has a negative effect due to temporary efficiency losses as firms 
adjust production to face competition.  
 
 
Keywords: total factor productivity, import competition, transport costs, plant-level 
data, Chile  
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1. Introduction 
Several studies find a positive impact of import competition on traditional total 
factor productivity (TFP) measures (Pavcnik, 2002, Fernandes, 2007, De Loecker, 2007 
among many others).
33
 By contrast, in political discourse specifically import competition 
from China is perceived as a potential threat to producers in other emerging economies. 
Moreover, it is well established that firms within any economy are very diverse in terms 
of their performance (Foster et al., 1998); therefore, positive impacts on average may 
actually mask negative effects for small and more vulnerable firms. Such differential 
impacts are important to take into account for the design of policies aimed at supporting 
businesses in emerging economies. Therefore, the first objective of this chapter is 
precisely to assess the heterogeneous impacts of import competition, including that from 
China, on firm TFP.   
The fact that our variable of interest is TFP adds an important challenge to the 
analysis. With the only exception of the basic definition of productivity – output per unit 
input – there is some confusion as to what TFP ideally measures and, more importantly, 
the lack of detailed data on firms and the products they produce introduces a series of 
biases in empirical analysis. Doubtless, the attempt to fully capture the complexities of a 
firm‟s production with existing data so as to recover actual TFP is impossible to achieve. 
However, the availability of data on firm products as well as firm output prices and 
output quantities allows obtaining somewhat improved TFP measures as specified 
below. It is important to see how traditional TFP estimates perform if compared to 
improved measures because it helps evaluate findings of the large literature that relies on 
those traditional TFP estimates. The second objective of our analysis is, therefore, to 
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 Tybout (2000) provides a review of the literature.  
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compare results using both those and improved TFP estimates when applied to the 
specific question outlined above: the impact of import competition distinguishing 
specifically the effects of Chinese competition and differences in outcomes depending 
on firms‟ distances to the productivity frontier. 
In this study we focus on two very specific shortcomings of traditional TFP 
measures:  the fact that  (1) they cannot avoid problems of mismeasurement that arise 
whenever firms change their production processes as new products are adopted or 
existing ones are dropped and (2) these measures are obtained using industry-level 
output deflators. We do not address the estimation technique based on which TFP 
estimates are derived but follow the methodology proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) due to its large popularity in empirical research (e.g. Alvarez, 2007, Javorcik and 
Spatareanu, 2008, Girma et al., 2007).
34
 Using a rich dataset of Chilean manufacturing 
firms and their products for the period 1996 – 2003 we compute TFP measures 
controlling for both shortcomings specified above. In our analysis we use industry-level 
information on transport costs from China and all other trade partners of Chile as an 
exogenous measure of import competition. The results suggest that while there is a 
difference in magnitudes, the general impact of import competition is positive and 
significant for all types of TFP measures. Also, the evidence shows that the effect of 
import competition from China on firm TFP is negative regardless of what measure of 
TFP is used. The latter effect is shown to be the result of temporary efficiency losses of 
firms as they adjust production following the adoption of new products to face import 
competition from China. In terms of heterogeneity, large and more productive firms tend 
                                                          
34
 One of the advantages of their methodology that explains some of its popularity is that it takes care of 
the endogeneity of inputs with respect to TFP.  
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to benefit more from import competition and suffer less from Chinese import 
competition.  
 TFP is in essence a measure of disembodied technical change and positive 
spillovers. A first step to obtain firm TFP measures consists in defining a production 
function that stipulates the relation between physical inputs and outputs both measured 
in quality-adjusted units. Since data on quality-adjusted output units is rarely available, 
researchers have used revenue-based output measures deflated by industry-level price 
indices to proxy for physical output. However, the use of industry-level prices and firm 
revenues only allows retrieving information on output if markets are perfectly 
competitive so that industry and firm prices are equal (Katayama et al., 2009).
35
 
Moreover, the recent analysis of firms and their products has highlighted other aspects 
of firm production that complicate the measurement of TFP (Bernard et al., 2005). We 
will focus on one central aspect only: the mismeasurement problem that arises for TFP 
estimates as firms change their production technologies when they drop or add 
products.
36
  We thus obtain in addition to traditional TFP estimates (S1) [TFP
S1
: pi = 
pindustry,year; for all firm-year observations] that correspond to what most of the literature 
on TFP has used as well as TFP estimates (S2) [TFP
S2
: pi = pindustry,year; for continued-
product firm-year observations] and (S3) [TFP
S3
: pi = pfirm,year; for continued-product 
firm-year observations].   
Analyzing the question of whether import competition affects firm TFP poses 
several challenges beyond concerns about the dependent variable itself. While import 
                                                          
35
 Otherwise, productivity measures contain mark-ups of price-setting firms. But firms with larger profits 
are not necessarily more productive (Foster et al., 2007). 
36
 Another complication is the fact that many firms produce more than one product and that, if considered 
as single-product firms, possible economies of scope and/or cost synergies are not taken into account (De 
Loecker, 2007). The concern seems, however, negligible at least in the case of our specific dataset as is 
discussed in section 2.  
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competition is expected to have a significant impact on TFP (e.g., Aghion et al., 2005, 
2006), it is equally possible that TFP affects import competition.
37
 In order to address 
reverse causality we rely on an effective trade barrier measure - transport costs - which 
captures differences in import competition across 4-digit ISIC industries that are 
exogenous to firm TFP. Another advantage of using trade cost measures is that these 
allow measuring import competition faced by Chilean producers from any country. We 
compute two separate import competition measures based on trade costs for Chinese 
exports to Chile and on trade costs for exporters from all other countries to distinguish 
overall effects from those specifically caused by Chinese import competition. In order to 
ensure that our estimates of the effect of import competition on firm-level TFP do not 
pick up the effects of foreign direct investment or internal competition we include these 
measures as well as variables that capture firm-specific characteristics as controls. 
Moreover, we ensure that our analysis does not erroneously compare the levels of TFP 
for firms in different industries by including 3-digit-ISIC industry-year fixed effects in 
addition to year fixed effects in our regressions. We use two methods of estimation for 
our main specification: ordinary least squares and quantile regressions. The latter serves 
to inform about the heterogeneous impacts of import competition on differently 
performing firms.   
We find a positive impact of import competition from all countries other than 
China on firm-level TFP in Chile; this confirms the findings of previous studies. If we 
compare results of measures S2 [TFP
S2
: pi = pindustry,year; for continued-product firm-year 
observations] and S3 [TFP
3
: pi = pfirm,year; for continued-product firm-year observations]  
with the measure S1 [TFP
S1
: pi = pindustry,year; for all firm-year observations] most of the 
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 One possibility for such reverse causality is that firms in industries with lower productivity may lobby 
policy-makers and obtain trade protection for their industries.  
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existing research relies on, our findings suggest that while their magnitudes differ the 
estimated impacts of import competition are qualitatively similar for all TFP measures. 
Our results also show that more efficient firms benefit more from import competition. 
The significant negative impact of Chinese import competition on TFP in Chile may be 
due to temporary efficiency losses as firms adjust their production either by improving 
existing products as discussed in Chapter 4 and after the adoption of new products as 
discussed in this chapter. There are, however, several possible caveats to our findings as 
will be discussed in the conclusion.    
This chapter relates most closely to three strands of the literature. Concerns about 
the measurement of TFP in the absence of firm output data and prices are raised by 
several studies including among others Griliches and Klette (1996), Jaumandreu and 
Mairesse (2005), and Katayama et al. (2009). The former two studies focus specifically 
on production function estimates themselves and propose alternative estimation 
techniques when data on output and prices are not available. A different approach is 
taken by a few other studies, including Eslava et al. (2004, 2005a, 2005b). They make 
use of firm-level price and output data to remove biases introduced by the use of firm 
output data and prices. These studies do not address mismeasurement problems that arise 
whenever firms add and/or drop products changing their production functions. Bernard 
et al. (2005) provide an interesting theoretical model to illustrate how product switching 
introduces undetermined biases which, ultimately, depends on underlying changes to 
production functions. Another source of bias arises for multi-product firms (De Loecker, 
2007). Furthermore, the chapter relates to the literature that has examined the impacts of 
import competition on TFP. A comprehensive overview of the literature is provided by 
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Tybout (2000).
38
 Our analysis is most similar to De Loecker (2007) who analyses 
impacts of import competition on TFP comparing alternative estimates. His analysis is, 
however, set in a very different context, the Belgian textile industry, and implements a 
methodology to deal with missing firm price information which is available for our 
analysis. Finally, regarding the heterogeneous impacts of competition on firms, our work 
is related to several papers including Schor (2004), Yasar and Morrison Paul (2007), 
Konings and Vandenbussche (2008), Lileeva and Trefler (2007) and Iacovone (2009) as 
well as Aghion et al. (2005, 2006). Similarly to Yasar and Morrison (2007) we use 
quantile regression analysis to study heterogeneous impacts. None of these papers 
analyze the question of the measurement of TFP and its possible impact on findings.  
Following the introduction this chapter proceeds as follows, in section 2 we 
review the basic notion of TFP, its traditional measurement and three main shortcomings 
of traditional TFP estimates. This is followed (in section 3) by a discussion of the 
empirical framework adopted covering data, TFP measures, trade costs and the 
regression framework itself. We next discuss results in section 4 and conclude (section 
5).  
2. Total Factor Productivity 
2.1 Definition  
The only aspect about TFP that is straightforward is its definition. It is simply 
“output per unit input” (Hulten, 2000) or, alternatively, the “ratio of a volume measure 
of output to a volume measure of input use” (OECD, 2001).39 TFP is interesting as a 
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 More recent studies include Pavcnik (2002) and Fernandes (2007) among many others. 
39
 Note that while this discussion will focus specifically on total factor productivity, much of it will be 
equally relevant for another popular measure of productivity, labour productivity. The difference between 
both concepts is that the latter only controls for labour inputs.  
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relative rather than an absolute measure either to measure performance relative to other 
firms or relative to the firm‟s past performance. Defining TFP requires defining the 
firm‟s production function, that is, specifying how inputs, X, are combined to generate 
output, Y:
40
  
)( itititit XFAY   
(1) 
where F specifies the production technology and A denotes TFP of firm i at time t. Since 
A cannot commonly be observed in the data
41
 it is obtained as a residual. Once a 
functional form is selected for F(.), a large variety of estimation techniques can be used 
to estimate Equation (1) and obtain the residual A. Discussing each of these techniques 
in detail is beyond the scope of this chapter. We will simply note that the main 
difference between the most common methods is how the term Fit(Xit), is obtained. Van 
Biesebroeck (2006, 2007) discusses the distinct approaches as they rely on different 
underlying assumptions.
42
  
2.2 Interpretation  
It is worth reflecting on what Ai will ideally measure since the empirical 
literature tends to be very concise on this topic and provide different explanations 
(Carlaw and Lipsey, 2004).
43
  We will review three common interpretations: (i) 
technological change, (ii) spillovers, and (iii) efficiency improvements. The first 
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 It should be mentioned that this representation introduces a limitation in that is suggests that firms 
produce a single output. We will discuss further below the issue of multiple outputs.  
41
 A possible way to measure directly a „quantity‟ related to TFP could be to have a measure of the 
number of defective units produced by a plant (see e.g. Sutton, 2004). This is, however, an unsatisfying 
measure since it does not capture all the technological change captured by productivity. 
42
 Van Biesebroeck (2006) shows that, in practice, when TFP growth and levels measures obtained using 
these diverse methods are applied to answer specific questions they generally tend to produce similar 
results. This does not, however, mean that any estimation technique is just as good to use. Methods matter 
significantly for any researcher interested in production function coefficient estimates themselves. 
Furthermore, as noted in a companion paper, each method may be appropriate for specific datasets 
depending on their characteristics (Van Biesebroeck, 2007).  
43
 The topic is discussed in the OECD Productivity Manual (2001) for aggregate TFP measures at the 
national or industry level. 
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explanation interprets an increase in Ait as equivalent to the adoption of a new production 
technique that allows producing a larger number of physical output with the same inputs 
this year compared to last year. It is important to bear in mind that Ait only captures 
disembodied technological change (OECD, 2001). It does not include improvements in 
production processes brought about by the purchase of new technologically more 
advanced machines. The reason for this is that TFP growth ideally measures output 
increases net of input increases. The type of technological change accounted for is free 
knowledge that allows achieving more output for given inputs.
44
 The empirical research 
supports this story partly as the relationship between innovation and TFP is found to 
exist; yet it explains only a little share of TFP growth (see OECD, 2001).
45
 This suggests 
that TFP should not be the only measure of interest for any exercise aiming to analyze 
technological change.
46
  
 Second, a related idea that comes to mind when thinking about Ait as capturing 
free disembodied knowledge is that of spillovers. Spillovers are externalities from 
economic activities on other actors that are not involved. In this context the idea is that 
the firm makes use of knowledge developed elsewhere at no charge. This is very close to 
the concept of disembodied knowledge but it does not include the possibility that the 
firm itself may find novel knowledge and in that way increase its own TFP. Yet most 
knowledge contributing to improve production techniques is likely to have cost an 
                                                          
44
 Note that while this is true in theory it is not necessarily the case empirically. Information on input 
quantities is frequently unavailable, so researchers use data on input expenditures deflated by input price 
deflators. If these do not take into account input quality improvements, then these will be included in TFP 
measures as long as price increases do not account for increased quality. This would include some 
embodied technological change but only under this specific condition (depending on market conditions in 
inputs markets that do not allow those offering better inputs to get full returns to their better inputs). This 
is discussed in further detail in Chapter 2.  
45
 However, this may to some extent also be due to shortcomings in measurement of TFP (as will be 
discussed below).   
46
 Note this does not in any way diminish the value of TFP measures since, if data are available, one can 
recover information on embodied technological change independently of the TFP measure since the 
researcher will know about firm purchases of higher quality inputs.  
  80 
investment from some other economic agent. Therefore, frequently free knowledge is 
likely to benefit the firm as some kind of positive externality from other producers.
47
  
 Third, another possible interpretation may be to suggest that TFP measures 
production efficiency improvements as firms do not use technologies and input 
resources optimally (Diewert and Lawrence, 1999). While TFP measures may, in 
practice, capture such efficiency effects, it is generally difficult to reconcile with theory 
since production functions supposedly outline output production possibilities given 
inputs and firms operate at their optimal production level.
48
 Among the many other 
aspects TFP estimates may capture are changes to scale economies, cyclical effects, 
adjustment costs, and measurement error.   
2.3 Measurement Problems: Product-Switchers 
Whatever method researchers ultimately choose to obtain TFP estimates, they 
initially take a potentially more important step specifying a specific production function 
for firms with specific measures of inputs and outputs. Total factor productivity is 
defined for a given production technology and output. Products datasets for 
manufacturing firms in different countries show that while some firms produce one and 
the same single product during their existence, a large proportion of firms produce more 
than one product and/or change products during their lifetime (Navarro, 2008, Bernard 
et al., 2006b, Goldberg et al., 2008). Most production inputs are not fully flexible and 
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 This interpretation is even more relevant in a developing country context and may apply well to 
discussions on productivity impacts of openness to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). This is the 
perspective adopted in Chapter 2 where we deal with the impacts of services FDI on TFP growth. The 
interpretation given to TFP growth is the idea of positive externalities accruing to domestic producers 
from improvements in the production of services by foreign producers. 
48 
DEA productivity analyses are a notable exception since they recognize the possibility for firms to 
produce within the technology frontier. This is one of the major advantages of these measures; however, 
technical complexity, demands on data, and the required underlying assumptions are a less attractive 
feature (Diewert and Lawrence,1999).  
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the discontinuation of a product or adoption of a new one will initially be misaligned 
with production inputs. The case of labour inputs is possibly the most obvious example; 
it will take time to dismiss employees that are no longer required or find additional 
employees that are more suitable. This means that specifically in periods when firms add 
and/or drop products their inputs very unlikely reflect actual inputs into production 
processes. These estimates are, therefore, likely to include large measurement errors as 
many firm resources do not adequately reflect production inputs used in the new 
production context.  Therefore, TFP measures during that specific period are not 
adequate for analysis.
49
 Note that this is not to say that possible adjustment costs will be 
excluded from our measure of TFP as firms learn to produce new and/or improved 
products.  The only problematic aspect here is the initial period of a major production 
change since it will not reflect production inputs correctly. If we measure TFP in that 
period it will not adequately inform on production efficiencies since some inputs while 
paid for by the firm would not even be used. Adjustment costs to new production 
processes captured will be those that arise during the period where firms “learn” optimal 
production techniques for new products.  
Another problematic issue is that in practice a large share of firms produces more 
than one product in every period. That creates further problems because producers are 
likely to have different production technologies for each product and an aggregate 
production function does not account for that adequately.  Bernard et al. (2005) argue 
                                                          
49
 Note that additional problems arise the aim is to have productivity growth estimates. If production 
technologies differ across narrowly defined products, then any TFP estimates will capture such differences 
across production techniques rather than actual improvements in TFP. It is the difference in production 
techniques used to manufacture different products that poses a problem here. If a firm were to decide on 
different products manufactured using the same technique, then it would still be valid to obtain TFP 
growth estimates as long as output is properly measured. That is, the output measure has to exclude any 
differences in demand-side aspects across previous and new products such as differences in firm market 
power affecting prices and, therefore, industry-level output prices.   
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that “(e)ven if firm-specific data on prices or information on physical quantities of 
output is available, measured firm TFP is biased because it captures both true TFP 
differences across firms as well as differences across products in production technique” 
(Bernard et al., 2005, p. 6). Moreover, if TFP is estimated for all products of multi-
product firms using an aggregate production function, this is problematic since it ignores 
economies of scope that plants may achieve by producing more than one output (de 
Locker, 2007). 
Several aspects suggest that in practice, if we account for firm prices, the multi-
product plant problem is somewhat attenuated. First, our dataset is not at the firm level 
but at the plant level, therefore, it describes all goods produced in a given physical 
location. While this might still include a variety of outputs it does exclude the possibility 
that we are including output of a conglomerate of plants. Second, and more importantly, 
the data shows that the production of multi-product firms is very much centered on their 
main products – which usually account for a large share in sales – and many of the 
additional products are from the same 4-digit ISIC industry. This suggests that other 
products are likely to be by-products of the same production process.  
2.4 Measurement Problems: Lack of Firm-Level Prices 
A firm‟s production function as specified in (1) relates physical units of output to 
physical units of inputs. Such information is, however, rarely available. For that reason, 
most of the literature has relied on TFP estimates that measure units of output and inputs 
using information about the value of outputs (through either value-added or sales) and 
the value of inputs (through expenditures on inputs) jointly with industry-level price 
deflators. (There is, however, a notable exception for inputs; labour inputs can generally 
be measured in units – i.e. counting the number of employees – and in our specific case 
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we also have a quantitative measure of electricity inputs.
50
)  Focusing on output 
measures, if industry prices pI are equal to firm prices pi, then firm physical output can 
be measured using information on firm sales (piYi) and on prices (pi) since the ratio of 
firm sales to prices is equal to output quantity Yi. However, this will only be obtained 
under the assumption of perfectly competitive markets where all firms are price-takers 
(and, therefore, prices are the same for all producers in the industry).
51
 Micro-level 
evidence has uncovered that there is a lot of price dispersion even within much 
disaggregated product categories (Abbott, 1988, Abbott, 1992, Dunne and Roberts, 
1992). This dispersion is, at least to some extent, due to differences in market power 
across firms (Abbott, 1992). Therefore, we know that firms most often operate in 
imperfectly competitive markets producing differentiated products and some firms – 
those with larger market power – charge higher prices than others (i.e., they are price-
setters).
52
 It is, therefore, impossible to recover output with this procedure without 
introducing biases in the output measure and, as a result, in the TFP measures.  
Firms with strong market power will charge prices that are higher than the 
industry average. If real output is obtained deflating sales revenues by the industry price 
index, then these firms will have a higher measured output than their true output. TFP 
estimates will therefore be higher for these producers relative to firms with less market 
power. Foster et al. (2007) provide empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis: 
firms with higher profits – those with some price-setting power – tend to be attributed 
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 Detail on inputs and outputs are provided in the data appendix.  
51
 As Martin (2005) points out, this is actually inconsistent with variation in TFP across firms - which is 
the main focus of our interest – since plants managing to produce output for same inputs should over time 
successfully impose themselves on the market and ensure that less efficient producers exit. 
52
 Note that a second reason why firms may charge higher prices is that they may produce better products 
compared to other firms. We will discuss that aspect below.  
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higher TFP measures than is the case when traditional revenue-based measures are used. 
This aspect is particularly relevant for TFP measures in levels.
53
  
2.5 Measurement Problems: Product Quality 
It is important to note that deflating revenue by firm-specific prices does not 
account for potential product quality improvements of firms‟ products over time. As 
discussed in Chapter 4 and in a large trade literature (e.g., Fontagné and Freudenberg, 
1997; Schott, 2008; Kiyota, 2008) product prices are an indicator of product quality: 
prices reflect partly the size of the firm mark-up and partly demand conditions. To 
account for quality, the ideal firm-level price measure would require having hedonic 
products measures (OECD, 2001).
54
 Otherwise all price increases are excluded – and 
this would introduce serious biases. The following illustrates the issue at hand: Consider 
the following Cobb-Douglas production function in logarithms and first-differences for 
plant i in industry j at time t: 

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For each plant, output is measured by nominal sales deflated by a firm-specific 
output price deflator. Improvements in the quality of output are not captured by firm-
specific output price deflators since we lack information on product characteristics. 
Following Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984), we can define a discrepancy jitd  between 
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 Similar issues may arise on the input side since with the exception of workers and some selected inputs 
(depending on the specific firm dataset used), information on the input quantities consumed is scarce and, 
therefore, expenditure in inputs deflated by industry prices are used. The possibility of deviations of 
industry prices from firm-specific prices in this case is to do with firms‟ potential possibilities to influence 
input markets. The topic is discussed in further detail by Katayama et al. (2009).  
54
 The method consists in defining firm‟s outputs over time as combinations of their characteristics so that, 
for instance, a new computer does not represent an entirely new product but rather a new combination of 
previous products‟ characteristics. Quality-adjusted price indices can be obtained by regressing product 
prices on a set of characteristics. But such procedures would require specific information on product 
characteristics that is generally unavailable. 
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the change in the available output price deflator, jitpyd ln , and the change in the true 
quality-adjusted output price deflator 
j
itpyd
*ln : jit
j
it
j
it dpydpyd 
*lnln .  If the 
change in nominal sales is correctly measured (
j
it
j
it NYdNYd
*lnln  ), then growth in 
output in (2) is calculated as jit
j
it
j
it pydNYdYd lnlnln  . However, growth in true 
output is given by 
j
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j
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j
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** . Making the simplifying assumption 
that inputs are correctly measured, (2) can be rewritten in true growth rates as:
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where 
j
itAd
*ln  is actual TFP growth. This implies that measured TFP growth jitAd ln  
based on (2) deviates from true TFP growth by the discrepancy in the change of the 
output deflator: jit
j
it
j
it dAdAd 
*lnln . As Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984) state, this 
equality is a definitional relationship between measured TFP growth and true TFP 
growth. This final shortcoming remains a problem for our improved TFP estimates since 
we do not have hedonic price indices. 
3. Empirical Framework 
3.1 Data 
The main dataset used in our analysis is the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Annual 
(ENIA), which is the annual manufacturing survey of Chilean plants with more than 10 
employees. The dataset is an unbalanced panel capturing plant entry and exit covering 
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 This is a strong assumption given the problems associated with the measurement of intermediates by 
deflated expenditures in the absence of data on physical quantities of intermediates, as discussed earlier.  
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the 1997-2003 period and including an average of 2894 plants per year
56
 classified into 
4-digit ISIC revision 2 industries.
57
 More details on how the dataset was obtained are 
given in Chapter 2. The ENIA survey collects plant-level information on sales, 
employment, raw materials, investments (buildings, machinery and equipment, 
transportation, and land) which are used to construct output and inputs for the 
production functions. We show how these are obtained below while information on the 
variables included is discussed in the data appendix.  
Table 6 shows descriptive statistics for our main regression variables as well as 
production function inputs. Furthermore, we make use of a companion dataset on the 
products of firms that provides information on overall sales by product and quantities as 
well as information on all the products produced by a firm. Most importantly for our 
purposes, that dataset provides us with information on (i) unit prices charged for firms‟ 
products, (ii) the number of products produced, and (iii) whether firms change the 
products they produce or not. More information on the dataset is provided in Chapter 4.  
3.2 Obtaining TFP Estimates 
The estimation of TFP is an increasingly complex topic of key importance with 
an important debate on the question of estimation procedures (Van Biesebroeck, 2007, 
Katayama et al., 2009)  It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss these questions 
in detail since our focus is on addressing the two shortcomings of measures identified 
above - the problem of product switching and the use of firm-specific price deflators – 
and compare TFP measures correcting for these shortcomings with standard TFP 
                                                          
56 The average number of plants in any year is computed based on our baseline regression sample S1.   
57
 The ENIA dataset has been widely used in research e.g., by Pavcnik (2002), Alvarez (2007), and 
Bergoeing and Repetto (2006). While the dataset provides information by plant according to Pavcnik 
(2002) more than 90% percent of Chilean firms during the 1979-1986 period were single-plant firms. Thus 
plant data corresponds to a large extent to firm data.  
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measures. In order to relate to the existing literature, we will use TFP estimates derived 
based on the popular method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
58
 Production 
technologies are obtained based on estimations assuming, generally, a common 
production technology for firms of the same more or less broadly defined industry (in 
our case we obtain these measures at the 2-digit ISIC industry level). A major 
contribution of these methods is to address the endogeneity problem of simple OLS 
production function estimates.
59
 
First, in order to address the problem posed by product-switching and multi-
product firms, our approach is to select a sub-sample including only firm-year 
observations when firms neither add nor drop products. We could be even more rigorous 
and exclude all multi-product firms. However, this would create another problem as it 
would significantly reduce the sample size and, therefore, increase potential biases. 
Considering the factors that attenuate possible problems (as discussed in section 2) due 
to the inclusion of multi-product plants we, therefore, decide not to drop them for any 
estimates.  
Second, the problem of industry-price deflators to obtain output can be addressed 
using firm-price deflators following Eslava et al. (2004, 2005a, 2005b).
60
 This approach 
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 Another popular method is the index number approach, applied and discussed in more detail in 
Appendix A of Chapter 5, has the advantage of obtaining productivity measures that do not require 
estimation, it allows each firm to have its own production technique but requires, in turn, that input 
markets are competitive so that the return to each input equals its marginal product. In that case, the return 
to each type of input – such as wages paid to labour - as a share of overall production costs is equivalent to 
marginal products and can, therefore, be measured using output revenue and input expenditure 
information.  Moreover, in practice, the method often requires assuming constant returns to scale because 
the rental price of capital is commonly unavailable. Assuming constant returns to scale allows obtaining 
the share of capital as what is left over after the shares of other inputs are discounted.  
59
 More detail on production methods is given in Olley and Pakes (1996) and, for extensions, in Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg et al. (2006).   
60
 Important alternative approaches are proposed by Katayama et al. (2009), Griliches and Klette (1996) 
and Gorodnichenko (2005). The way these studies propose to address the problem of firm price-taking 
behavior is to model firm product demand. Moreover, output biases are corrected for by either using 
revenue output measures deflated by firm prices (Eslava et al., 2004, 2005a, 2005b) or physical output 
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effectively ignores possible quality improvements reflected in price increases. The issue 
cannot be adequately addressed in the absence of hedonic price indices. The fact that 
only two studies (Foster et al, 2007 and Syverson, 2004) use physical output quantities 
for the estimation of TFP highlights another complication: firms‟ products are highly 
heterogeneous and differ in quality. The two studies can only obtain meaningful results 
for a selection of producers – those producing homogeneous products with little scope 
for quality differences. While it is possible to compare physical output of tons of cement 
it is not clear how units of cars can be compared. This is because there is little scope for 
improvements when it comes to cement, but there may be huge differences between a 
given quantity of cars produced by one firm versus another firm. What is important is 
not the fact that firms do not charge differential prices for those products – that is not 
essential since the price level does not enter the computations at all – but that output 
quantities are comparable. Otherwise, it is absolutely important to include information 
on prices since they are the only element that allows distinguishing among a 
heterogeneous set of goods in terms of inherent quality differences. As an example, the 
number of high-quality cars cannot be compared to that of low-quality cars. However, 
since researchers are still interested to compare producers of these cars and obtain their 
TFP, the only option is to use price information jointly with output quantities trying to 
properly deflate price inflation. 
Our procedure thus consists in obtaining production function estimates following 
the method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for each 2-digit industry. We will obtain 
three TFP estimates S1 [pi = pindustry-year; for all firm-year observations], S2 [pi = pindustry-
                                                                                                                                                                           
quantities (Foster et al., 2007, Syverson, 2004) or, in the absence of data on prices, correcting for demand 
side aspects (Van Biesebroeck, 2007). It is important to mention that Eslava et al. (2004, 2005a, 2005b) 
use demand estimations to obtain their TFP. However, they do not do so to correct for output biases (they 
correct for those by use of firm-specific prices) but in order to use those results as instruments for 
endogenous production inputs.   
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year; for all continued product firm-year observations] and S3 [pi = pplant-year, for all 
continued product firm-year observations]. Note that we obtain firm-specific output 
deflators calculated as a weighted average of firm product price changes with weights 
given by the sales share of products in total firm sales following the method proposed by 
Eslava et al. (2004). More detail on how those deflators are computed is provided in the 
data appendix. Production function estimates are provided in the appendix. Table 6 
provides, in addition, descriptive statistics for these three sets of TFP estimates showing 
that for the variables of interest for this study the characteristics of the 3 samples 
(corresponding to each of the TFP estimates) are fairly similar allowing comparisons 
across different samples possible.
61
  
3.3 Trade Costs  
Our measure of transport costs is based on detailed information provided by the 
Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) on freight costs excluding insurance 
costs and the free on board customs value (fob) of Chilean imports for each 8-digit 
Harmonized System (HS) code, exporting country, and year from 1997 to 2003. First, 
we compute for 8-digit HS code i from exporting country c in year t freight rates as the 
ratio of freight costs ( ictfreight ) to the fob value of imports ( ictfob ): 
ictictict fobfreightTC / . Second, we aggregate these freight rates from the 8-digit HS 
code, exporting country, and year level to the 4-digit ISIC (revision 2) and year level 
using (i) a concordance between 8-digit HS and 4-digit ISIC codes and (ii) weights 
given by Chile‟s 8-digit HS fob imports from each exporting country and year as a ratio 
to Chile‟s total imports in the corresponding 4-digit ISIC code in that year. More details 
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 We note, however, that there is a slight decrease in the share of exporters and output from samples S1 to 
S3. 
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on the construction of the freight costs measure are provided in Chapter 4. We will refer 
to our measure hereafter as „transport costs measure‟. 
Table 7 illustrates the substantial variation in our transport costs measure over 
time and across a selection of 4-digit industries. Since some countries may not export a 
product to Chile due to prohibitive transport costs, our measure is a lower bound for 
transport costs accounting only for those of the exports that actually occur (Hummels, 
2001). However, since this feature of our measure is common to all products, it does not 
impair our analysis which focuses on the relative differences in the relative rather than 
the absolute magnitude of transport costs across industries and time.  
Transport costs proxy adequately for the exposure to import competition of 
plants in Chilean industries during the sample period for four reasons. First, export 
choices are to some extent driven by freight costs. For example, within disaggregate 
product categories, exporters with the lowest freight rates are shown to have the largest 
import shares based on data for the U.S., New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay (Hummels, 2001). Second, transport costs can play an important 
role in “altering patterns of trade across goods and partners” due to their size and 
variability across trade partners (Hummels et al., 2008). Third, transport costs represent 
currently a greater share of trade costs than tariffs for most countries including Chile 
(Anderson and Wincoop, 2004).
62
 Fourth, our measure excludes insurance costs and, 
therefore, does not face related concerns of endogeneity.  
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 Moreover, the most usual measure of trade barriers - tariffs - is not informative in the Chilean context 
due to the uniform tariff structure across industries in place since the 1980s‟ trade liberalization 
(Chumacero et al., 2004). Chile‟s entry into preferential trade agreements with various countries and 
regions since the 1990s introduced a complex set of product- and country-specific exceptions to that 
uniform tariff structure which could provide useful variation for our analysis. However, such exceptions 
are subject to political economy pressures and are likely to be endogenous to product quality in an 
industry. 
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Finally, note that our measure of transport costs is obtained at the 4-digit ISIC 
revision 2 level. Each transport cost measure is linked to the plant‟s main product 
industry in all cases where firms produce more than one product. We believe that this is 
a better measure of the level of import competition faced by the firm than a weighted 
average of trade costs for all products of the firm. The latter may, however, provide for 
an interesting robustness check.  
3.4 Regression Framework 
The basic specification which will allow us to examine TFP responses to changes 
in the transport costs faced by each plant‟s main product is given by:  
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where itTFPlog  is the log of TFP of plant i in year t, 
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itTCchina   and 
4
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itTCall   are 
transport costs for imports from China and for imports from all other countries, 
respectively for the 4-digit industry k4 to which the firm‟s main product belongs, itX  is 
a vector of controls to be specified below,, 3mI * tI  are 3-digit industry m3-year fixed 
effects, and it  is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) residual. We will 
now discuss the different issues that arise from this specification. 
First, it is important to discuss the possibility of reserve causality: firm TFP may 
have an impact on import competition. One way that such reverse causality could 
materialize is political lobbying of firms against trade liberalization. We can, however, 
disregard this possible channel as our measure of import competition is a measure of 
“external” transport costs incurred by imports from the exporting country until the 
arrival to Chilean ports and thus are not affected by Chilean trade policy decisions. 
Moreover, even if Chilean policy-makers attempted to reduce trade-related insurance 
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costs or to improve the quality of domestic ports, those actions would not be captured by 
our measure of transport costs the more so since it excludes insurance costs.  
However, we can identify two possible ways how TFP may affect transport 
costs. First, if some firms improve their TFP strongly, then some producers who 
previously exported to Chile may decide to stop their product exports to Chile. This will 
affect our competition measures if the impact is such that some countries‟ industries no 
longer export to Chile because they will no longer enter transport cost calculations. Our 
measure of transport costs would only increase, however, to reflect this decline in 
competition if those countries had lower transport costs. It is likely that it would be 
producers in countries exporting smaller quantities to Chile that would stop exporting 
and that exporting smaller quantities would be linked to higher transport costs. Thus, 
there is a possibility that our measure of transport costs may decrease as a result of TFP 
improvements. This issue is relevant for our analysis to the extent that only half of 
Chile‟s import relationships at the country-4-digit industry level last the entire sample 
period. However, since our measure is a weighted average of transport costs across all 
countries, the exclusion of a country is unlikely to affect it unless it is one of the largest 
trading partners. Our data shows that few of the large trading partners stop exporting any 
4-digit categories to Chile during the sample period.
63
 Nonetheless, we consider this 
issue in our robustness checks and find that our results are not driven by this potential 
reverse causality channel. The second possibility is that TFP improvements in Chile 
could motivate producers in certain countries to export smaller quantities to Chile. This 
would result in higher freight rates if exporters no longer benefit from economies of 
scale in the transportation of their products. In this case, TFP improvements would lead 
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 Considering the top 10 exporting countries to Chile for each 4-digit industry, 4,400 out of 4,764 
observations (94%) correspond to relationships that last the entire sample period.  
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to weaker import competition and actually work against the finding of a positive effect 
of import competition on TFP improvements. However, the importance of such scale 
economies in affecting freight rates is unclear. These two possibilities describe possible 
effects of TFP improvements on transport costs. To help mitigate these potential biases 
in our estimates of 1TC  and 2TC , we follow Bernard et al. (2006a) and include a one-
year lag in both variables TCchina  and .TCall  
Second, direct comparisons of TFP in levels are complicated since this would 
compare firms employing potentially very different production methods. Therefore, we 
include industry-year fixed effects so as to account for such differences (Van 
Biesebroeck, 2006). Third, foreign companies have two options to sell their products in 
the local market: the first option is to export products to Chile and the second is to set up 
a plant in Chile and produce there. As firms may decide between these options 
depending on their costs, high trade costs may render the FDI option more tempting 
whereas low trade costs may have the opposite effect. Thus, competition through FDI 
may be correlated with our trade costs measure. We, therefore, include a measure of FDI 
defined as the share of foreign workers in total workers by 4-digit industry as a control. 
We also control for several other potentially partly unobserved industry characteristics 
via the inclusion of 3-digit industry-year fixed effects.  
Fourth, in addition to foreign competition, local competition is an equally 
important element to account for. The degree of local competition may be affected by 
the extent of import competition and, therefore, may be to some extent correlated with 
trade costs. To ensure that our import competition measure does not pick up any of these 
effects we include two controls: the normalized Herfindahl index computed at the 4-digit 
industry level as an industry-level measure of competition and a measure of firm market 
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shares. Technological differences between industries likely have an impact on their 
market structure so that the measure of firm market shares is not reliable in cross-
sectional comparisons (Sutton, 1996). We, therefore, follow Disney et al. (2003) and use 
the change in firm market share rather than the level of the firm market share. 
Finally, while it is not strictly necessary to our analysis – as trade costs are very 
unlikely to be correlated with firm characteristics – we include three traditional firm 
controls – dummies for firm size and for foreign-ownership status and for exporter firms 
to be absolutely certain none of these characteristics are taken up by our trade costs 
measure. Indeed, as our results reported below will show that their inclusion does not 
significantly affect our results. This confirms our intuition of an unlikely correlation of 
firm characteristics with our variable of interest, trade costs.  
Thus, the full regression that we estimate is the following:  
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where dFDIit is a dummy indicating whether firm i at time t is foreign-owned or not, 
∆MSHAREit is the change in firm i‟s market share between t and t-1.  dXit is a dummy for 
exporter status of firm i at time t and dSIZEit denotes firm size dummies.
64
 Industry 
controls included are FDIIt – a measure of the share in total 4-digit ISIC industry 
employment of foreign-owned companies - and herfindahlIt – the normalized Herfindahl 
index measured at the 4-digit ISIC industry level at time t.  
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 Three size categories are considered: small plants (1-50 employees), medium plants (50-200 
employees), and large plants (200 or more employees). But the results are robust to the use of alternative 
size categories.  
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4. Results 
4.1 Main Findings 
Panel 1 of Table 3 reports the results of our baseline OLS regression for (5) using 
TFP measure S1 [TFP
S1
: pi = pindustry,year; for all firm-year observations].  Note that in 
this as in all other tables we report the coefficient on the negative of trade costs; a higher 
value of the trade costs measure corresponds to an industry with stronger import 
competition. We find a positive and significant impact of competition from all countries 
with the exception of China and a significant negative impact of competition from China 
on firm TFP. Note that qualitatively the results do not change as we include plant and/or 
industry controls. Note that the change in the magnitude of the estimates reported in 
columns (1), (2) and (3), (4) is not due to the inclusion of firm controls but rather to the 
decrease in sample size as we include the growth in firm market shares between t and t-
1. Panel 2 of Table 3 shows in addition to these OLS estimates results from quantile 
regressions. Based on the TFP estimates S1 [TFP
S1
: pi = pindustry,year; for all firm-year 
observations] we find that all firms benefited from foreign import competition. 
However, there are important differences in terms of magnitudes; less efficient firms 
tend to improve less as a result of import competition from countries other than China 
than those with already high TFP. This is intuitive suggesting that firms with better 
capabilities for innovation (the highest-TFP firms) will be the more so in a position to 
improve their production processes as competition increases. We also find a negative 
impact of import competition from China on all firms. Whereas for firms at the very top 
of the distribution the impact is lower and no longer significant the effect is especially 
negative for firms in lower deciles.  
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Panel 1 of Table 4 reports the results of OLS regressions for TFP estimates S2 [pi 
= pindustry-year; for all continued product firm-year observations] and S3 [TFP
S3
: pi = 
pfirm,year; for continued-product firm-year observations]. We find that qualitatively results 
are maintained if compared to results for TFP estimate S1 [TFP
S1
: pi = pindustry,year; for all 
firm-year observations]. The magnitude of the impact is, however, significantly higher 
for TFP estimates S2 and S3. While we cannot exclude the possibility that sample 
selection affects the results, our evidence suggests that, if anything, traditional TFP 
estimates potentially underestimate the positive effects of import competition. In the 
case of import competition from China we find, in contrast, a stronger negative impact 
of import competition if we compare results to those for standard TFP estimates.  
In Panel 2 of Table  we show results for quantile regressions for TFP estimate S2 
[pi = pindustry-year; for all continued product firm-year observations]. We find the same 
progression showing that particularly more efficient producers manage to improve TFP 
more strongly than those at the bottom of the distribution. As for the negative impacts of 
China, while in general a negative impact is found we cannot observe a clear trend 
across deciles for this sample. Panel 3 of Table 4 shows the results using the TFP 
estimates S3 [TFP
S3
: pi = pfirm,year; for continued-product firm-year observations]. As 
before results suggest that firms at the very top of the TFP distribution benefit more and 
that the negative impacts of Chinese import competition are larger for firms at the 
bottom. What is striking for both the overall impact of competition and that from China 
is the significant difference between results from OLS and quantile regressions. If we 
compare the results of our quantile regressions across the different TFP measures 
quantitative differences are not as large as OLS regression results would suggest. This 
strengthens the finding that TFP measures of type S1 do not perform significantly 
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different from measures that correct for mismeasurement due to product switching and 
firm-price deflated outputs.   
4.2 Robustness 
Table 5 shows the results of several robustness tests. First, we compare results as 
we impose a more stringent criterion on our TFP estimates removing the top and bottom 
5% of observations. We find that the results are qualitatively maintained. Second, we 
address the potential endogeneity of trade costs discussed above by considering only 
trade costs corresponding to imports above 1000 USD in any one year.
65
 The results are 
reported in Panel 2 of Table 5. Third, we examine whether our results would be 
maintained if we confined our analysis to the set of firms that are in the sample during 
the entire sample period. We find that this is indeed the case for all three TFP measures. 
Interestingly, the qualitatively stronger results for this subsample point towards larger 
benefits from import competition from the all countries except China and negative 
impacts from China.  
Finally, we explore a different estimation technique that consists in having the 
log of output, itYlog  as the dependent variable and adding the production inputs, Iit, (i.e., 
the log of skilled and unskilled employment, materials, capital, services and energy) as 
controls resulting in the following estimating equation:   
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We select the same three samples used above to obtain three distinct TFP 
estimates  i.e. S1 [Y
S1
: pi = pindustry,year; for all firm-year observations], S2 [Y
S2
: pi = 
pindustry,year; for continued-product firm-year observations], and S3 [Y
S3
: pi = pfirm,year; for 
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 Chapter 3 discusses the reason for this robustness test in further detail.  
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continued-product firm-year observations]. The exercise is slightly different from the 
above as quantile regressions will divide firms according to their size (measured in terms 
of their revenue). The results are reported in Panels 1 to 3 of Table 6. Overall the OLS 
results are qualitatively similar to those for TFP though the signs are not significant for 
all three samples: a positive impact of competition from all countries with the exception 
of China and a negative impact of import competition from China. As for the quantile 
regressions, all consistently show a negative impact of import competition from China 
for small firms specifically and an apparently positive effect for larger firms. With the 
only exception of S3 estimates the evidence suggests that the positive effects are 
particularly powerful for firms at the top of the size distribution.  
4.3 Why Does Chinese Import Competition Affect TFP Negatively?  
It is somewhat surprising to find a significant negative impact of import 
competition from China on plant TFP. We would expect competition to stimulate 
efficiency improvements rather than the opposite which seems at first difficult to 
explain. The evidence provided in Chapter 4 does, however, provide a compelling 
explanation for this seemingly surprising result. That study shows that competition from 
developing countries including China stimulates firms‟ incremental product innovation 
to escape competition from abroad. Product upgrading requires the implementation of 
changes in firm production techniques and such adjustments may temporarily have a 
negative effect on TFP. The negative impact of substantial adjustments in technologies 
on TFP was found to be significant for Colombian plants by Hugget and Ospina (2001).  
There is also evidence demonstrating that specifically product innovation may lead to 
weaker or even negative TFP growth (Parisi et al., 2006; Harrison et al., 2005; and Hall 
et al., 2007). Note that in the case of our data we can exclude the possibility that 
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negative effects are simply due to measurement problems as firms switch products and 
are instead effectively due to adjustments since results hold equally for TFP measures S2 
and S3. 
In order to test the validity of this explanation we first check whether there is 
indeed a differential impact of import competition from China compared to all other 
countries on product innovation. If there was no differential impact on product 
innovation, then this would not be the correct explanation for negative impacts of 
competition from China but not for all other countries. Since our hypothesis relies on 
adjustment costs introducing a temporarily negative effect on TFP, we select a more 
radical type of innovation than product improvement: new product adoption. Column (1) 
of Table 7 shows the results of a simple probit regression model explaining product 
adoption using the trade costs measures for China and all other countries as well as same 
controls as in the TFP regressions. We find indeed that only competition from China has 
a positive and significant impact on product adoption. The same does not hold for import 
competition from all other countries. This finding gives some support to our hypothesis. 
However, it is possible that both effects are in fact unrelated.  In order to explore 
whether our hypothesis finds support in the data we investigate in which industries 
classified according to their technological sophistication import competition from China 
results in negative effects. In order to do so we rely on the OECD (2005) classification 
of industries and obtain three industry categories: (1) high- and medium-technology 
industries, (2) medium-low-technology industries and (3) low-technology industries.
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Results for all types of TFP estimates (S1, S2 and S3) are reported in columns (2), (3) 
and (4) of Table 7. The findings show that significant negative effects of import 
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 The classification is based on R&D expenditures and outputs of 12 OECD countries for the 1991-1999 
period. Further detail is provided in OECD (2005).   
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competition from China are specifically concentrated in low-technology sectors. As 
shown in column (5) of the same table it is precisely in these industries that import 
competition from China stimulates product adoption.
67
 Temporal adjustment costs for 
firms operating in these industries may well play an important role as firms change their 
product structure. Based on the evidence provided here, we therefore feel there is some 
evidence to conclude that the negative impact of Chinese import competition on TFP is 
likely a consequence of adjustment costs as Chilean firms engage in the production of 
new products at the temporary expense of efficiency. The fact that we find a stronger 
negative impact for smaller firms suggests that given lower production scales any re-
adjustment is more costly for them than for bigger firms.  
5. Conclusion 
The increased availability of data on quantities and prices of firm manufactured 
products has both provided a means to solve some of the shortcomings of existing TFP 
measures and at the same time uncovered additional challenges for TFP estimates given 
the complexities of firm production patterns. In this chapter we focus on two important 
difficulties: (i) the fact that a large share of firms switch products over their lifetime;  
TFP estimates will likely suffer from important mismeasurement problems of production 
functions  and (ii) the problem that industry-level price deflators for output will attribute 
higher TFP to plants with stronger market power. Using a popular TFP estimation 
technique in the empirical literature we find that the answer to the question of how 
import competition affects TFP is not affected by the correction for these two aspects in 
                                                          
67
 Note that product adoption probit regressions reported in columns (1) and (5) of Table 7 are based on 
the full sample of firms. Unreported regression results show that results are maintained if the sample is 
restricting to include sample S2 and sample S3 observations only.  
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TFP measurement. There is a consistently positive effect of stronger import competition 
from all countries with the exception of China on firm TFP in Chile.  
This finding suggests that some of the prior literature would not have been 
different had the authors been able to correct for these two shortcomings. There are, 
however, other challenges that our improved TFP estimates do not address such as the 
use of correct input deflators. Moreover, there is a substantial debate about TFP 
estimation techniques themselves (Van Biesebroeck, 2007, Katayama et al., 2009). 
Further studies that examine how these measures compare to TFP measures obtained if 
firm product data are not available will be useful to evaluate findings of the existing 
literature  that rely on these measures of TFP. 
The negative impact of import competition from China points to a potential 
production restructuring process that causes temporary efficiency losses of firms. We 
show in Chapter 4 that competition from developing countries stimulates firm product 
upgrading and we have shown here that Chinese competition has a positive impact on 
product adoption. Losses in TFP are concentrated in low-technology sectors where most 
product adoption by Chilean firms takes place. Small firms have greater losses as 
adjustments are likely more radical and as they rely on fewer resources allowing them to 
invest in both efficiency improvements and product adjustment simultaneously.   
There are, however, several shortcomings in our analysis have to be pointed out. 
Most importantly, while our measure of import competition, transport costs, might well 
capture import competition in Chile in firm product markets it is equally possible that it 
captures several other effects. One telling example is that the measure will equally 
capture the obstacles to imports of production inputs for firms. The evidence might 
actually measure impacts of differential access to production inputs. The story might 
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rather be about lost learning opportunities than competition. Moreover, to the extent that 
transport costs to Chile are correlated with those for other countries such as, e.g., 
neighbour country, Argentina, our measure would also capture the effects of import 
competition in Argentina on Chilean firms. This could specifically affect those firms that 
export to the Argentinean market. These are important concerns that will require further 
analysis in order to strengthen findings reported here.  
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Chapter 3: Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Final Estimation Samples  
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation
LP(2003) TFP Estimates
Log of plant TFP S1 2.633 2.585 0.592
Log of plant TFP S2 2.613 2.552 0.573
Log of plant TFP S3 2.612 2.550 0.567
Control Variables
Industry share of FDI 0.123 0.106 0.123 0.124 0.106 0.122 0.125 0.106 0.123
Foreign ownership dummy 0.055 0 0.228 0.055 0 0.229 0.054 0 0.227
Change in firm market share 0 0 0.038 0 0 0.029 0 0 0.029
Normalised Herfindahl index 0.078 0.046 0.094 0.077 0.046 0.090 0.077 0.046 0.091
Exporter status dummy 0.217 0 0.412 0.199 0 0.399 0.196 0 0.397
Firm size dummy 1 0.224 0 0.417 0.210 0 0.407 0.206 0 0.406
Firm size dummy 2 0.070 0 0.254 0.062 0 0.241 0.062 0 0.241
Production Function Inputs 
Log of skilled employment 2.414 2.303 1.103 2.368 2.303 1.088 2.370 2.303 1.092
Log of unskilled employment 2.717 2.833 1.528 2.660 2.773 1.513 2.653 2.773 1.505
Log of materials inputs 12.349 12.025 1.740 12.260 11.921 1.709 12.256 11.910 1.715
Log of services inputs 10.208 10.400 2.706 10.066 10.257 2.705 10.101 10.272 2.668
Log of energy inputs 4.569 4.248 1.918 4.496 4.174 1.882 4.478 4.159 1.857
Log of capital 12.045 11.925 2.032 11.930 11.792 2.035 11.919 11.776 2.040
Plant Sales Volume 
Log of industry-price deflated output 13.046 12.717 1.687 12.954 12.596 1.668 12.951 12.592 1.666
S1 (17331 Observations) S2 (12218 Observations) S3 (11925 Observations)
 
Table 2: Transport Costs for Selected 4-digit Industries and Years 
4-digit ISIC 1997 1999 2002
3112 Manufacture of dairy products 7.98% 6.46% 6.25%
3118 Sugar factories and refineries 10.67% 15.67% 14.02%
3212 Manufacture of made-up textile goods except wearing apparel 6.69% 7.74% 8.60%
3220 Manufacture of wearing apparel except footwear 4.98% 5.35% 5.13%
3312 Manufacture of wooden and cane containers and small cane ware 9.15% 6.29% 6.11%
3320 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures, except primarily of metal 13.72% 12.25% 13.98%
3122 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds 15.61% 12.91% 12.74%
3133 Malt liquors and malt 19.49% 12.61% 15.66%
3140 Tobacco manufactures 8.19% 8.46% 8.79%
3215 Cordage, rope and twine industries 4.33% 5.08% 6.39%
3233
Manufacture of leather and leather substitutes, except footware and 
wearing apparel
8.29% 9.85% 9.06%
3240
Manufacture of footwear, except vulcanised or moulded rubber and 
plastic footwear
5.20% 5.50% 5.81%
3412 Manufacture of containers and boxes of paper and paperboard 15.14% 10.52% 10.41%
3512 Manufacture of fertlizers and pesticides 11.21% 11.91% 10.95%
3551 Tyre and tube industries 7.95% 7.69% 8.25%
3560 Manufacture of plastic products not elsewhere specified 10.27% 10.04% 9.13%
3620 Manufacture of glass and glass products 13.49% 14.31% 13.84%
3720 Non-ferrous metal basic industries 4.64% 4.58% 4.06%
3822 Manufacture of agricultural machinery and equipment 6.51% 5.36% 6.21%
3831 Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery and apparatus 4.85% 4.63% 4.80%
3852 Manufacture of photographic and optical goods 3.36% 3.36% 3.85%
3420 Printing, publishing and allied industries 8.04% 8.74% 8.24%
3522 Manufacture of drugs and medicines 3.30% 3.07% 3.31%
3610 Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware 11.85% 15.67% 13.97%
3710 Iron and steel basic industries 10.59% 10.06% 10.15%
3812 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures primarily of metal 12.20% 11.35% 12.94%
3813 Manufacture of structural metal products 9.80% 7.65% 8.05%
3844 Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles 8.69% 10.56% 11.49%
 
Note: The table shows for each 4-digit industry transport costs aggregated from the level of the 8-digit HS 
code, exporting country, and year to the level of the 4-digit ISIC and year using as weights Chile‟s fob 
imports from each country and year. 
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Table 3: Impact of Transport Costs for All Countries except China and China on TFP Estimates (S1) 
Panel 1: OLS Regression Results for TFP Estimates (S1) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transport Costs for All Countries Except China t-1 1.199*** 1.138*** 1.384*** 1.333***
(0.270) (0.280) (0.280) (0.290)
Transport Costs for China t-1 -0.312*** -0.298*** -0.248** -0.236**
(0.110) (0.100) (0.110) (0.110)
Plant Controls No No Yes Yes
Industry Controls No Yes No Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18967 18960 17337 17331
R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.53
Dependent Variable: Log of Plant S1 TFP (LP, 2003)
OLS Regression Results
 
Panel 2: Quantile Regression Results for TFP Estimates (S1) 
OLS
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Transport Costs for All Countries Except China t-1 1.333*** 1.144*** 1.258*** 1.283*** 1.296*** 1.420*** 1.333*** 1.734*** 1.914*** 2.056***
(0.290) (0.310) (0.230) (0.200) (0.200) (0.180) (0.190) (0.220) (0.230) (0.370)
Transport Costs for China t-1 -0.236** -0.462*** -0.345*** -0.319*** -0.329*** -0.313*** -0.232*** -0.372*** -0.163 -0.0519
(0.110) (0.150) (0.110) (0.089) (0.092) (0.083) (0.083) (0.094) (0.099) (0.150)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17331 17331 17331 17331 17331 17331 17331 17331 17331 17331
Quantile Regressions
Dependent Variable: Log of Plant S1 TFP (LP, 2003)
 
Notes: For ordinary-least squared regressions we report robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. For quantile regressions we report standard errors in parenthesis. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively.  All regressions include the negative of transport costs. Plant controls include dummies for firm size, 
foreign ownership, exporter status as well as the change in firms’ market shares between t-1 and t. Industry controls include the employment share of foreign firms over total employment 
by 4-digit industry as well as the normalised Herfindahl index.   
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Table 4: Impact of Transport Costs for All Countries except China and China on TFP Estimates (S2) and (S3) 
Panel 1: OLS Regression Results TFP Estimates (S1), (S2) and (S3) 
TFP S1 TFP S2 TFP S3
(1) (2) (3)
Transport Costs for All Countries Except China t-1 1.333*** 3.972*** 5.216***
(0.290) (0.820) (1.440)
Transport Costs for China t-1 -0.236** -0.467* -1.042***
(0.110) (0.250) (0.320)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17331 12218 11925
R-squared 0.53 0.90 0.90
Dependent variables: Log of Plant TFP (LP, 2003)
OLS Regression Results
 
Panel 2: Quantile Regression Results for TFP Estimates (S2) 
OLS
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Transport Costs for All Countries Except China t-1 3.972*** 1.531*** 1.230*** 1.410*** 1.329*** 1.293*** 1.387*** 1.790*** 2.188*** 2.321***
(0.820) (0.480) (0.320) (0.260) (0.210) (0.240) (0.330) (0.300) (0.360) (0.480)
Transport Costs for China t-1 -0.467* -0.248 -0.309* -0.343*** -0.373*** -0.369*** -0.389** -0.501*** -0.420** -0.208
(0.250) (0.240) (0.160) (0.130) (0.100) (0.110) (0.160) (0.140) (0.170) (0.210)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12218 12218 12218 12218 12218 12218 12218 12218 12218 12218
Dependent Variable: Log of Plant S2 TFP (LP, 2003)
Quantile Regressions
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Panel 3: Quantile Regression Results for TFP Estimates (S3) 
OLS
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Transport Costs for All Countries Except China t-1 5.216*** 0.197 1.525*** 1.153*** 1.279*** 1.468*** 1.219*** 1.426*** 1.322*** 2.180***
(1.440) (0.680) (0.510) (0.440) (0.340) (0.320) (0.330) (0.400) (0.460) (0.630)
Transport Costs for China t-1 -1.042*** -1.096*** -0.967*** -0.803*** -0.790*** -0.772*** -0.611*** -0.521*** -0.424** -0.535*
(0.320) (0.300) (0.230) (0.210) (0.160) (0.150) (0.160) (0.190) (0.220) (0.280)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925
Dependent Variable: Log of Plant S3 TFP (LP, 2003)
Quantile Regressions
 
Notes: For ordinary-least squared regressions we report robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. For quantile regressions we report standard 
errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively.  All regressions include the negative of transport costs. 
Plant controls include dummies for firm size, foreign ownership, exporter status as well as the change in firms‟ market shares between t-1 and t. Industry controls 
include the employment share of foreign firms over total employment by 4-digit industry as well as the normalised Herfindahl index.   
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Table 5: Robustness Tables for TFP Estimates (S1), (S2) and (S3) 
Panel 1: OLS and Quantile Regression Results Excluding the Top and Bottom 5% of TFP Estimates  
OLS OLS OLS
30 50 70 30 50 70 30 50 70
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Transport Costs for All Countries Except China t-1 1.380*** 1.271*** 1.343*** 1.588*** 3.304*** 0.924*** 1.203*** 1.497*** 2.994** 0.855* 0.619** 1.034***
(0.240) (0.180) (0.170) (0.220) (0.750) (0.260) (0.260) (0.270) (1.230) (0.440) (0.260) (0.340)
Transport Costs for China t-1 -0.191** -0.274*** -0.288*** -0.312*** -0.536** -0.276** -0.376*** -0.503*** -1.088*** -0.755*** -0.552*** -0.374**
(0.092) (0.080) (0.073) (0.092) (0.220) (0.130) (0.120) (0.120) (0.280) (0.200) (0.120) (0.160)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15908 15908 15908 15908 11192 11192 11192 11192 10936 10936 10936 10936
Dependent variables: Log of Plant TFP (LP, 2003)
TFP S1 TFP S2 TFP S3
Quantile Regressions Quantile Regressions Quantile Regressions
 
Panel 2: OLS and Quantile Regression Results Using Transport Cost Estimates Excluding Import Flows below 1,000 USD 
OLS OLS OLS
30 50 70 30 50 70 30 50 70
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Transport Costs for All Countries Except China t-1 1.333*** 1.283*** 1.420*** 1.734*** 3.972*** 1.410*** 1.293*** 1.790*** 5.216*** 1.153*** 1.468*** 1.426***
(0.290) (0.200) (0.180) (0.220) (0.820) (0.260) (0.240) (0.300) (1.440) (0.440) (0.320) (0.400)
Transport Costs for China t-1 -0.236** -0.319*** -0.313*** -0.372*** -0.467* -0.343*** -0.369*** -0.501*** -1.042*** -0.803*** -0.772*** -0.521***
(0.110) (0.089) (0.083) (0.094) (0.250) (0.130) (0.110) (0.140) (0.320) (0.210) (0.150) (0.190)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17331 17331 17331 17331 12218 12218 12218 12218 11925 11925 11925 11925
TFP S3
Quantile Regressions
Dependent variables: Log of Plant TFP (LP, 2003)
TFP S1 TFP S2
Quantile RegressionsQuantile Regressions
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Panel 3: OLS and Quantile Regression Results for the Sample of Continued Firms  
OLS OLS OLS
30 50 70 30 50 70 30 50 70
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Transport Costs for All Countries Except China t-1 1.871*** 1.529*** 1.761*** 2.153*** 4.703*** 1.793*** 1.368*** 2.063*** 6.645*** 1.716*** 1.981*** 1.997***
(0.360) (0.220) (0.240) (0.220) (1.170) -0.39 -0.31 -0.39 (1.980) (0.450) (0.470) (0.520)
Transport Costs for China t-1 -0.233* -0.314*** -0.353*** -0.359*** -0.579* -0.409** -0.472*** -0.549*** -1.316*** -1.071*** -0.885*** -0.608**
(0.130) (0.093) (0.100) (0.091) (0.340) -0.18 -0.14 -0.17 (0.410) (0.210) (0.220) (0.240)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11270 11270 11270 11270 8052 8052 8052 8052 7898 7898 7898 7898
TFP S1 TFP S2 TFP S3
Quantile Regressions Quantile Regressions Quantile Regressions
Dependent variables: Log of Plant TFP (LP, 2003)
 
Notes: For ordinary-least squared regressions we report robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. For quantile regressions we report standard errors in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively.  All regressions include the negative of transport costs. Plant controls include 
dummies for firm size, foreign ownership, exporter status as well as the change in firms‟ market shares between t-1 and t. Industry controls include the employment share of foreign 
firms over total employment by 4-digit industry as well as the normalised Herfindahl index.   
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Table 6: Output regressions for output measures (S1), (S2) and (S3) 
Panel 1: Output regressions for output measures (S1) 
OLS
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Transport Costs for All Countries Except China t-1 0.421 0.065 0.208 0.279* 0.224 0.320** 0.299* 0.490*** 0.693*** 0.622**
(0.260) (0.220) (0.170) (0.150) (0.180) (0.140) (0.150) (0.190) (0.200) (0.290)
Transport Costs for China t-1 -0.021 -0.345*** -0.234*** -0.189*** -0.094 -0.033 0.119* 0.097 0.108 0.217*
(0.100) (0.100) (0.078) (0.068) (0.081) (0.065) (0.069) (0.082) (0.085) (0.130)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inputs to Production Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17331 17331 17331 17331 17331 17331 17331 17331 17331 17331
Dependent variables: Log of real firm sales - Sample: S1
Quantile Regressions
 
Panel 2: Output regressions for output measures (S2) 
OLS
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Transport Costs for All Countries Except China t-1 0.748** 0.332 0.381* 0.489*** 0.378* 0.400** 0.585*** 0.620*** 0.815*** 0.718*
(0.350) (0.290) (0.210) (0.180) (0.200) (0.200) (0.220) (0.180) (0.260) (0.380)
Transport Costs for China t-1 -0.037 -0.392*** -0.254** -0.235*** -0.115 0.000 0.098 0.177** 0.163 0.287
(0.130) (0.150) (0.100) (0.089) (0.096) (0.097) (0.100) (0.086) (0.120) (0.180)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inputs to Production Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12218 12218 12218 12218 12218 12218 12218 12218 12218 12218
Dependent variables: Log of real firm sales - Sample: S2
Quantile Regressions
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Panel 3: Output regressions for output measures (S3) 
OLS
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Transport Costs for All Countries Except China t-1 0.563 1.375* 0.661 0.220 0.121 0.057 0.195 -0.007 0.237 0.393
(0.510) (0.780) (0.420) (0.380) (0.310) (0.250) (0.330) (0.350) (0.420) (0.510)
Transport Costs for China t-1 -0.444** -1.766*** -0.963*** -0.687*** -0.466*** -0.421*** -0.196 0.002 -0.078 0.093
(0.200) (0.330) (0.190) (0.180) (0.140) (0.120) (0.150) (0.170) (0.200) (0.230)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inputs to Production Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925
Dependent variables: Log of real firm sales - Sample: S3
Quantile Regressions
 
Notes: For ordinary-least squared regressions we report robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses. For quantile regressions we report standard errors in parenthesis. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively.  All regressions include the negative of transport costs. Plant controls include dummies for firm size, 
foreign ownership, exporter status as well as the change in firms’ market shares between t-1 and t. Industry controls include the employment share of foreign firms over total employment 
by 4-digit industry as well as the normalised Herfindahl index.  Production inputs include the log of skilled workers, log of unskilled workers, energy consumption as well as a measure 
capital, materials and services used for production.  
 
  114 
Table 7: Impact of Transport Costs on Product Adoption and TFP Distinguishing by Industrial Technological Intensity  
Product 
Adoption TFP S1 TFP S2 TFP S3
Product 
Adoption
Probit OLS OLS OLS Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transport Costs for All Countries Except China t-1 -3.146***
(0.950)
Transport Costs for China t-1 2.018***
(0.450)
Transport Costs for All Countries Except China * High- and Medium-Technology Industries  t-1 -0.617 -1.436 2.551 -8.223***
(0.810) (2.220) (1.950) (2.080)
Transport Costs for All Countries Except China * Medium- Low-Technology Industries t-1 1.447* 6.053** 11.02** -6.377***
(0.780) (2.460) (5.080) (2.420)
Transport Costs for All Countries Except China * Low-Technology Industries t-1 1.696*** 4.581*** 4.911*** -0.535
(0.320) (0.950) (1.640) (1.140)
Transport Costs for China * High- and Medium-Technology Industries  t-1 0.359 -0.335 -1.365 1.686
(0.680) (1.580) (1.430) (1.720)
Transport Costs for China * Medium-Low-Technology Industries  t-1 -0.0534 -0.774 -0.593 0.482
(0.290) (0.670) (1.270) (1.140)
Transport Costs for China * Low-Technology Industries t-1 -0.331*** -0.525** -1.202*** 2.167***
(0.120) (0.270) (0.320) (0.500)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16825 17331 12218 11925 16825
 
Notes: Columns (1) and (5) report results of probit regressions of firm product adoption computed at the 7-digit product level. Columns (2), (3) and (4) are OLS regressions of TFP S1, 
S2 and S3 respectively. Columns (2) to (5) split transport costs estimates for all countries (except China) and China into three categories, high- and medium-technology industries, 
medium-low-technology industries and low-technology industries following the OECD classification (2005). For  all regressions we report robust standard errors clustered at the firm-
level in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively.  All regressions include the negative of transport costs. Plant controls 
include dummies for firm size, foreign ownership, exporter status as well as the change firms' market shares between t-1 and t. Industry controls include the employment share of 
foreign firms over total employment by 4-digit industry as well as the normalised Herfindahl index.  
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Appendix 
1. Data Issues 
Computing firm-level output prices 
We obtain firm-level output prices by deflating nominal sales by a firm-level price index 
which is obtained computing Tornquist indices as proposed by Eslava et al. (2004). 
First, we obtain a weighted average of the growth of the prices of plant j‟s products i 
between time t and t-1  where Pijt are prices charged for product i of plant j at time t 
while sijt and sijt−1 are shares of product i in plant j‟s total production for years t and t-1. 
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The distribution of the weighted average of the growth in prices has large outliers. We, 
therefore, treat all firm average price growth rates below -50% and above 100% as 
missing. The indices for the levels of output prices for each plant j are constructed as 
follows:  
 ijtijtjt PPP  1lnln     (A2) 
Using this information, we fix 1996 as the base year and compute prices relative to the 
base year, setting Pj1996 = 100. The construction of price indices requires a common base 
year for all firm observations. As this is an unbalanced sample we do not have 
information for all firms for the year 1996. In order to be able to use information for 
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those firms as for others as well as to deal with missing observations, we follow Eslava 
et al. (2004) and impute product prices for plants with missing values using average 
prices in their sector, location and year.  
Production Function Variables  
We compute two distinct output measures for our analysis and use the same five 
inputs used in Chapter 2: skilled and unskilled labor, materials, electricity, services and 
capital. These inputs are the same for all three production function estimations and TFP 
estimates. The following provides detail as to how these variables were computed.     
Skilled and unskilled labor are measured by the number of workers in the following 
occupational categories: (a) skilled: owners, managers, administrative personnel, and 
specialized production workers, and (b) unskilled: workers directly or indirectly 
involved in the production process, and home workers.  
Materials is measured by deflated materials expenditures. The materials price 
deflator is based on a weighted average of the aforementioned 3-digit output price 
deflators where the weights are given by the share that each 3-digit industry‟s output 
represents in total manufacturing intermediates used by all 3-digit industries based on an 
input-output table. For years 1992-2002 [2003-2004], the weights are based on the 1986 
[1996] Chilean input-output table. 
Electricity is the quantity of electricity bought plus the quantity of electricity 
generated minus the quantity of electricity sold in thousands of kilowatts.  
Services is measured by the deflated sum of expenditures on advertising, banking 
commissions and interest payments, communications, insurance, legal, technical, and 
accounting services, licenses and foreign technical assistance, rental payments, transport, 
other services, and water. The services price deflator is based on GDP deflators for 4 
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groups of services from the Chilean Central Bank: (i) electricity and water, (ii) transport 
and communications, (iii) financial services, insurance and business services, and (iv) 
real estate. We calculate a weighted average of these GDP deflators where the weights 
are given by the share that each of these 4 groups of services represents in total 
intermediate expenditures (manufacturing plus services) for each 3-digit industry based 
on the 1996 Chilean input-output table.  
Capital is computed using the perpetual inventory method (PIM). The ENIA survey 
provides information on four types of capital: buildings, machinery and equipment, 
transport equipment, and land. For each type of capital we compute net investment flows 
as the sum of purchases of new capital, purchases of used capital and improvements to 
capital minus the sales of capital and deflate these by an investment price deflator 
constructed as the ratio of current gross capital formation to constant gross capital 
formation (in local currency units) from the World Development Indicators with base 
year 2002. For each type of capital, the PIM formula Kit+1 = (1 – δ) Kit + Iit is applied, 
where Iit are real net investment flows and δ is a depreciation rate. Since detailed studies 
of depreciation rates in Chile are unavailable, we use the following rates proposed by 
Pombo (1999) who studied the same type of capital goods in Colombia: 3% for 
buildings, 7% for machinery and equipment, and 11.9% for transport equipment. Land is 
assumed not to depreciate. We also experimented with alternative rates of depreciation 
but did not find this to make a substantial difference to the final capital stock values nor 
to our main results. The initial value of the capital stock needed to apply the PIM 
formula is given by the book value of each of the four types of capital in the first year of 
plant presence in the sample. Whenever the book value is available only in a latter year, 
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we back out that value until the plant‟s first year in the sample taking into account the 
investment price deflator and the corresponding depreciation rate.  
Output is measured by deflated sales. For traditional TFP estimation (S1) [TFP
S1
: pi 
= pindustry,year; for all firm-year observations] and the continued products sample (S2) 
[TFP
S2
: pi = pindustry,year; for continued-product firm-year observations] the output price 
deflator is based on information on indexes of total sales and indexes of physical 
production for each 3-digit industry from the Chilean Statistical Institute. Based on the 
equality total sales=physical production * price, one obtains growth in total 
sales=growth in output + growth in prices. Using this formula we compute an industry 
output price deflator using 2002 as the base year. For years 1992-2002, the price deflator 
is obtained for 3-digit ISIC Rev. 2 industries while for 2003-2004 it is obtained for 3-
digit ISIC Rev. 3 industries. For the improve TFP estimate (S3) [TFP
S2
: pi = pfirm,year; for 
continued-product firm-year observations] we deflate sales by the firm-level price index 
specified above. The latter were used for the other two samples (S1 and S2). To avoid 
possible outlier problems, we drop the top and bottom 1% of TFP levels estimates for all 
three samples (S1, S2 and S3) of observations from our main regression sample. 
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2. Production Function Coefficient Estimates 
Chapter 3 - Appendix: Tables 
Table 1: Estimation using industry-level output price deflators for all plants, 1996 - 
2003 
     Food       
(ISIC 31)
 Textiles 
Apparel 
(ISIC 32)
 Wood 
Furniture 
(ISIC 33)
 Paper 
Printing 
(ISIC 34)
 Chemicals 
(ISIC 35)
 Nonmet. 
Minerals 
(ISIC 36)
Basic 
Metals 
(ISIC 37)
Machinery 
(ISIC 38)
 Other 
Manuf. 
(ISIC 39)
Log of Skilled Labor 0.081*** 0.161*** 0.088*** 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.107*** 0.153*** 0.137*** 0.231***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.021) (0.020) (0.028) (0.028) (0.046) (0.019) (0.054)
Log of Unskilled Labor 0.054*** 0.083*** 0.051*** 0.033*** 0.028** 0.036** 0.004 0.075*** 0.143***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.011) (0.025)
Log of Materials 0.760*** 0.670*** 0.731*** 0.663*** 0.682*** 0.643*** 0.562*** 0.648*** 0.621***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.019) (0.030) (0.003) (0.038) (0.014) (0.061)
Log of Services 0.006** 0.071*** 0.035*** 0.017** 0.014** -0.01*** -0.017 0.050*** -0.008
(0.003) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.011) (0.010) (0.023)
Log of Electricity 0.140*** 0.120*** 0.150** 0.010 0.170** 0.260** 0.010 0.150*** 0.030
(0.034) (0.042) (0.059) (0.028) (0.070) (0.113) (0.111) (0.022) (0.048)
Log of Capital 0.020 0.010 0.010 0.270 0.040 0.010 0.390 0.010*** 0.060
(0.015) (0.061) (0.257) (0.169) (0.255) (0.014) (0.330) (0.001) (0.119)
Number of Observations 10394 5018 3285 2132 3961 1432 529 5923 424
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) Estimation
Dependent Variable: Log of Output
 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the plant-level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
 
Table2: Estimation using industry-level output price deflators for plants that do not 
change their production, 1996 - 2003 
     Food       
(ISIC 31)
 Textiles 
Apparel 
(ISIC 32)
 Wood 
Furniture 
(ISIC 33)
 Paper 
Printing 
(ISIC 34)
 Chemicals 
(ISIC 35)
 Nonmet. 
Minerals 
(ISIC 36)
Basic 
Metals 
(ISIC 37)
Machinery 
(ISIC 38)
 Other 
Manuf. 
(ISIC 39)
Log of Skilled Labor 0.087*** 0.156*** 0.092*** 0.202*** 0.172*** 0.093*** 0.167** 0.112*** 0.251***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.025) (0.024) (0.039) (0.030) (0.084) (0.023) (0.079)
Log of Unskilled Labor 0.058*** 0.092*** 0.064*** 0.041*** 0.024* 0.047*** 0.020 0.063*** 0.145***
(0.006) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.035) (0.012) (0.038)
Log of Materials 0.745*** 0.668*** 0.727*** 0.647*** 0.690*** 0.660*** 0.516*** 0.653*** 0.653***
(0.014) (0.022) (0.027) (0.021) (0.048) (0.024) (0.064) (0.016) (0.060)
Log of Services 0.006** 0.081*** 0.026*** 0.020* 0.009 -0.011*** -0.045** 0.051*** -0.017
(0.003) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.003) (0.018) (0.012) (0.023)
Log of Electricity 0.180** 0.100* 0.040 0.080 0.030 0.200** 0.100 0.050 0.010
(0.089) (0.051) (0.048) (0.051) (0.104) (0.100) (0.133) (0.063) (0.057)
Log of Capital 0.010 0.010 0.460 0.090 0.750** 0.030*** 0.340 0.060 0.010
(0.911) (0.163) (0.311) (0.338) (0.330) (0.011) (0.246) (0.116) (0.208)
Number of Observations 7050 2819 1690 1292 2216 930 270 3235 252
Dependent Variable: Log of Output
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) Estimation
 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the plant-level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.  
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Table 3: Estimation using firm-level output price deflators for plants that do not 
change their production, 1996 - 2003 
     Food       
(ISIC 31)
 Textiles 
Apparel 
(ISIC 32)
 Wood 
Furniture 
(ISIC 33)
 Paper 
Printing 
(ISIC 34)
 Chemicals 
(ISIC 35)
 Nonmet. 
Minerals 
(ISIC 36)
Basic 
Metals 
(ISIC 37)
Machinery 
(ISIC 38)
 Other 
Manuf. 
(ISIC 39)
Log of Skilled Labor 0.094*** 0.173*** 0.045 0.240*** 0.218*** 0.114*** 0.183** 0.147*** 0.261***
(0.013) (0.025) (0.032) (0.027) (0.042) (0.032) (0.089) (0.032) (0.093)
Log of Unskilled Labor 0.058*** 0.106*** 0.072*** 0.059*** 0.046*** 0.041* 0.006 0.090*** 0.196***
(0.010) (0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.032) (0.017) (0.042)
Log of Materials 0.743*** 0.651*** 0.744*** 0.557*** 0.637*** 0.622*** 0.592*** 0.610*** 0.626***
(0.017) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.055) (0.030) (0.067) (0.019) (0.084)
Log of Services 0.006 0.076*** 0.030*** 0.040*** 0.021** -0.010** -0.055** 0.050*** -0.022
(0.004) (0.015) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.005) (0.022) (0.013) (0.027)
Log of Electricity 0.160** 0.100* 0.010 0.010 0.280** 0.010 0.200 0.040 0.010
(0.064) (0.055) (0.112) (0.065) (0.110) (0.116) (0.138) (0.054) (0.085)
Log of Capital 0.010 0.010 0.980** 0.480** 0.020 0.010 0.140 0.020 0.570**
(0.280) (0.098) (0.429) (0.204) (0.215) (0.107) (0.198) (0.049) (0.283)
Number of Observations 7033 2744 1596 1167 2143 845 243 3135 240
Dependent Variable: Log of Output
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) Estimation
 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the plant-level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Chapter 4: Does Tougher Import Competition Foster Product Quality 
Upgrading?
*
 
(Co-authored with Ana M. Fernandes, The World Bank) 
Abstract 
This chapter examines whether the increased exposure to import competition affects 
product quality upgrading using a rich dataset of Chilean manufacturing plants and their 
products. We measure product quality with product unit values and use industry-level 
transport costs as an exogenous measure of import competition. In line with the “escape 
competition” hypothesis of innovation, our estimates show a positive and robust effect 
of import competition on product quality. Our evidence suggests that while import 
competition contributes to quality upgrading and this holds especially for non-exporting 
plants, competitive pressure alone will not enable plants to catch up with leading world 
producers.  
 
 
Keywords: import competition, transport costs, product quality, incremental innovation, 
output unit values, plant-level data, Chile. 
JEL Classification codes: O31, F14, L6. 
 
 
  
                                                          
* This chapter is based on Fernandes, A. and C. Paunov (2009), Does Tougher Import 
Competition Foster Product Quality Upgrading?, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 4894.  
 
  122 
1. Introduction 
The acceleration in globalization witnessed over the last two decades and the 
corresponding increased exposure to competition from low-price producers in China and 
India have created a new economic environment for emerging economies (World Bank, 
2006; OECD-WEF, 2008). Since production costs - especially those that are wage-
related - cannot be infinitely reduced, the main way for manufacturing firms in those 
economies to position themselves in domestic and international markets is to focus on 
offering upgraded and differentiated rather than “mundane” labor-intensive products 
(Moreira, 2007). Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2006) argue that such upgrading will provide 
the “high road” to competitiveness offering higher revenues and wages in contrast to the 
“low road” which would require price reductions squeezing revenues. Many factors can 
facilitate taking on the “high road”, one of them is the competitive pressure from abroad 
which may force firms to improve their products to stay in business. In this chapter, we 
provide a rigorous empirical foundation to this hypothesis by examining the following 
question: does increased exposure to import competition foster firm product quality 
upgrading?
 
 
Innovation plays a crucial for growth and welfare (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1998). However, the effects of competition on innovation are the 
object of some theoretical controversy and the empirical evidence is not always clear-cut 
as discussed below. Our study fills a gap in the literature by examining a potentially 
important determinant of incremental innovation reflected in product quality upgrading: 
import competition.
68
 In an emerging economy context it is all the more relevant to 
                                                          
68
 We follow Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2006) in equating product quality upgrading with innovation “to 
increase value-added”.  
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focus on such upgrading since most firms lag behind the world‟s technology frontier so 
radical innovation outcomes are less forthcoming.   
While the idea of linking import competition to product quality upgrading is 
appealing, its empirical implementation faces two challenges. The first challenge 
concerns the measurement of product quality. To address it, we exploit a new dataset 
including rich information from census data on all the products manufactured by all 
Chilean plants during the 1997-2003 period. We follow the empirical trade literature and 
use unit values (prices) of products to measure their unobserved quality or 
sophistication.
69
 The second challenge concerns the difficulty in identifying causal 
effects of import competition on quality upgrading as upgrading can itself affect whether 
and how much foreign competitors choose to export to the domestic market. To address 
it, we rely on an effective trade barrier measure - transport costs - which capture 
differences in import competition across industries that are exogenous to quality 
upgrading.  
Our econometric approach exploits the variation in transport costs across 4-digit 
industries and over time and consists of regressions of product unit values on a lagged 
measure of transport costs, a set of plant and industry control variables, as well as 
product, plant, year, and industry-year fixed effects. Importantly, our specifications 
identify impacts by establishing comparisons of unit values across plants within product 
categories. No attempt is made to distinguish higher-quality from lower-quality products 
since differences across products in units of measurement and other characteristics 
preclude the direct comparability of their unit values.  
                                                          
69
 Iacovone and Javorcik (2008), Kugler and Verhoogen (2008), and Lelarge and Nefussi (2008) use data 
on unit values of domestic or exported products to proxy for product or export quality at the plant level, 
while Kiyota (2008) and Schott (2008) use data on unit values of exports to proxy for export quality at the 
country level. 
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Our main finding suggests that import competition has a positive and significant 
impact on plant-level product quality upgrading. The magnitude of the estimated impact 
increases as our sample is progressively restricted to include all plants but only the 
products that they neither start producing nor discontinue producing during the sample 
period (continued products) and then to include only the plants in the sample during the 
entire period of analysis (continuing plants) and their continued products. This 
difference in magnitudes suggests that products with less upgrading potential are likely 
to be discontinued by plants and new products are also less subject to upgrading as a 
result of import competition after their initial introduction.  
It seems to be mainly increased import competition from less advanced economies 
that leads to the average positive impact of import competition on quality upgrading. 
This finding suggests that while increasing the sophistication of products is a distinct 
option that Chilean plants use to escape competition from less advanced economies, 
competition from more advanced economies does not engender the same response. 
Focusing on the differential impacts of tougher import competition across plants, we 
find that domestic-owned plants that do not export their products exhibit the strongest 
response in terms of quality upgrading. This is likely the case because the other plants 
are already exposed to international competition through other channels. We also show 
that increased import competition provides a significantly larger boost to the quality of 
products sold only in the domestic market than to the quality of products that are also (or 
exclusively) exported. Finally, we provide evidence that import competition is 
associated with a wider divergence in quality within product categories, which may 
suggest the presence of heterogeneous impacts of competition on plants with different 
productivity.  
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We successfully submit our results to a variety of tests. Our results are robust to 
the use of multiple outlier criteria and to the inclusion of additional or alternative control 
variables. Our findings are also maintained if different lags of the transport cost measure 
or alternative transport cost measures are used, suggesting that endogeneity problems are 
not a concern. A different concern about our results arising from the use of plant product 
prices as our outcome of interest is that the imports-as-market-discipline-hypothesis 
predicts a negative effect of import competition on prices and price-cost margins 
(Levinsohn, 1993; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). Since radical trade liberalization in 
Chile occurred in the early 1980s, we would not expect the pro-competitive price-
lowering effects (the aforementioned “low road”) as a reaction to imports to still play a 
major role during our sample period. Indeed, we are able to dismiss those concerns 
based on our estimation of the link between transport costs and price-cost margins of 
Chilean plants following the widely used methodology proposed by Roeger (1995). 
Finally, while the use of unit values to signal product quality is well-founded in the 
industrial organization and the trade literatures, we provide explicit evidence confirming 
that our estimated increases in unit values due to tougher import competition are indeed 
picking up improvements in product quality. While we believe that those analyses and 
checks contribute to strengthening our findings, there are a couple of limitations to our 
findings as will be discussed in the concluding section.   
This chapter relates to the debates in two strands of the literature. First, theoretical 
and empirical studies on product market competition and innovation are unclear about 
the sign of that relationship (Ahn, 2002). In a seminal contribution, Schumpeter (1942) 
argues that producers facing less competition are best placed to innovate since getting 
adequate returns for one‟s innovation requires some form of temporary monopoly 
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power. In contrast, strong competition may foster innovation as producers need to 
escape their innovating peers to stay in business. Aghion et al. (2005, 2006) predict and 
show evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between competition and innovation 
on a model which allows for counteracting „escape competition‟ effects as well as 
„Schumpeterian‟ effects of competition on innovation. Gorodnichenko et al. (2008), 
however, find no support for the inverse U-shaped relationship. Second, the theoretical 
literature on within-plant margins of adjustment to increased import competition is 
ambiguous about the incentives for plants to invest in productivity-enhancing 
technology and innovate.
70
 In Goh (2000) import competition increases these incentives 
by reducing the opportunity cost of technological effort and in Thoenig and Verdier 
(2003) it results in defensive skill-intensive innovations by plants desiring to reduce 
future threats of imitation or leapfrogging by competitors. In contrast, Rodrik (1992) 
argues that by reducing the plant‟s market share, import competition may actually 
decrease its incentives to innovate, reviving the arguments of Schumpeter (1942).  
To the best of our knowledge, empirical studies examining the effects of import 
competition on plant-level innovation outcomes are rare and those available differ in 
important aspects from ours. Bertschek (1995) and Baldwin and Gu (2004) examine the 
effect of import competition measuring German and Canadian plants‟ involvement in 
product upgrading or innovation by an affirmative answer to the question: „Did you 
introduce new or significantly improved goods‟.71  Lelarge and Nefussi (2008) study the 
link between import competition from low-wage countries and French plants‟ research 
                                                          
70
 See Tybout (2000) for a survey of the literature. 
71
 Alvarez and Robertson (2004) use a similar question to relate innovation outcomes for Chilean and 
Mexican plants to alternative dimensions of openness: foreign direct investment and exports. 
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and development (R&D) spending and the effect of the latter on exported products‟ unit 
values, in the absence of information on domestically sold products.  
Our study‟s contributions to the literature are four-fold. First, ours is the first study 
to examine the impact of import competition on incremental rather than radical R&D-
intensive innovation at the plant level for an emerging economy. Indeed, this is the type 
of innovation that is more prevalent in emerging economies where producers often 
improve upon products imported from developed countries. Second, we measure 
incremental innovation using direct quantitative information on product prices instead of 
relying on subjective perception-based measures of product upgrading as in previous 
studies. Third, we analyze the effects of import competition on quality upgrading for the 
universe of Chilean manufacturing products whereas most previous studies focus on 
exported products. This feature of the analysis is particularly important given that 86 
percent of the products manufactured by Chilean plants are sold only in domestic 
markets. Furthermore, exported products may differ in many respects from domestically 
sold products, thus estimates obtained focusing exclusively on the former may be biased. 
Fourth, our identification of the effects of import competition on product quality relies 
on the use of a measure of transport costs that separates freight costs from insurance 
costs and thus improves upon that used by Bernard et al. (2006a) for U.S. industries and 
can confidently be considered exogenous to quality upgrading. 
Our findings suggest that increased exposure to import competition, including that 
from China and India, may be beneficial by encouraging producers to follow the “high 
road” to competitiveness (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2006). Taking into account the 
evidence provided by Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) that Mexican plants invest in 
product quality upgrading before they export, our findings suggest that over time plants - 
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including  those with no export experience - may be able to progressively target more 
sophisticated export markets. However, our evidence also suggests that import 
competition may be insufficient to enable quality upgrading where the technology gap 
between foreign competitors and local producers is high. Other policy tools will be 
necessary to encourage more radical innovation in products.   
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
Section 3 presents the empirical specification. Section 4 discusses our main results, 
robustness tests, evidence of quality upgrading, and the imports-as-market-discipline 
hypothesis. Section 5 examines the differential impacts of import competition by type of 
exporting country and by type of plant and product. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Data  
2.1 Plant Unit Values and Other Information 
In our analysis, we use a dataset with information on products at the plant level 
from 1997 to 2003 that is merged with the annual manufacturing census of Chilean 
plants with more than 10 employees (ENIA). Both datasets are provided and collected 
by the Chilean National Statistical Office. The products dataset includes information for 
each plant and year on the physical quantity sold and the sales value of each of 2,018 
products at the 7-digit ISIC level (revision 2). Appendix Table 1 provides some 
examples of 7-digit ISIC categories to illustrate the level of detail of the products. The 
ENIA census described in detail in Chapter 2 is an unbalanced panel of plants capturing 
entry and exit that includes information on basic plant characteristics such as 
employment, ownership and on accounting variables such as sales. 
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For each product p7 of plant i in year t we construct a unit value as 
777 p
it
p
it
p
it QSUV  , where S  is the value of sales and Q  is the physical quantity sold. A 
unit value measures the average price charged by a plant for each product in a year. We 
assume that an increase in unit values proxies for plant product quality upgrading. Our 
dataset reports the physical quantities of the 2,018 products in 20 different measurement 
units, some of which are shown in Appendix Table 1. The unit values for products 
measured in different units (e.g., price per kilogram, price per liter) are not comparable. 
To obtain our final estimating sample, we address two issues on the measurement units 
of the products‟ physical quantities: (i) some plants do not report the measurement unit 
of their products‟ quantity, and (ii) some plants report their products‟ quantity in a 
different unit than the unit in which the majority of plants report product quantities. The 
unit values of both types of plants cannot be compared to those of other plants producing 
the same 7-digit product and are thus excluded from the final sample. Further, to 
eliminate potential outliers we exclude the top and bottom 5% of the distribution of unit 
values for any 7-digit product. Appendix 2 describes further the cleaning procedures 
used for the products dataset and some tests performed to assess the goodness of the 
data. Our final sample combining the products dataset with the ENIA census includes 
55,294 plant-year-product observations with the average number of products 
manufactured per plant being 2.3. Navarro (2008) shows that many stylized facts based 
on the Chilean products dataset are similar to those obtained for a U.S. products dataset 
by Bernard et al. (2006b) and an Indian products dataset by Goldberg et al. (2008).
72
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 For example, the average shares of the most important product, the second most important product, and 
so on, in total sales of Chilean multi-product plants are strikingly similar to those of U.S. and Indian multi-
product plants. 
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Table 1 shows average coefficients of variation in unit values for selected 4-digit 
industries. The statistics show a substantial degree of heterogeneity in unit values across 
plants and point to some interesting differences across industries. Industries with 
homogeneous products and thus less scope for quality differences such as cement or 
petroleum refineries are characterized by low average coefficients of variation. 
However, industries where quality is expected to play a more important role such as 
electrical machinery, motorcycles, and professional equipment are characterized by 
higher coefficients of variation.  
 
2.2 Transport Costs  
Our measure of transport costs is based on detailed information provided by the 
Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) on freight costs excluding insurance 
costs and the free on board customs value (fob) of Chilean imports for each 8-digit 
Harmonized System (HS) code, exporting country, and year from 1997 to 2003. First, 
we compute for 8-digit HS code i from exporting country c in year t freight rates as the 
ratio of freight costs ( ictfreight ) to the fob value of imports ( ictfob ): 
ictictict fobfreightTC / . Second, we aggregate these freight rates from the 8-digit HS 
code, exporting country, and year level to the 4-digit ISIC (revision 2) and year level 
using (i) a concordance between 8-digit HS and 4-digit ISIC codes and (ii) weights 
given by Chile‟s 8-digit HS fob imports from each exporting country and year as a ratio 
to Chile‟s total imports in the corresponding 4-digit ISIC code in that year. Appendix 2 
provides more details on the construction of the freight costs measure hereafter referred 
to as „transport costs measure‟. 
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Table  illustrates the substantial variation in our transport costs measure over time 
and across a selection of 4-digit industries. Since some countries may not export a 
product to Chile due to prohibitive transport costs, our measure is a lower bound for 
transport costs accounting only for those of exports that actually occur (Hummels, 
2001). However, as this feature of our measure is common to all products, it does not 
impair our analysis which focuses on differences in the relative rather than the absolute 
magnitude of transport costs across industries and time.  
Transport costs proxy adequately for the exposure to import competition of plants 
in Chilean industries during the sample period for four reasons. First, export choices are 
to some extent driven by freight costs. For example, within disaggregate product 
categories, exporters with the lowest freight rates are shown to have the largest import 
shares based on data for the U.S., New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay (Hummels, 2001). Second, transport costs can play an important role in 
“altering patterns of trade across goods and partners” due to their size and variability 
across trade partners (Hummels et al., 2008). Third, transport costs represent currently a 
greater share of trade costs than tariffs for most countries including Chile (Anderson and 
Wincoop, 2004).
73
 Fourth, our transport costs measure excludes insurance costs and, 
therefore, does not suffer from the related concerns of endogeneity.  
Finally, note that our transport costs measure is obtained at the 4-digit ISIC 
revision 2 level. A more aggregate measure may not adequately capture the degree of 
import competition faced by plants. For example, 3-digit industry 311, food 
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 The most usual measure of trade barriers - tariffs - is not informative in the Chilean context due to the 
uniform tariff structure across industries in place since the 1980s‟ trade liberalization (Chumacero et al., 
2004). Chile‟s entry into preferential trade agreements with various countries and regions since the 1990s 
introduced a complex set of product- and country-specific exceptions to that uniform tariff structure that 
could provide useful variation for our analysis. However, such exceptions are subject to political economy 
pressures and likely to be endogenous to product quality in an industry. 
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manufacturing, includes 4-digit industries ranging from fruit and vegetable canning to 
bakery. If we considered a transport costs measure at the 3-digit level, an increase in 
imported bakery products would erroneously suggest that fruit and vegetable canning 
products also faced stronger import competition, when such products are not exactly 
substitutes. Certainly, one could argue that measuring import competition at the 4-digit 
level for bakery products (ISIC 3117) is still too aggregate. An import competition 
measure at the 4-digit level implies that increased imports of cookie products strengthen 
the competition faced by cake products too. Cake products may indeed be challenged by 
imports of cookie products because consumers may decide to substitute cake for cookie 
products. If competition was measured at a more disaggregate level - i.e., distinguishing 
cake from cookie products - then one might wrongly ignore that cross-effect. Hence, we 
consider 4-digit to be an adequate level at which to measure the degree of import 
competition as it accounts for a reasonable degree of substitutability across products.  
 
3. Empirical Framework 
To examine the impact of import competition on product quality, we need to 
account for the fact that 49 percent of Chilean plants manufacture multiple 7-digit 
products. Among these multi-product plants in any given year, 55 percent manufacture 
products within a single 4-digit industry whereas the remainder manufacture products 
across at least two different 4-digit industries.
74
 As mentioned in Section 2.2, transport 
costs are measured at the 4-digit level. Thus, plants manufacturing 7-digit products in 
various 4-digit industries face a different degree of import competition in each of the 4-
digit industries to which their products belong. The specification which allows us to 
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 Thus, in any given year about 78% of Chilean plants manufacture products within a single 4-digit 
industry.  
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examine quality upgrading responses to changes in the transport costs faced by each of 
the plant‟s products is given by:  
7374
1
7 ***log pitit
mp
it
k
itTC
p
it fIIIXTCUV    , (1) 
where 7log pitUV  is the log of the unit value for 7-digit product p7 manufactured by plant 
i in year t, 41
k
itTC    are transport costs for 4-digit industry k4 to which the plant‟s product 
p7 belongs, itX  is a vector of controls to be specified below, 
7pI  are 7-digit product 
fixed effects, 3mI * tI  are 3-digit industry m3-year fixed effects, if  are plant fixed 
effects, and 7pit  is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) residual.  
We now discuss various econometric issues associated with the estimation of 
Equation (1). First, there is a possibility of reverse causality as product quality may 
affect import competition. Improvements in product quality in Chile may encourage the 
opening of its economy to further trade (e.g., by reducing lobbying pressures against 
openness) and result in tougher import competition. This issue does not concern us, 
though, since our measures capture „external‟ transport costs incurred by imports from 
the exporting country until the arrival to Chilean ports and thus are not affected by 
Chilean trade policy decisions. Moreover, even if Chilean policy-makers attempted to 
reduce trade-related insurance costs or to improve the quality of domestic ports, those 
actions would not be captured by our measure of transport costs which excludes 
insurance costs. This advantage of our measure relative to that of Bernard et al. (2006a) 
is particularly relevant as insurance costs increase with the value - and likely the quality 
- of an exported product (Hummels et al., 2008).  
Nevertheless, there are two possible ways in which product quality could affect 
transport costs. The first possibility is that if certain countries‟ producers stopped 
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exporting to Chile due to improved domestic product quality, our measure of transport 
costs could be affected since those countries no longer enter the transport costs‟ 
calculation. If these countries used to export high-quality products to Chile, then the 
import competition faced by Chilean plants in these 4-digit industries would be 
effectively reduced. However, the new measure of transport costs would only increase, 
reflecting this decline in competition, if those countries also had low transport costs. It is 
likely that it would be producers in countries exporting smaller quantities to Chile that 
would stop exporting and that exporting smaller quantities would be linked to higher 
transport costs. Thus, measured transport costs could decrease as a result of quality 
upgrading. This issue is relevant for our analysis to the extent that only half of Chile‟s 
import relationships at the country-4-digit industry level last the entire sample period.
75
 
However, since our measure is a weighted average of transport costs across all countries, 
the exclusion of a country is unlikely to affect it unless it is one of Chile‟s largest trading 
partners. Our data shows that few large trading partners stop exporting any 4-digit 
categories to Chile during the sample period.
76
 Nonetheless, we consider this issue in our 
robustness checks in Section 4.2 and find that our results are not driven by this potential 
reverse causality channel. The second possibility is that improvements in product quality 
in Chile could motivate producers in certain countries to export smaller quantities to 
Chile. This would result in higher freight rates if exporters no longer benefit from 
economies of scale in the transportation of their products. In this case, quality upgrading 
would result in weaker import competition and actually work against the finding of a 
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 Out of 4,960 country-4-digit industry pairs in Chilean imports, 2,449 (49%) last the entire sample 
period. Excluding import flows below 5,000 USD, out of 3,866 country-industry pairs, 2,428 (63%) last 
the entire sample period.  
76
 Considering the top 10 exporting countries to Chile for each 4-digit industry, 4,400 out of 4,764 
observations (94%) correspond to relationships that last the entire sample period.  
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positive effect of import competition on quality upgrading. However, the importance of 
such scale economies in affecting freight rates is unclear. These two possibilities by 
which quality upgrading could affect transport costs may lead to biases in the estimate of 
TC . To help mitigate these potential biases, we follow Bernard et al. (2006a) and 
include a one-year lag of the variable TC as shown in Equation (1).
77
 
Second, unit values reflect a combination of quality and cost attributes such as 
input prices. Specifically, higher costs of production at the plant level may, depending 
on the market‟s level of competition, lead to increases in unit values unrelated to quality 
improvements. Production costs may actually be correlated with our measure of 
transport costs if intermediate inputs are imported or affected by the degree of import 
competition in final products. To the extent that transport costs differ across industries in 
their level and evolution over time and that plants use inputs from industries other than 
their own, the potential correlation with production costs seems limited. Nevertheless, 
we believe that our specification must include in the vector of controls proxies for 
production costs: average wages paid by the plant, the share of skilled labor in the 
plant‟s total workforce, unit prices paid for electricity by the plant, and the share of 
imported materials in total plant materials. Appendix 2 provides details on these four 
variables.   
Third, omitted variables at the industry or plant levels correlated with import 
competition but also with product quality could bias the estimate of TC . The 
knowledge spillovers generated by FDI in an industry could drive plants, particularly 
those domestic-owned, to upgrade product quality. In this case omitting FDI from our 
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 We should note, however, that since unit values are serially correlated over time for plants, the use of 
lagged transport costs does not fully correct for potential reverse causality.  
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specification could bias downward the effect of import competition. However, higher 
FDI in an industry could also have a negative effect on quality upgrading by domestic-
owned plants through market-stealing effects. In this case omitting FDI from our 
specification could bias upward the effect of import competition. Import competition 
may also be correlated with domestic competition in the industry. If stronger domestic 
competition in an industry has „escape‟ effects as in Aghion et al. (2005), then it is likely 
associated with quality upgrading in that industry. Foreign exporters have an incentive to 
send to Chile products for which local substitutes have lower quality since it is easier to 
compete with those. Thus, omitting domestic competition from our specification could 
result in a negative link between import competition and product quality and a 
downward bias in the effect of import competition. To control for these possibilities, we 
include measures of FDI and domestic competition in the vector of controls: the share of 
total employment in the plant‟s main 4-digit industry accounted for by foreign-owned 
plants and the Herfindahl index for each of the 4-digit industries to which the plant‟s 
products belong.
78
 Foreign-owned plants may produce higher-quality products and 
exhibit higher unit values relative to domestic-owned plants, regardless of import 
competition. The vector of controls includes a dummy for the plant‟s foreign ownership 
status to account for this possibility. That vector includes also an indicator for multi-
product plants to acknowledge potential differences between multi-product and single-
product plants.
79
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 Since total employment of a plant is not allocated across the production of each of its products, the share 
of total employment accounted for by foreign-owned plants is computed for the plant‟s main 4-digit 
industry, which is for multi-product plants the industry to which the major product belongs. The major 
product accounts for the largest share (which could be less than 50%) of the plant‟s total sales. 
79
 For example Bernard et al. (2006b) show that U.S. multi-product plants are significantly larger and 
more productive than single-product plants. The identification of the coefficient on the indicator for multi-
product (foreign-owned) plants in our plant fixed effects estimation is based on plants that switch into 
multi-product status (foreign ownership) during the sample period. 
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Fourth, for any given product, quality differences may not fully explain the 
corresponding dispersion in unit values. Since unit values are prices, their increase may 
reflect to some extent an increase in a plant‟s market power. Moreover, plant size may 
play a role for quality upgrading by allowing the corresponding fixed costs to be spread 
over a larger scale and granting easier access to the financing necessary for upgrading, 
mimicking the role that size plays for radical innovation (Cohen, 1995; Cohen and 
Klepper, 1996). To address these possibilities, the vector of controls includes a measure 
of the plant‟s market share in each of the 4-digit industries to which its products belong 
and three size dummies based on the plant‟s total employment.80  
Fifth, by including 3-digit industry-year fixed effects, we account for 
technological progress or other shocks experienced by Chilean industries during the 
sample period. In particular, these fixed effects may account for different trends in the 
prices of materials and capital goods faced by plants operating in different 3-digit 
industries which could affect the prices at which they sell their final products.
81
  
Sixth, it is crucial to control for plant-specific unobservable heterogeneity by 
including plant fixed effects in Equation (1). Plants differ in the diversity of products 
they manufacture and in the type and quality of management which could affect their 
incentives and possibilities for quality upgrading. However, due to the presence of 
multi-product plants in the sample it is also crucial to control for product fixed effects in 
Equation (1) to ensure that TC  is identified based on a comparison of unit values across 
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 The size dummies are defined in Appendix 2.   
81
 IMF (2008) shows that the recent commodity price boom (with the exception of copper and oil) began 
only after the end of our sample period. Our year and industry-year fixed effects account for possible 
increases in the prices of copper and oil in the last two sample years which could have affected final 
products‟ unit values. Regarding oil, we also estimate Equation (1) for a sample excluding industries 353 
(petroleum refineries) and 354 (manufacture of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal) and find 
similar results relative to those discussed in Section 4.1. 
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plants producing the same product, as import competition changes. Moreover, product 
fixed effects account for physical or technological characteristics differentiating 7-digit 
products which may influence their unit values.  
In sum Equation (1) allows us to identify an unbiased effect of import 
competition on product quality upgrading at the plant level due to the exogenous nature 
of transport costs and the set of control variables and fixed effects included.
82
  
 
4. Results  
4.1 Main Results  
 Table 3 presents the results from estimating Equation (1) with robust standard 
errors clustered by 4-digit industry and year considering all plants and products in Panel 
A.
83
 To simplify the interpretation, 4kitTC  in Equation (1) measures the negative of 
transport costs: i.e., its increase corresponds to an increase in import competition whose 
quality upgrading impact is captured by a positive TC . All specifications include plant 
and product fixed effects, as well as year and 3-digit industry-year fixed effects. The 
estimates in column (1) show that import competition has a positive effect on product 
quality when plant cost controls, other plant characteristics, and industry characteristics 
are ignored. In column (2), the specification includes only plant characteristics in 
addition to transport costs. The estimate of TC  is positive and significant and its 
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 Note that active innovation promotion programs may affect plants‟ incentives and possibilities to 
engage 
 in quality upgrading. However, our specification would need to account for such programs only if they 
targeted specific industries and could therefore be systematically correlated with import competition. The 
Chilean National Fund for Technological and Productive Development (FONTEC) - a public program in 
place since 1991 - helped finance innovation projects for manufacturing firms (Benavente et al., 2007). 
However, the program did not target specific industries within manufacturing. 
83
 The significance of TC  is maintained when standard errors are clustered by plant, product, or product-
year. 
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magnitude increases. The difference in results across columns (1) and (2) suggests that 
in column (1) import competition may be picking up the effect of omitted plant 
characteristics negatively associated with quality. Columns (3) and (4) show the results 
from specifications where in addition to transport costs either only industry 
characteristics or only plant cost controls are included, respectively. The estimates of 
TC  are positive, significant, and similar in magnitude to that in column (1) suggesting 
these factors do not substantially affect the results. Column (5) shows our preferred 
specification which includes the three types of controls.
84
 The estimate of TC  implies 
that a one percentage point reduction in transport costs would lead to an increase in log 
unit values of almost 2% within plants and products.
85
 Since transport costs average 
9.2% in our sample, a one percentage point reduction represents a meaningful increase 
in the degree of import competition faced by plants. Such reduction would correspond to 
the following important increases in actual unit values: e.g., (i) from an average of USD 
86 to USD 93 for bicycles, (ii) from an average of USD 227 to USD 250 for domestic 
ovens and (iii) from an average of 16,454 USD to USD 19,735 for fabricated motor 
vehicles.
86
  
While for brevity the tables do not report the estimated coefficients on the 
control variables included in our regressions, three findings are noteworthy. For a given 
product category, larger plants exhibit significantly higher unit values than smaller 
plants while multi-product plants exhibit significantly lower unit values than single-
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 The control variables are contemporaneous relative to plant unit values. However, we obtain 
qualitatively similar results when one-year lagged control variables are included.   
85
 Unit values are measured in logarithms and transport costs are measured in fractional terms, thus 1.9% 
is obtained by multiplying 1% by 1.887. 
86
 These averages are for year 2000 and the unit values are expressed in USD using the corresponding 
average peso-USD exchange rate obtained from the Central Bank of Chile. Providing an economic 
magnitude for the average product is difficult due to the lack of comparability of unit values across 
products measured in different units. 
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product plants. Plants with larger market shares have significantly higher unit values, as 
expected. However, this market power effect does not eclipse the importance of 
increased import competition in generating quality improvements. 
Panels B and C of Table 3 show the results from estimating Equation (1) for two 
different sub-samples. In Panel B, we use a sub-sample of all plants but only the 
products that plants neither start producing nor discontinue during their years in the 
sample (continued products). The effect of import competition on product quality is 
found to be positive, significant, and much larger than in Panel A. The difference in 
magnitudes suggests that products with less upgrading potential are likely to be 
discontinued by plants and new products are also less subject to upgrading as a result of 
import competition after their initial introduction. In Panel C, we use a sub-sample 
including only plants that are in the sample during the entire sample period (continuing 
plants) and including for each of those plants only their continued products. Import 
competition has a positive and significant effect on product quality, whose magnitude is 
even larger than in Panel B. This difference in magnitudes suggests that the „well-
established‟ products of continuing plants are more prone to quality upgrading as a 
response to increased import competition than the continued products of plants which 
just started operations or those of plants in their years shortly before exit.  
4.2 Robustness  
We conduct an extensive set of robustness tests to our preferred specification 
(column (5) of Panel A in Table 3).
87
 First, we consider alternative criteria to eliminate 
                                                          
87
 For brevity, we show in what follows only the regression results corresponding to the full sample used 
in Panel A. However, the pattern detected across panels in Table 3 is also verified for our robustness and 
other regressions: i.e., the magnitude of TC  is larger for the sub-sample of all plants but only continued 
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outliers in our dependent variable. Columns (1)-(4) of Table  show the estimates of 
Equation (1) for four samples based on the following outlier criteria: excluding none of 
the observations (column (1)), excluding the top and bottom 10% of unit values for any 
product (column (2)), excluding observations with unit values above (below) the 75
th
 
(25
th
) percentile plus (minus) by 1.5 times the inter-quartile range (column (3)) or 
replacing those observations by those cut-off values (column (4)). The estimates show a 
significant positive effect of declines in transport costs on quality upgrading.
88
  
A possible concern with our estimates is that the regressions give a larger weight 
to multi-product plants which have more observations per year than to single-product 
plants. To address this possibility, we follow the two-stage regression procedure 
proposed by Kugler and Verhoogen (2008). First, we regress plant unit values (the 
dependent variable in Equation (1)) on plant-year, product-year, and year fixed effects. 
For any given year, the estimated plant-year fixed effect provides an average plant unit 
value identified by the differences between a plant‟s unit value(s) and those of other 
plants producing the same product(s) in that year. Second, these time-varying average 
plant unit values are regressed on our transport cost measures along with 3-digit 
industry-year fixed effects.
89
 In this regression a single-product plant and a multi-
product plant included in the sample during the same number of years have equal 
weight. Column (5) of Table  presents the results from this regression and shows that our 
main finding is qualitatively maintained. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
products (corresponding to Panel B) and even larger for the sub-sample of continuing plants and continued 
products (corresponding to Panel C). These results are available from the authors upon request. 
88
 While we base our main results on the exclusion of outliers for product categories, qualitatively similar 
results are obtained when the exclusion of outliers is done for product-year categories. 
89
 We refer the reader to Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) for further details on this two-stage procedure, in 
particular on the non-identification of some plant-year fixed effects.  
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Column (1) of Table 5 shows that the estimate of TC  is robust to the addition of 
an indicator for the plant‟s exporter status which controls for possible unit value 
differences for exporters independent of import competition. Measuring competition in 
the domestic market is inherently difficult. Column (2) of Table 5 shows that the effect 
of import competition is robust to the use of the sum of the market shares of the 5 plants 
with the largest market shares in each of the 4-digit industries to which a plant‟s 
products belong as the measure of competition.
90
 Moreover, within-country costs of 
transportation, among several other factors, may give plants in certain regions stronger 
market power. Hence, we show in column (3) of Table 5 the results from a specification 
where we add to our preferred specification regional Herfindahl indexes and market 
shares. Our estimate of TC  remains qualitatively unchanged.  
Table 5 also shows the results from three experiments to address potential reverse 
causality problems in our main specification. A first experiment consists of including in 
Equation (1) either the two-year or the three-year lag of transport costs. The results 
reported in columns (4) and (5) still show a positive and significant effect of lagged 
import competition on quality. A second experiment consists of modifying the definition 
of transport costs to exclude from the calculation of the weighted average country-
product-year freight costs corresponding to import flows below 1,000 or 5,000 USD. 
The effects of import competition reported in columns (6) and (7) are still positive, 
significant, and are substantially higher than those in Table 3. This finding is reassuring 
with respect to the endogeneity concern discussed in Section 3, since import flows above 
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 In unreported regressions we also find robust effects of import competition when we replace the plant‟s 
market share in each of its 4-digit industries by that in each of its 5-digit or 6-digit industries, or in each of 
its 7-digit products. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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5,000 USD are more permanent.
91
 In the third experiment reported in column (8), we 
find our results to be qualitatively unchanged for an alternative measure based only on 
the freight rates for country-industry relationships lasting the entire sample period.
92
 The 
evidence in columns (6) to (8) suggests that our decision to use information on freight 
costs for all import flows in our main specification is, if anything, underestimating the 
effect of import competition on product quality. 
4.3 Unit Values and Quality  
Increases in unit values seem to correspond well to the definition of incremental 
innovation in the OECD Oslo manual (1997) which covers “existing product[s] whose 
performance has been significantly enhanced or upgraded”. For certain consumer 
products such as automobiles or washing machines, it is clear that higher prices are 
directly correlated with higher quality. This explains why various studies in the trade 
literature have taken for granted the idea that increases in export unit values represent 
improvements in quality (Fontagné and Freudenberg, 1997). The summary statistics on 
the heterogeneity in unit values presented in Table 1 support this argument. Industries 
with little scope for quality differences show low relative variation in unit values while 
industries where quality is expected to play an important role such as professional 
equipment (which includes information technology products) exhibit a much higher 
variability in unit values.  
An extensive industrial organization literature has examined the role of product 
pricing as a signal for quality. The market for „lemons‟ of Akerlof (1970) illustrates this 
clearly: in the presence of imperfect information, firms with high quality products need 
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 About 63 percent of those country-industry relationships last the entire sample period compared to 49 
percent of the country-industry relationships corresponding to all import flows. 
92
 Note that while the specifications in columns (6) to (8) provide a relevant robustness test, they could 
introduce a sample selection bias due to the omission of some country-year relationships.  
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to introduce signals -  higher prices - to convey to consumers the high quality of their 
products. Fluet and Garella (2002) show theoretically that in markets with strong vertical 
product differentiation (i.e., those with substantial quality differences within product 
categories) firms may base their signaling on prices only.
93
  Thomas et al. (1998) 
provide empirical evidence showing that higher prices are used for quality signaling 
purposes in the U.S. automobile industry. More broadly, this literature shows that prices 
are a good signal for quality since firms often choose intentionally their level as to reveal 
to consumers the higher quality of their products.  
To provide further support that our estimates refer to product quality, we conduct 
different tests. Specifically, we examine whether the effects of import competition on 
unit values are stronger for industries whose product attributes (e.g., substitutability) 
suggest more opportunities for quality improvements or for plants whose actions or 
characteristics are likely to be associated with those improvements. We estimate a 
variant of Equation (1) given by: 
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where the effect of transport costs is allowed to differ across industries or plants 
belonging to group 1 and industries or plants belonging to group 2, and all other 
variables are defined as before. Column (1) of Table  reports the results from estimating 
Equation (2) considering as group 1 (group 2) differentiated goods industries (non-
differentiated goods industries) according to the classification proposed by Rauch 
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 The authors also show that in other scenarios, firms resort additionally to advertising as a signal for 
quality.  
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(1999).
94
 The response to import competition is expected to be naturally larger in 
industries with a greater scope for quality differentiation. Our estimates show that the 
impact of tougher import competition on quality upgrading is indeed significantly larger 
for plants in differentiated goods industries.  
In addition, product quality upgrading often requires substantial investments in 
physical capital by plants. Column (2) of Table  shows the results from estimating 
Equation (2) defining group 1 (group 2) to include plants engaged in substantial (low) 
new investments relative to their capital stock. We assume that a substantial new 
investment relative to the capital stock - a ratio above 50% - represents the adoption of 
new technology by a plant, following Huggett and Ospina (2001). The estimates and the 
F-test show that the effect of import competition on unit values is significantly stronger 
for plants engaged in technology adoption.  
Moreover, human capital is a key component of a plant‟s absorptive capacity to 
new technology and knowledge necessary for product quality upgrading (Cohen and 
Levintahl, 1989; Pack, 2006). Column (3) of Table  shows the results from estimating 
Equation (2) defining group 1 (group 2) to include plants whose wage share of skilled 
labor in the first sample year is larger (smaller) than the sample median. The estimates 
and the F-test show that increased import competition leads to a significantly stronger 
increase in unit values for plants with larger skill shares. Overall, the findings in 
columns (1) to (3) provide evidence to support our assumption that increases in unit 
values are a good proxy for improvements in product quality.  
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 According to Rauch‟s classification, differentiated products are those that are neither (i) homogenous - 
traded in organized exchanges (e.g., steel) nor (ii) reference-priced - having listed prices in trade 
publications (e.g., some chemical products) and require a more important degree of buyer-seller 
interaction. To use Rauch‟s classification, we establish a correspondence between his 4-digit SITC rev. 2 
codes and our 4-digit ISIC rev. 2 codes. For the printing industry (ISIC 342), we are unable to establish an 
unambiguous correspondence and thus drop it from the regressions using the industry groups 1 and 2 
based on the Rauch classification 
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4.4 The Imports-as-Market-Discipline Hypothesis 
A potential concern about our main results arises from the use of product prices as 
our plant-level outcome of interest. The imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis predicts 
a negative effect of import competition on price-cost margins (the ratio of the difference 
between price and marginal cost to price) of manufacturing plants, which might appear 
to be at odds with our results. To examine the effects of import competition on price-
cost margins - which are not observable given that marginal costs are not observable - 
we follow the widely used methodology proposed by Roeger (1995). The methodology 
computes the difference between the primal Solow residual in the presence of imperfect 
competition (Hall, 1988) and the corresponding dual Solow residual derived from a cost 
function. This difference eliminates plant unobserved productivity which is associated 
with an endogeneity bias in production function estimation and results in an equation 
providing consistent estimates for price-cost margins.
95
 We allow average price-cost 
margins to vary with the degree of import competition and with the degree of domestic 
competition faced by each plant in its main 4-digit industry.
96
 Our estimable equation is 
given by:  
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where itZ  and itX  are computed based on the growth of plant nominal sales, wage 
bill, intermediate costs, and capital as described in Appendix 3, 41
k
itTC   is defined as 
before, 4kitH  is the Herfindahl index in 4-digit industry k4, if  are plant fixed effects, and 
                                                          
95
 We refer the reader to Roeger (1995) and Konings et al. (2005) for details on the derivation of that 
equation. 
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 Plant level estimates of price-cost margins cannot be obtained due to insufficient degrees of freedom.  
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it  is an i.i.d. residual.
97
 The estimate of 1  is the average price-cost margin while the 
estimates of 2  and 3  show how average price-cost margins differ depending on the 
degree of import and domestic competition, respectively.  
The results from estimating Equation (3) by plant fixed effects are shown in Table  
with standard errors clustered by 4-digit industry and year. Columns (1) and (3) show 
that the average price cost-margins of Chilean plants are positively related to import 
competition. However, the effects are insignificant. In contrast, columns (2) and (3) 
show that average price-cost margins are positively and significantly linked to domestic 
competition. The estimated positive impact of import competition on price-cost margins 
may reflect increased market rents achieved by plants as a result of their incremental 
innovation to escape increased import competition. Since radical trade liberalization in 
Chile occurred in the early 1980s, it is not surprising that during our sample period the 
price-cost margins of Chilean plants were not disciplined by stronger import 
competition. Those pro-competitive price-lowering effects likely occurred much earlier. 
However, we should note that the absence of strong effects on price-cost margins does 
not weaken our evidence of quality upgrading since the increase in price-cost margins 
driven by higher prices charged for higher quality products may have been counteracted 
by the higher costs incurred by plants to achieve those quality improvements. If plants 
have to incur costs to signal the quality of their products, then these additional costs 
could equally explain why price-cost margins do not vary significantly with import 
competition. 
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 For comparability with the estimates of Equation (1) transport costs are lagged one year. However, the 
results are qualitatively similar including current transport costs or including all variables lagged one year. 
  148 
5. Heterogeneity in the Impact of Import Competition 
5.1 Does the Impact Differ by the Type of Exporting Country? 
The evidence in Section 4 shows that import competition has on average a 
positive impact on product quality. A natural question that follows is whether increases 
in all types of import competition provide Chilean plants with incentives for quality 
upgrading. One of the advantages of our transport costs measure is that it is based on 
freight rate information for the countries of origin of all Chilean manufacturing imports. 
We can therefore distinguish import competition from technologically more advanced, 
richer, higher-wage countries from import competition from other countries. We 
estimate the following specification:  
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where transport costs measures are computed separately for more advanced countries 
moreadvk
MitTC
4
1  and less advanced countries 
lessadvk
LitTC
4
1  according to two country 
classifications, and all other variables are defined as in Equation (1). First, we define 
more advanced countries to be high-income and upper-middle income countries 
according to the World Bank‟s income group classification and report the results in 
column (1) of Table .
98
 Second, we define more advanced countries to be countries 
whose scores in the Global Competitiveness Report‟s general country ranking are above 
                                                          
98
 We use the World Bank country classification as of April 2007 which establishes four income groups: 
low-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and high-income and covers all countries 
included in our transport cost dataset. The classification is based on gross national income per capita using 
the World Bank Atlas method. Upper-middle-income and high-income countries have an income level 
similar to or above that of Chile. We also estimate Equation (4) defining more advanced countries to be 
high-income countries and obtain qualitatively similar results.  
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the median score and report the results in column (2) of Table .
99
 The estimates show 
that increased import competition from less advanced countries is the strongest stimulant 
for product quality upgrading by Chilean plants. The F-tests show that the difference in 
the effects across country groups is statistically significant for both classifications. These 
findings suggest that tougher competition from low-wage countries (including China and 
India) serves as an incentive for quality upgrading by Chilean plants and thus can be 
viewed as an advantageous type of competition. The products exported by more 
advanced countries to Chile may be too sophisticated for local plants to be able to „beat‟ 
through quality upgrading. This finding provides support to the existence of a costly-to-
overcome „technology gap‟ that Cimoli and Correa (2002) argue has been responsible 
for lower growth benefits from trade liberalization in Latin America. Our evidence also 
support the hypothesis that the high cost of catching-up with more advanced economies 
in order to upgrade product quality may constitute a barrier to economic growth (Parente 
and Prescott, 1994).  
 
5.2 Does the Impact Differ across Types of Plants or Types of Products? 
 An issue of interest is whether import competition affects product quality across 
all plants and all products equally or whether the effects are heterogeneous. First, we 
explore the possibility that plants which are less integrated into global markets may be 
affected differently by import competition. Table 9 shows the results from estimating 
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 The World Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum, 2007) ranks 131 countries‟ 
performance based on a broad range of factors affecting a country‟s business climate: institutions, 
infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, health and primary education, higher education and training, 
goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market, sophistication, technological readiness, 
market size, business sophistication, and innovation. Countries are ranked and given a performance score. 
We use the median score to divide our sample into above-median and below-median performers.  
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Equation (1) based on three restricted sub-samples of plants: including only non-
exporting plants (column (1)), including only domestic-owned plants (column (2)), and 
including only domestic-owned plants which do not export (column (3)). The impact of 
import competition on product quality is positive and significant in all columns. 
Interestingly, the impact is substantially larger in magnitude for domestic-owned plants 
that do not export. This means that an increase in import competition elicits the strongest 
quality upgrading response from the plants that are less exposed to international 
competition through other channels such as exports or multinational parent linkages. A 
rationale for this finding is that plants that are more internationally integrated through 
exports or foreign ownership may already have been forced to undertake quality 
upgrading and increased import competition provides a weaker incentive for further 
upgrading.  
 Second, we examine whether plant size affects the strength of the impact of 
import competition on product quality. Column (4) of Table 9 shows the results from 
estimating Equation (2) defining group 1 (group 2) to include plants whose average total 
employment over the sample period is higher (lower) than the sample median.
100
 Plant 
size is used as a rough proxy for plant performance and for whether a plant is a „leader‟ 
i.e., it is closer to the technological frontier (of its industry or of the world) according to 
the terminology of Aghion et al. (2005, 2006). However, our F-test shows that the 
estimated effect of import competition does not differ significantly across plant size. 
This finding stands in contrast with those of Aghion and co-authors who show that 
leaders innovate more due to foreign competition than plants more distant from the 
technological frontier. The difference in findings could be simply due to the fact that 
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 The sample median employment is computed pooling across all plants and years. Note that the 
specifications still include three size dummies as control variables. 
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size is a poor proxy for a plant‟s distance to the technological frontier. Defining the 
distance to the technological frontier based on plant TFP measures would be closer to 
the strategy followed by Aghion et al. (2005, 2006) but we deliberately avoid pursuing 
that strategy due to the presence in our sample of many multi-product plants for which 
the usual measures of TFP can be biased (Bernard et al., 2005). Instead, we use an 
indirect approach to estimate heterogeneous impacts. We compute for each 7-digit 
product and year the absolute coefficient of variation in unit values (a measure of quality 
dispersion) and regress it on our transport costs measure. The results, reported in column 
(6) of Table 9 show a positive impact of import competition on product quality 
dispersion. This finding hints at the presence of heterogeneous impacts of competition 
on plants, possibly depending on their closeness to the technological frontier. The 
confirmation of this possibility cannot, however, be directly inferred from these results.  
Column (5) of Table 9 shows the results from estimating Equation (2) defining 
group 1 to include products that are exported (at least partially) and group 2 to include 
products that are sold exclusively in the domestic market. Interestingly, the estimates 
and F-test show that the impact of increased import competition on quality upgrading is 
significantly higher for domestically sold products. It is possible that once these 
domestically sold products achieve sufficiently high quality, plants are able to sell them 
in export markets also, which is indeed the finding for Mexican plants by Iacovone and 
Javorcik (2008). This result points to the importance of using data both for domestically 
sold as well as for exported products to study the link between import competition and 
quality rather than data on exported products only.  
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6. Conclusion 
 So, does import competition affect product quality? We investigate this question 
using a rich dataset of Chilean plants and products and a regression framework where 
increases in unit values proxy for product quality improvements and transport costs are 
the exogenous measure of import competition. Our results show that import competition 
does have a positive, significant, and robust impact on product quality for Chilean 
plants. To the extent that these findings can be generalized to other middle-income 
countries, they suggest that increased exposure to import competition, including that 
from China and India, can be beneficial by encouraging their producers to follow the 
“high road” to competitiveness (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2006). Moreover, in light of 
the evidence provided by Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) that Mexican plants invest in 
product quality upgrading before they export, our findings suggest that over time plants - 
including those with no export experience - may be able to progressively target more 
sophisticated export markets.  
 However, our evidence also suggests that import competition may be insufficient 
to enable quality upgrading where the “technology gap” between foreign competitors 
and local producers is high. In so far as quality upgrading for non-frontier products 
presents a less demanding task than more radical innovation, our findings suggest that 
while import competition encourages upgrading, other policy tools will be necessary for 
more radical innovations.  
Our findings also suggest that the recent models of heterogeneous multi-product 
firms such as those of Bernard et al. (2006c) and Eckel and Neary (2006) that examine 
changes in firms‟ product mix as a response to trade costs‟ reductions have yet to exploit 
other interesting margins of adjustment such as the possibility of quality upgrading.  
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As was pointed out in Chapter 3, there are several shortcomings due to our 
measure of import competition. First of all, while transport costs might well measure 
import competition in Chile in firm product markets it is equally possible that it also 
captures several other effects. One telling example is that the measure will equally 
capture the obstacles to imports of production inputs for firms. We might actually 
measure impacts of improved access to production inputs and their impact on product 
quality rather than effects from competition. Also, we have implicitly assumed that a 
reduction on transport costs is equivalent to a unilateral trade liberalization that increases 
imports. However, reductions in the transport costs of imports into Chile may be 
correlated with reductions in the transport costs faced by Chilean exporters. Hence an 
alternative interpretation of the negative effect of transport costs on quality upgrading is 
that they reflect the effects of a symmetric increase in export market access and not 
those of product market competition. Verhoogen (2008) shows that such increase led to 
quality upgrading by Mexican firms.ory might rather be about lost learning opportunities 
than competition. These are important concerns that will require further analysis in order 
to strengthen findings reported here.  
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Chapter 4: Tables 
 
Table 1: Heterogeneity in Unit Values within Selected 4-digit Industries 
4-digit ISIC  Coefficient of Variation
3111 Slaughtering, preparing and preserving meat 4.6%
3114 Canning, preserving and processing of fish, crustaces and similar 
foods
9.7%
3134 Soft drinks and carbonated waters industries 5.0%
3212 Manufacture of made-up textile goods 51.4%
3220 Manufacture of wearing apparel 81.9%
3312 Manufacture of wooden and can containers 37.2%
3420 Printing, publishing and allied industries 30.3%
3530 Petroleum refineries 5.5%
3620 Manufacture of glass and glass products 47.9%
3610 Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware 22.9%
3692 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 7.4%
3831 Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery 34.6%
3844 Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles 70.5%
3851 Manufacture of professional and scientific, and measuring and 
controlling equipment n.e.c.
86.6%
3901 Manufacture of jewellery and related articles 28.2%
 
Notes: The table shows for each 4-digit industry the simple average across all sample years of the industry‟s yearly 
coefficients of variation in unit values. For each 4-digit industry and year, the yearly coefficient of variation in unit 
values is obtained as a weighted average of the coefficients of variation in unit values for each of its 7-digit products 
using as weights the share of each 7-digit product in the 4-digit industry‟s total sales in the year.  
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Table 2: Transport Costs for Selected 4-digit Industries and Years 
4-digit ISIC 1997 1999 2002
3112 Manufacture of dairy products 7.98% 6.46% 6.25%
3118 Sugar factories and refineries 10.67% 15.67% 14.02%
3212 Manufacture of made-up textile goods except wearing apparel 6.69% 7.74% 8.60%
3220 Manufacture of wearing apparel except footwear 4.98% 5.35% 5.13%
3312 Manufacture of wooden and cane containers and small cane ware 9.15% 6.29% 6.11%
3320 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures, except primarily of metal 13.72% 12.25% 13.98%
3122 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds 15.61% 12.91% 12.74%
3133 Malt liquors and malt 19.49% 12.61% 15.66%
3140 Tobacco manufactures 8.19% 8.46% 8.79%
3215 Cordage, rope and twine industries 4.33% 5.08% 6.39%
3233
Manufacture of leather and leather substitutes, except footware 
and wearing apparel
8.29% 9.85% 9.06%
3240
Manufacture of footwear, except vulcanised or moulded rubber 
and plastic footwear
5.20% 5.50% 5.81%
3412 Manufacture of containers and boxes of paper and paperboard 15.14% 10.52% 10.41%
3512 Manufacture of fertlizers and pesticides 11.21% 11.91% 10.95%
3551 Tyre and tube industries 7.95% 7.69% 8.25%
3560 Manufacture of plastic products not elsewhere specified 10.27% 10.04% 9.13%
3620 Manufacture of glass and glass products 13.49% 14.31% 13.84%
3720 Non-ferrous metal basic industries 4.64% 4.58% 4.06%
3822 Manufacture of agricultural machinery and equipment 6.51% 5.36% 6.21%
3831 Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery and apparatus 4.85% 4.63% 4.80%
3852 Manufacture of photographic and optical goods 3.36% 3.36% 3.85%
3420 Printing, publishing and allied industries 8.04% 8.74% 8.24%
3522 Manufacture of drugs and medicines 3.30% 3.07% 3.31%
3610 Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware 11.85% 15.67% 13.97%
3710 Iron and steel basic industries 10.59% 10.06% 10.15%
3812 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures primarily of metal 12.20% 11.35% 12.94%
3813 Manufacture of structural metal products 9.80% 7.65% 8.05%
3844 Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles 8.69% 10.56% 11.49%
 
Note: The table shows for each 4-digit industry transport costs aggregated from the level of the 8-digit HS code, 
exporting country, and year to the level of the 4-digit ISIC and year using as weights Chile‟s fob imports from each 
country and year. 
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Table 3: Effects of Transport Costs on Unit Values – Main Results 
Panel A: Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transport Costs t-1 1.887** 1.891** 1.884** 1.881** 1.887**
(0.750) (0.750) (0.740) (0.750) (0.730)
Plant Controls No Yes No No Yes
Industry Controls No No Yes No Yes
Plant Cost Controls No No No Yes Yes
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 41032 41032 41018 40991 40981
R-Squared 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
Panel B: Sample of Continued Products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transport Costs t-1 3.897*** 3.875*** 3.788*** 3.904*** 3.788***
(0.950) (0.960) (0.920) (0.950) (0.930)
Plant Controls No Yes No No Yes
Industry Controls No No Yes No Yes
Plant Cost Controls No No No Yes Yes
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 18159 18159 18156 18138 18138
R-Squared 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58
Panel C: Sample of Continuing Plants and Continued Products 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transport Costs t-1 4.691*** 4.639*** 4.516*** 4.680*** 4.463***
(0.980) (0.990) (0.930) (0.980) (0.940)
Plant Controls No Yes No No Yes
Industry Controls No No Yes No Yes
Plant Cost Controls No No No Yes Yes
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 11762 11762 11762 11750 11750
R-Squared 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59
Dependent Variable: Log of Unit Value 
Dependent Variable: Log of Unit Value 
Dependent Variable: Log of Unit Value 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by 4-digit industry and year in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. The negative of transport costs is included in the regressions. Plant 
controls include size dummies, a dummy for foreign ownership, a dummy for multi-product plants, and the plant's market 
share at the 4-digit level. Industry controls include the share of employment in foreign-owned plants in total 4-digit 
industry employment and the normalized Herfindahl index at the 4-digit industry level. Plant cost controls include the log 
of average wages, the share of skilled labor in total labor, the log of unit electricity prices paid by the plant, and the share 
of imported inputs in total inputs. The regressions in Panel B are estimated for the sub-sample of all plants but only 
products that the plant neither starts producing nor discontinues during its years in the sample while those in Panel C are 
estimated for the sub-sample of plants included in the sample during the entire sample period and for each of those plants 
only the products that they produce during the entire sample period. 
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Table 4: Effects of Transport Costs on Unit Values – Different Outlier Criteria and 
Weights 
Dependent Variable: 
Residual Log of Unit 
Value 
No Outliers 
Excluded
Exclude 
Top/Bottom 
10% of Unit 
Values by  
Product
Exclude Unit 
Values Based 
on Quartiles 
Criterion by 
Product
Windsorize Unit 
Values Based 
on Quartiles 
Criterion by 
Product
Second Stage 
Regression In 2-
Stage Procedure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transport Costs t-1 1.917** 1.821** 1.745** 2.156*** 5.119***
(0.840) (0.730) (0.730) (0.760) (1.880)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Plant Cost Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Plant Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 44157 36733 41929 44157 19546
R-Squared 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.32
Dependent Variable: Log of Unit Value 
Different Outlier Criteria for Unit Values
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by 4-digit industry and year in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. The negative of transport costs is included in the regressions. The 
samples used in columns (1) to (4) are described in the text. Plant controls in columns (1)-(4) include size dummies, a 
dummy for foreign ownership, a dummy for multi-product plants, and the plant's market share at the 4-digit level. 
Industry controls include the share of employment in foreign-owned plants in total 4-digit industry employment and the 
normalized Herfindahl index at the 4-digit industry level. Plant cost controls include the log of average wages, the share 
of skilled labor in total labor, the log of unit electricity prices paid by the plant, and the share of imported inputs in total 
inputs. 
 
 
  161 
Table 5: Effects of Transport Costs on Unit Values – Robustness 
Additional Plant 
Control
Exporter Status
Share of Top 5 
Plants in 4-digit 
Industry
Adding 
Regional 
Competition 
Measures
Two-Year Lag Three-Year Lag 
Exclude 
Country-
Product Import 
Flows below 
USD 1,000
Exclude 
Country-
Product Import 
Flows below 
USD 5,000
Include Only 
Continued 
Country-4-digit 
Industry Import 
Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Transport Costs t-1 1.888** 1.955** 2.601*** 3.336*** 3.255*** 3.937***
(0.730) (0.770) (0.780) (1.180) (1.170) (1.250)
Transport Costs t-2 2.683**
(1.330)
Transport Costs t-3 2.765*
(1.440)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant Cost Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 40981 40734 38276 32387 24368 40947 40947 40834
R-Squared 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56
Dependent Variable: Log of Unit Value 
Alternative Lags for Transport 
Costs Measure
Alternative Transport Costs MeasuresDifferent Competition Measure
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by 4-digit industry and year in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, 
respectively. All regressions include the negative of transport costs, those in columns (6) to (8) include modified versions of that measure described in the text. Plant 
controls include size dummies, a dummy for foreign ownership, a dummy for multi-product plants, and the plant's market share at the 4-digit level., and a dummy 
for the plant‟s exporter status (only in column (1)). Industry controls include the share of employment in foreign-owned plants in total 4-digit industry employment 
and the normalized Herfindahl index at the 4-digit industry level (except in column (2) where the sales share of the largest 5 plants at the 4-digit level is included). 
Plant cost controls include the log of average wages, the share of skilled labor in total labor, the log of unit electricity prices paid by the plant, and the share of 
imported inputs in total inputs. 
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Table 6: Effects of Transport Costs on Unit Values – Evidence of Quality Upgrading 
(1) (2) (3)
Transport Costs t-1  * Dummy for Differentiated Product Industries 5.386***
 (1.880)
Transport Costs t-1  * Dummy for Non-Differentiated Product Industries 1.304*
 (0.760)
Transport Costs t-1 * Dummy for Large Investment-Capital Ratio 2.591***
(0.860)
Transport Costs t-1 * Dummy for Small Investment-Capital Ratio 1.698**
(0.700)
Transport Costs t-1 * Dummy for Firms with Higher Skilled Share 2.702***
(0.710)
Transport Costs t-1 * Dummy for Firms with Lower Skilled Share 1.740**
(0.820)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes
Plant Cost Controls Yes Yes Yes
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Plant Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
P-value for F-Test of Difference in Coefficients across Groups 0.04 0.04 0.08
Number of Observations 39296 40981 37343
R-Squared 0.56 0.56 0.57
Dependent Variable: Log of Unit Value 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by 4-digit industry and year in parentheses. **, and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. The regressions include the negative of transport costs interacted with 
alternative sets of dummy variables described in the text. The plant controls, industry controls, and plant cost controls 
included in the regressions are similar to those in column (5) of Panel A of Table 3. 
 
Table 7: Effects of Transport Costs on Price-Cost Margins 
(1) (2) (3)
ΔX t 0.506*** 0.454*** 0.492***
(0.029) (0.016) (0.029)
ΔX t* Transport Costs t-1 0.417 0.413
(0.340) (0.324)
ΔX t* Herfindahl Index t 0.178** 0.177**
(0.084) (0.081)
Plant Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 18282 18282 18265
R-Squared 0.42 0.42 0.42
Dependent Variable: ΔZ t  (in Equation (3))
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by 4-digit industry and year in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. The computation of the dependent variable itZ  
and of itX  is described in Appendix 3. In columns (1) and (3) the negative of transport costs is included in levels 
and interacted with itX . 
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Table 8: Effects of Transport Costs on Unit Values – By Type of Country 
(1) (2)
Transport Costs t-1  from More Advanced Countries WB 0.639
  (0.720)
Transport Costs t-1  from Less Advanced Countries WB 3.381***
  (0.900)
Transport Costs t-1  from More Advanced Countries GCR -0.273
   (0.670)
Transport Costs t-1  from Less Advanced Countries GCR 3.362***
   (1.030)
Plant Controls Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes
Plant Cost Controls Yes Yes
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Plant Fixed Effects Yes Yes
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
P-value for F-Test of Difference in Coefficients across Country Groups 0 0
Number of Observations 40947 40907
R-Squared 0.56 0.56
Dependent Variable: Log of Unit Value 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by 4-digit industry and year in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. Column (1) includes the negative of transport costs for high income 
and upper-middle income countries and for lower-middle income and low income countries according to the World 
Bank country specification. Column (2) includes the negative of transport costs for countries with a performance score 
above the median and for countries with a performance score below the median, according to the Global 
Competitiveness Report. The plant controls, industry controls, and plant cost controls included in the regressions are 
similar to those in column (5) of Panel A of Table 3.  
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Table 9: Effects of Transport Costs on Unit Values – By Type of Plant or Product 
Dependent 
Variable is 
Coefficient of 
Variation in Unit 
Values
Sample of Non-
Exporting 
Plants
Sample of 
Domestic Plants
Sample of 
Domestic Non-
Exporting 
Plants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Transport Costs t-1 3.529*** 1.924** 3.784*** 0.617***
(0.850) (0.760) (0.900) (0.140)
Transport Costs t-1  * Smaller Plants Dummy 1.681***
   (0.640)
Transport Costs t-1 * Larger Plants Dummy 1.506**
 (0.690)
Transport Costs t-1 * Exported Products Dummy 0.887
 (0.780)
Transport Costs t-1* Non-Exported Products Dummy 2.089***
 (0.730)
Plant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product Cost Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Plant Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
3-Digit Industry*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value for F-Test of Difference in Coefficients 
across Groups
0.61 0
Number of Observations 31309 38500 30411 40981 40981 3737
R-Squared 0.6 0.57 0.6 0.56 0.56 0.14
Excluding Plants with International Ties
Dependent Variable: Log of Unit Value 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by 4-digit industry and year in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. All regressions include the negative of transport costs, those in 
columns (4) and (5) include that variable interacted with alternative sets of dummy variables described in the text.  The 
plant controls, industry controls, and plant cost controls included in the regressions are similar to those in column (5) of 
Panel A of Table 3. 
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Appendix 
 
1. Examples of 7-Digit Products for Selected 4-digit Industries 
 
4-digit 
ISIC
7-digit        
ISIC
Product Description Unit of 
Measurement
Average Annual 
Unit Value 
Changes
3117101 Bread of any kind, size and quality (except sweet bread) in tons 2.89%
3117201 Cookies, with and without sugar and filled in tons 4.28%
3117301 Noodles, pasta including macaroni in tons 0.22%
3117402 Mixed dough (for different types of cakes) in tons -11.42%
3311307 Finished parquet excluding plastic parquet in square meters 1.28%
3311302 Wooden boards for prefabricated houses in square meters -13.16%
3311306 Wooden doors with or without glass in units 0.10%
3311124 Sawing wood in cubic meters 5.94%
3320908 Sofas and armchairs of the type used in ceremonies in units 31.79%
3320910 Wooden tables for computers and typewriters in units 10.08%
3320906 Wooden household furniture in units 26.47%
3320913 Office furniture in units -5.45%
3843201 Fabricated motor vehicles in units 0.41%
3843409 Wheels and related parts and vehicle accessories in units 5.78%
3843421 Heating appliances for motor vehicles in units -2.68%
3843422 Metallic frames for trucks, special frames in units 19.27%
3559324 Gloves of caoutchouc one pair 13.63%
3559327 Sports shoes one pair 5.51%
3559320 Caoutchouc sheating for mining in tons 17.00%
3559332 Articles made of caoutchouc for vehicles in tons 26.81%
3829056 Cablecars in units 20.74%
3829032 Gas regulators in units -4.56%
3829060 Moving staircases in units 26.01%
3829002 Pumps for liquids for manual use in units 13.71%
Manufacture of rubber products 
n.e.c.
Machinery and equipment 
except electrical n.e.c. 
Manufacture of motor vehicles
Manufacture of bakery products
Sawmills, planing and other 
wood mills
Manufacture of furniture and 
fixtures, except primarily of 
metal
3559
3829
3483
3117
3311
3320
 
Notes: For each 7-digit product and year, we compute the average logarithmic unit value by pooling across all plants 
that manufacture that product. Then across any two consecutive years we compute the difference in average log unit 
values to obtain the annual change in unit values. The statistic in the table shows the simple average of those annual 
changes.  
 
2. Data Issues 
2.1 Plant and Products Data 
We combine a products dataset at the 7-digit level for the period 1997-2003 and the 
annual manufacturing census of Chilean plants with more than 10 employees (ENIA) for 
the same period. As described in Chapter 2 the ENIA includes some plants with 
discontinuous data over the sample period. For those plants, we consider only the 
observations across consecutive years for which yearly growth rates of any variable can 
be computed. In the products dataset, products are identified by a classification based on 
ISIC Rev. 2 and Rev. 3. More detail on the products data is provided in Navarro (2008). 
We obtain products at the 7-digit level building up from what Navarro (2008) refers to 
as „ENIA products‟. Specifically, for each plant reporting more than one entry for a 7-
digit product in a given year (Z entries) we sum the information on sales values and 
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product quantities of those Z entries for that plant as long as all the Z entries‟ quantities 
are reported in the same unit. The sum provides us with a single entry for that 7-digit 
product for that plant in that year. If the entries‟ quantities are reported in multiple units, 
we drop those products from the analysis. Note that these deletions occur in a very small 
number of cases. Also note that if aggregated to the 4-digit level, our 7-digit products 
correspond exactly to the United Nations product classification. 
For our analysis, we use information on sales values and product quantities sold for 
each 7-digit product, plant, and year. We exclude from the final sample (i) plants that do 
not report the measurement unit for their products‟ quantities and (ii) plants that report 
their products‟ quantities in a different unit than the unit in which the majority of plants 
report. We also exclude from the sample the top and bottom 5% of the unit values‟ 
distribution for any 7-digit product. After applying these data cleaning procedures our 
final sample includes 55,294 plant-year-product observations.  
We test the goodness of our products data by identifying plants with irregular 
product „drops‟ (i.e., products that disappear from production and then reappear again) 
and plants with product „jumps‟ (i.e., products that are produced only once in the 
intermediate years of plant presence in the sample). These tests, which follow Bernard et 
al. (2008), are satisfactory in that product „drops‟ and product „jumps‟ are relatively 
infrequent. We also perform another test which compares the standard deviations of 
„purged‟ unit values for 4-digit industries with the same standard deviations obtained for 
a Colombian products dataset by Kugler and Verhoogen (2008). „Purged unit values‟ are 
the residuals from regressions of log unit values on product fixed effects or from 
regressions of log unit values on product-year fixed effects. Our standard deviations are 
somewhat larger than theirs but are sufficiently within bounds to be explained by the 
fact that we consider a different country with a distinct profile of manufacturing 
production.   
We use variables from the ENIA census to compute the proxies for costs of 
production included in our regressions. Plant average wages are obtained as the ratio of 
total wages paid to the plant‟s employees. Plant skill share is defined as the ratio of the 
number of skilled workers (a sum of managers, administrative personnel and qualified 
production workers) to the total number of workers employed by the plant. Plant 
electricity unit prices are computed as the log of the ratio of electricity expenditure to the 
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quantity of electricity purchased. To eliminate outliers in each of these variables, we 
follow a „winsorizing‟ procedure whereby we replace the top and bottom 5th percentile 
of observations in each year by the value of the cut-off observations at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 
percentile in that year, respectively. Plant share of imported materials is computed as the 
ratio of the expenditure in imported materials and primary inputs to the overall 
expenditure in materials and primary inputs. The three size dummies are defined based 
on total employment: small plants have less than 50 employees, medium plants have 50 
to 200 employees, and large plants have more than 200 employees. 
 
2.2 Transport Costs Data 
We use a transport costs dataset from the ALADI secretariat for the period 1997-
2003 that includes the freight value (excluding insurance costs) and the free on board 
customs value (fob) of Chilean imports for each 8 digit HS code, exporting country, and 
year. For each 8-digit HS code, exporting country, and year we compute a freight rate as 
the ratio of the freight costs to the fob imports. We remove observations with higher 
freight costs than their fob import value for values below 1,000 USD. Our measure of 
transport costs is given by a weighted average of the freight rate aggregated from the 
level of the 8-digit HS code, exporting country, and year, to the level of the 4-digit ISIC 
and year using as weights Chile‟s fob imports from each country and year. To convert 
import flows between 8-digit HS codes and 4-digit ISIC codes we use a correspondence 
obtained from http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/ 
HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/TradeConcordances.html. Our dataset includes all 
Chilean imports originating in 169 countries. Taking the overall value of imports for the 
entire period 1997-2003, the top 10 exporters to Chile are the United States, Brazil, 
Argentina, China, Germany, Japan, France, Mexico, South Korea, and Italy.  
 
3. Methodology and Data Issues for Price-Cost Margins 
The difference between the primal Solow residual and the corresponding dual Solow 
residual derived from a cost function results in the equation below which follows 
Konings et al. (2005): 
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(A1) 
where it  is the price-cost margin for plant i in year t,  itYitYitit PPYY   is nominal 
sales growth,  
itLitLitit
PPLL   is wage bill growth,   
itMitMitit
PPMM   is 
intermediate costs growth,  
itKitKitit
PPKK   is capital stock growth, and Lit , 
Mit  are labor and intermediates shares in total nominal sales. Equation (A1) assumes 
constant returns to scale: )1( MitLit    is the cost share of capital. To reach Equation 
(2) in the text we designate the left hand side of Equation (A1) by itZ , and the right 
hand side parentheses term by itX , we interact itX  separately with the transport costs 
measure and with the Herfindahl index, we include in Equation (A1) the transport costs 
measure and the Herfindahl index levels as well as year fixed effects and we add an i.i.d. 
stochastic residual it . Equation (2) in the text is estimated for the sample of plants in 
the ENIA dataset during the 1997-2003 period. For plants with discontinuous data we 
include only the observations across consecutive years for which yearly growth rates of 
variables can be computed. The sample differs from that used for the unit values 
regressions since the observations are dropped based on the following criteria: (1) we 
exclude from the sample plants with missing sales, wage bill, intermediate costs, or 
capital variables; (2) we impute sales, wage bill, intermediate costs, or capital to correct 
for non-reporting by a plant in a single year (which occurs in fewer than 30 plant-year 
observations); (3) we exclude from the sample plants whose sales growth, wage bill 
growth, or capital growth is larger than (smaller than) 400%; (4) we exclude from the 
sample plants whose sales (wage bill) growth ranges between 100% and 300% (-300% 
and -100%) but is not accompanied by corresponding high (low) growth rates of 
intermediate costs (total employment). After applying these data cleaning procedures our 
final sample includes 31,318 plant-year observations.  
To compute itZ  and itX , we use plant-level information on nominal sales and on 
total wage bill and compute their corresponding logarithmic growth rates. Nominal 
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intermediate costs are obtained as the sum of materials costs and electricity costs and the 
corresponding logarithmic growth rate is calculated. Capital stocks are computed using 
the perpetual inventory method (PIM) as described in Chapter 2 and the corresponding 
logarithmic growth rate is computed. We define the rental price of capital to be equal to 
the product of the aforementioned investment goods price deflator and the sum of the 
real interest rate and a depreciation rate as in Konings et al. (2005). Similarly, data on 
the lending interest rate and the consumer price index taken from the IMF financial 
statistics is used to compute the real interest rate. The depreciation rate used is the 
simple average of the rates used in Chapter 2 for three types of capital goods: 3% for 
buildings, 7% for machinery and equipment, and 11.9% for transport equipment. Using 
an alternative depreciation rate equal to 10% provides almost similar results. The share 
of labor (intermediates) in sales is given by the ratio of the wage bill (intermediate costs) 
to total nominal sales.  
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Chapter 5: Technology vs. Trade  
What Explains Relative Wage Changes in Chile? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter analyses the effects of trade and technological change on the decrease in 
wage inequality in the Chilean manufacturing sector for the 1996 -2003 period. We 
establish the impact of trade by means of regressing product price changes on production 
cost shares of skilled and unskilled labour as well as capital. We do the same analysis for 
technological change which is measured by total factor productivity growth. A novelty 
of our analysis is that we conduct that analysis both at firm and industry levels. We find 
that technological change rather than trade explains the decrease in relative wages. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Chilean economy has been open to trade well before other Latin American 
economies (Moreira and Blyde, 2006). Trade openness had significant positive impacts 
on the economy including productivity gains and product upgrading as discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4.  However, it apparently did not have a positive impact on income 
inequality since income inequality hardly changed from the late 1980s to the 1990s 
(Bravo and Marinovic, 2001, World Bank, 2000). Wage differences between skilled and 
unskilled workers in the manufacturing sector were also persistently high over the same 
period.  However, we find that there was a significant decrease in wage inequality over 
the 1996 – 2003 period. Given the high level of wage inequality in Chile and Latin 
America as a whole it is the more so important to investigate what factors contributed to 
this reduction in the Chilean case. The simple question we ask in this chapter is to what 
extent this recent trend in relative wages can be explained by effects of trade and 
technological change.  
 There has been a lot of empirical work on this topic in the empirical literature,
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but only few analyses have evaluated the relative contributions of both trade and 
technological change to wage inequality within a single theoretical set-up. We base our 
empirical work on a model proposed by Leamer (1998) that offers such a framework. 
The key characteristic of this model is that it situates the discussion of relative wages in 
a multi-sector model where labour is flexible across sectors. The contributions of both 
trade and technological change on relative wages will depend on the potential sectoral 
bias of those changes and resulting effects on the profitability of sectors. If, to give an 
example, the profitability of some sectors increased there would be an inflow of labour 
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 References are provided in section 2 of this chapter.  
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in order to restore the zero-profit condition of perfect competition.  As sectors differ in 
their relative use of skilled and unskilled labour the relative demand for both factors 
would be affect with consequences for relative wage payments. An important conclusion 
is, therefore, that the effect of technological change depends on its sector-bias and cost-
reduction potential rather than whether it is skill-biased or not.  
The empirical strategy we implement follows directly from the theoretical 
framework. We make use of a rich dataset on Chilean firms and their products for 1996 
and 2003 and implement two regressions to establish the firm/sector biases of changes in 
trade and technology. First, we regress price changes from 1996 to 2003 on the cost 
shares of skilled and unskilled workers as well as capital. Second, we do the same 
analysis for technological change proxied by TFP growth from 1996 to 2003 on cost 
shares. The estimated coefficients on the cost shares of wages are ‟mandated‟ wage 
changes by sector biases of technological and price changes. Studies using this 
methodology (e.g. Haskel and Slaughter, 2001 and Gregory and Zissimos, 1999) were 
conducted exclusively at rather aggregate industry levels as more disaggregate industry 
price indices were not available. The question of the correct level of aggregation is, 
however, an important aspect. The model relies on heterogeneity across sectors in terms 
of their different factor intensities and the implicit assumption is that each industry 
sector regroups firms with the same input factor intensities. If too broadly defined 
industries are chosen, it may be that each industry includes firms with very diverse 
factor intensities so that aggregate factor intensities are in fact misleading. Our 
contribution consists in verifying that such problems of aggregation do not affect results. 
We do that in implementing the analysis at the level of the 4- and 3-digit ISIC industry 
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classification as well as at the plant level. Moreover, ours is the first analysis to do this 
type of analysis in the context of an emerging economy. 
We find consistently across all three specifications that technological change 
rather than trade explains the decrease in relative wages. At least for our data we can 
exclude the possibility that aggregation drives industry-level results. Our evidence is not 
inconsistent with evidence that documents the importance of skill-biased technological 
change, but shows that cost-reducing technological change was concentrated in 
unskilled-intensive sectors so as increase relative unskilled wages. Results are robust to 
the exclusion of potentially influential outliers. Notwithstanding, there are a couple of 
caveats to our findings that are discussed in the concluding section.  
Following the introduction, the paper describes income inequality in Chile and 
the existing literature on the topic (section 2). This is followed by a detailed discussion 
of the “mandated wage equations” methodology and its theoretical underpinnings 
(section 3). Next, in section 4 we briefly describe the data and how firm-level output 
prices are obtained. We will then present results and interpret them in light of the 
existing evidence (section 5). Finally, section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Existing Evidence on Wage Inequality  
2.1 Wage Inequality in Chile  
We find there is a decrease of wage inequality in the manufacturing sector in 
Chile over the period 1997 – 2003. Figure 1 documents well the decrease in relative 
wages.
102
 This is a very interesting finding since there have been no significant 
improvements in wage inequality in Chile from the end of the 1980s and for most of the 
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 Appendix Table 1 shows relative wages for skilled and unskilled labour and further data both for the 
entire sample and for the restricted sample that is analysed.  
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1990s.
103
 The evidence is the same whether one uses information from the Chilean 
Household Surveys (CASEN) or the Manufacturing Firm Census (ENIA) we will rely 
on in this study.
104
 This is the more so striking since Chile has one of the highest levels 
of income inequality in Latin America, a region with very high levels of income 
inequality that are only exceeded  in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2003). The lack 
of a more equitable distribution of the gains from substantial economic growth in Chile 
has in fact been one of the big shortcomings of an otherwise impressive performance 
and the persistence of inequality is a major issue of political debate (The Economist, 
2007).  Explaining the causes of the decrease in wage inequality is, therefore, an 
important topic.  
2.2 Evidence on the Causes of Wage Inequality  
Wage inequality in the United States increased significantly in the 1980s and 
1990s. Similar changes took place in the United Kingdom in the 1980s (Katz and Autor, 
1999). The initial evidence has been the beginning of a huge literature that documents 
the features of wage inequality in OECD countries and discussed its causes. Three main 
explanations emerged from this literature attributing increased wage inequality to the 
effects of (i) trade, (ii) skill-biased technological change (SBTC) and (iii) changes in 
labour market institutions.
105
 These have frequently been analysed separately.
106
 Studies 
                                                          
103
  Bravo and Marinovic (2001) and World Bank (2000) among many others provide statistical evidence.   
104
 Unreported comparisons of our dataset with the Chilean household survey (CASEN) suggest that the 
ENIA picks up a smaller proportion of high income earners. This is intuitive since firm owners are not 
included in relative wage statistics which includes managers, qualified production workers and 
administrative staff in the group of skilled workers and unqualified production and non-production 
workers as well as support staff as unskilled workers.  
105
 Katz and Autor (1999) provide a useful overview on trends, theory and evidence for the United States 
and some other OECD countries. Acemoglu (2002) provides a useful review of research on SBTC in 
OECD countries. Note that since we focus on the trade versus technology debate studies on the 
contribution of labour institutions will be left out of the discussion.  
106
 See e.g. Deardorff (2005) on the trade hypothesis and Acemoglu (2002), Card and DiNardo (2002) on 
the SBTC hypothesis. The literature reviews provide a full list of the related literature.  
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for developing countries focused mainly on documenting the skills impacts following 
trade liberalisation.
107
 Only few of these look at the technological change hypothesis.
108
  
A few papers analyse the roles of trade and technology in Chile. Gallego (2006) 
assesses the importance of technology on wage inequality.
109
 The results of this study 
point to the importance of technical change to account for higher wage inequality. Beyer 
et al. (1999) and Robbins (1994) find evidence that trade had a negative impact on 
inequality for an earlier period.
 110
  
These studies do not try to establish the relative contributions of both technology 
and trade despite the fact that both effects are likely interlinked. Bustos (2005) presents a 
model and shows some evidence that trade liberalisation may increase the profitability 
of new technologies in less developed countries. Hence, trade may lead to increased 
wage inequality if, for instance, skill-biased technologies are adopted as a result.
111
 Even 
in the absence of such an obvious relationship between trade openness and technological 
change, both factors are likely to simultaneously impact relative wages and it is, 
therefore, desirable to analyse both jointly. An approach aiming at reconciling both 
approaches – the one focusing on trade and the second on technological change - was 
first developed by Leamer (1998). Haskel and Slaughter (2001) used it to understand 
relative contributions of trade and technology to increased UK wage inequalities. The 
results, summarised in Haskel (2000), suggest that in the US both trade and technology 
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 Section 3.2. in Pavcnik and Goldberg  (2004) gives an overview of these studies.  
108
 Fajnzylber and Fernandes (2004) provide an interesting study on this topic. They analyse plant-level 
data for Brazil, China and Malaysia and find evidence that for all countries foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and technology licensing were correlated with more skilled-labour demand, which they interpret as 
possibly related to diffusion of skill-biased technology from developed countries.  
109
 His strategy is similar in spirit to that of Berman and Machin (2000). 
110
 Note that two other papers by Pavcnik (2003) and Fuentes and Gilchrist (2005) proceed to analyse the 
joint effect. However, their analysis relies on a variable, labelled in the survey as ‟patentes y derechos 
municipales‟. Despite the similarity in name the latter does not refer to patents. Therefore, the results of 
studies cannot be used as a comparison.  
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had an impact on increased wage inequality (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999). For the UK, 
by contrast, technological changes do not seem concentrated in skill-intensive sectors.  
2.3 Wage Inequality in Light of the Macroeconomic Context 
 It is useful to consider regulatory changes and the macroeconomic context to 
frame our analysis. First of all, the discussion in Chapter 1 illustrates that the period we 
analyse here is a period of strong economic growth largely shared by a corresponding 
growth in manufacturing value-added interrupted only the spillover effects of the Asian 
crisis. As technological change is an important explanation for growth, this strongly 
suggest that such changes took place over the period of analysis. Also, there was an 
increase in imports with potential effects on relative product prices.  
Focusing on the labour market more specifically Chapter 1 shows that there was 
constant employment growth between 1987 and 2006. This is clearly not consistent with 
the assumption of fixed labour supply of our theoretical model (as described in the 
following section). For the 1997 – 2003 period we study here the growth rate is positive 
and of about 7%. Depending on the skills composition of those new employees this 
might have some effect we are do not address in this study given the confines of our 
theoretical model.  
Another aspect discussed in the introduction that could be highly relevant for our 
analysis is the increase in real minimum wages due to the economic slowdown. 
However, the onset of the decrease in relative wages happens after the increase in 
minimum wages that started in 1998. Moreover, the study by Infante et al. (2003) 
suggests that minimum wages were not very effective as the outcome was an increase in 
informal wage contracts allowing firms to pay lower wages than those imposed by 
regulation. Notwithstanding, a formal study on the impacts of the rise in minimum 
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wages on relative wages would be useful to understand whether they had some effect on 
wage inequality.  
3. Methodology  
3.1 Mandated Wage Equations 
The theoretical background of the “mandated wage approach” is outlined in 
detail by Haskel (2000). We will, therefore, merely highlight the basics of the model so 
as to motivate our empirical contribution and for the interpretation of our findings. The 
main reason why we have chosen to use this methodology is because it seeks to 
understand the relative contributions of international trade and technological change to 
relative wage movements. This is a particularly attractive feature, because it is possible 
to evaluate their contribution and give quantitative estimates of the effects of both on 
relative wages. Furthermore, the empirical framework is also useful since its theoretical 
framework is an extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, and, therefore, lends itself to 
straightforward interpretation once results are obtained.  
The key insight of the multi-sector model characterising the mandated wage 
equations approach is that none of the evidence on skill-biased technical change within 
one sector would give conclusive evidence that SBTC explains relative wage changes. 
This is because relative wages depend on whether technical progress and output prices 
are changing by more in one sector relative to another. The differences in technological 
progress across sectors (with differently skill-intensive production technologies) are 
what matters.  
The following is a useful illustrative example: Consider an increase in skilled-
labour supply to the economy. In a one-sector model, the economy can absorb the extra 
skilled labour only through wage changes. In a multi-sector model, by contrast, sectoral 
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output can change, as well. A combination of higher output in the skill-intensive sector 
and lower output in the unskilled-intensive sector can potentially absorb the rise in 
skilled supply (a Rybczynski effect). No relative wage change would be necessary. 
Therefore, the economy-wide labour-demand curve, in a multi-sector model, reflects 
both these output mix changes and relative wage changes. 
3.2 The Basic Framework  
The theory assumes there are several heterogeneous zero-profit industries so that 
revenue equals cost; so for sectors i and j we have:  
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where p are prices, Y is output and C are total and c marginal production costs of sectors 
i and j.  All workers are considered mobile across sectors and, therefore, each sector 
faces a flat relative labour supply curve and wages ws and wu are the same across sectors. 
The pool of skills available in the workforce is taken to be fixed. Equation (1) implies 
that price is equal to marginal cost.  
 Applying logarithms to equation (1), totally differentiating with respect to time 
and using Shephard‟s lemma, the changes in (log) relative wages can be written as 
follows:  
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where siV  and 
s
jV  are shares of skilled labour in the total wage bill, TFP is total factor 
productivity and p are prices in industry sectors i and j. Note that we assume that 
s
j
s
i VV  . Skilled and unskilled wages are not indexed because there is free mobility of 
workers across sectors. Hence, there will only be one price for each type of labour in the 
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economy. Let us imagine here that industry i is more skill-intensive than industry j. The 
equation (1) shows that changes in total factor productivity or prices may affect relative 
wages. For both variables their relative impacts across sectors and not the magnitude of 
their effects within single sectors matters for the determination of relative wages. 
The explanation for this is as follows taking the example: If technological change 
is more important in skill-intensive sectors than in less skill-intensive sectors, the former 
will generate more profits than the latter. Available profit opportunities generate 
incentives to shift more production to skill-intensive sectors. This generates a relative 
increase in the economy‟s demand for skilled workers. If the supply of skilled workers is 
fixed, there will be an increase in their relative wages. This increase will continue up to 
the point where the rise in relative wages has driven positive profits in the skill-intensive 
sectors back down to zero. The opposite would happen if this had happened in less skill-
intensive sectors. Note that technological progress itself does not have to be skill-biased 
in order to affect relative wages in this set-up. It could be that it improves productivity of 
both types of labour, but if it is relatively more important in the skill-intensive sector it 
would still affect relative wages as described before.
112
 
 
3.3 Empirical Specification 
The empirical strategy that follows this framework, therefore, consists in 
regressing changes in product prices and TFP for different sectors on cost shares of 
production inputs. We use product price changes to indicate trade-induced changes in 
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 Changes in prices across industries may also have an impact on relative wages. The impact depends on 
relative changes across different sectors. If prices fall in a specific sector, the zero-profit condition no 
longer holds. Firms in that industry will make negative profits. As a consequence, there will be a shift in 
the economy‟s production towards other products. Assume this happens in the skill-intensive industry. 
There will be a boom in the non-skill-intensive sector. The relative demand for unskilled workers rises 
and, as a consequence, their relative wage. The extent of the wage increase until the fall in relative wages 
of skilled workers has restored the zero-profit condition in the skill-intensive sector. 
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relative wages. This is because, according to theory, trade will affect product prices. TFP 
is our measure of technological change since it incorporates all types of efficiency 
improvements with cost-reducing potential rather than specifically skill-biased or skill-
neutral technological changes only.  The estimated coefficients on the cost shares of 
wages are ‟mandated‟ wage changes by sector biases of technical and price changes. If 
zero profit conditions have to be restored in all sectors after price and technology 
changes, these are the necessary wage changes.
113
 Thus, the basic empirical specification 
is given by the following equation: 
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Equation (2) says that changes in pi or TFPi can be accompanied by changes in ws and wu 
and still be consistent with zero profits. Note that the changes in ws and wu are weighted 
by factor cost shares which gives the effect on profitability. 
We can use data on prices and outputs and inputs to construct Δpi, ΔTFPi, 
s
iV , 
u
iV . 
The terms Δws and Δwu are unknown since they are the changes in economy-wide 
factor prices required to maintain zero profits. To find them, Haskel and Slaughter 
(2001), following Leamer (1998), estimate the following regressions: 
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 are the cost shares of capital, skilled and unskilled labour in total 
output respectively. And ε1 and ε2 are errors arising from, for instance, measurement 
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 That is, if there is stronger technological change in skill-intensive industries, this requires an increase in 
skilled wages to get back to zero profit conditions. The same holds for price changes, a price increase in 
unskilled-intensive industries leads to a shift in production towards these industries and a necessary 
increase in the wages of unskilled workers to restore zero-profits in these industries. 
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error and the failure of zero profits to hold exactly. The results indicate whether TFP 
changes have been biased towards skilled or unskilled workers (4).  It does the same for 
price changes (5). Both prices and technology are assumed to be exogenous.  
3.4 Levels of Data Aggregation 
A further question is the level of aggregation of the data to be used for the 
analysis. In the discussion above we have loosely referred to sectors without specifying 
what ‟sectors‟ referred to. Studies that have used this methodology including Leamer 
(1998); Haskel and Slaughter (2001); Gregory and Zissimos (1999) have differed in that 
respect. While these studies have all used industry-level data, their applications have 
used very different levels of industry disaggregation. This ranged from 444 industries 
(Leamer, 1998) to 67 (Haskel and Slaughter, 2001). The choice was most likely driven 
by limitations to data availability. Specifically, price deflators are usually available only 
at more aggregated industry levels. What level of disaggregation would be most 
appropriate? Is this in any sense important? This theoretical framework is based on 
traditional trade theory which analyses industry sectors rather than firms. But what is 
meant by ‟industry‟ and what is it the model wants to capture? The model is about 
heterogeneity across sectors in terms of different factor intensities )(
s
j
s
i VV  .  
The expectation is that each industry sectors groups firms with comparable 
technology and skill-intensity. If too broadly defined industries are chosen, it may be 
that each industry includes firms with diverse production technologies and, hence, 
different factor intensities. In that case, results may wrongly label within-industry skill 
biases and specific compositional effects as sector bias. In order to find a suitable 
equivalent empirical studies have used firm information aggregated within industry 
classifications. While one may argue that firms that produce the same type of product 
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have fairly similar products, it is not necessarily the case. For instance, larger firms 
within the industry may have a different more capital-intensive production technology 
than smaller firms because of scale economies. Indeed, we find that this is the case for 
our sample of firms. Less than 25% of the variance in the cost share of skilled labour can 
be explained by 4-digit ISIC Rev. 2 industry group. The number is below 10% for 
unskilled labour cost share. The number is significantly lower when we take it down to 
the 3-digit ISIC Rev. 2 industry level.  
We, therefore, choose to do the analysis at the level of the firm in addition to 
using industry categories (ISIC Rev. 2). At the three-digit level, we have 29 different 
industries. By contrast at the four-digit level, there are 80 different industries in the 
sample. Further, the most disaggregated level of analysis we will use are firms 
themselves. 
4. Data 
The main database we will use is the Chilean manufacturing firm Census data 
(ENIA) provided by the Chilean National Institute of Statistics (INE). The unbalanced 
panel covers manufacturing firms with at least 10 employees. More detail on the main 
dataset in general is provided in Chapters 2 and 3. The information we use in this 
analysis is data on firms‟ value-added, the number of skilled and unskilled workers they 
employ as well as their wage bills and capital inputs. We classify workers into two 
groups based on occupation: Managers, qualified production workers and administrative 
staff are classified as skilled workers while unqualified production and non-production 
workers as well as support staff form part of the unskilled labour group. While the 
classification is not directly related to skills we feel confident that this is a relevant split 
also since on average individuals in the first set of occupations are more skilled than 
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those in the second (Machin, 1996).
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 The capital stock is obtained using the perpetual 
inventory method as explained in the data appendix.  
We use this information to compute cost shares as wage payments to skilled 
labour and unskilled workers over value-added. Note that since we do not have 
information on payments to capital, we follow Haskel and Slaughter (2001) and compute 
the payment to capital as equal to value added minus wage payments. Since we analyse 
the impact over a longer time period, we take the average of cost shares between 1996 
and 2003 for our regressions.  
For the computation of both price changes and TFP growth, we make use of a 
complementary dataset that gives detailed information on firms‟ products. We use 
information on the value and quantity of product sales to obtain firm-specific price 
indices. Following Eslava et al. (2004), we construct firm-level prices using Tornquist 
indices. Tornquist indices for plant j at time t selling products i are the weighted average 
of the growth in prices for all products:  
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where Pijt are prices charged for product i of plant j at time t while sijt and sijt−1 are shares 
of product i in plant j‟s total production for years t and t-1. The indices for the levels of 
output (or material) prices for each plant j are constructed using the weighted average of 
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 The same was used by Haskel and Slaughter, (2001) among many others.  
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the growth of prices fixing 1999 as the base year. Then the price index at time t for plant 
j is: 
                             ijtijtjt PPP  1lnln  (6) 
Note that the use firm-level price data significantly reduces sample size. A first reason is 
that certain price data were unavailable or have been removed due to potential outlier 
criterion. Second, since we look at changes over the time span 1996 – 2003 we only 
keep firms in the sample over the entire period. While this does not remove all concern, 
we can, however, demonstrate that our sample still captures changes in inequality well. 
It is comparable to the several statistics on relative wages for the complete sample of 
firms (Appendix Table 1).  Finally, we compute the growth rate of prices between 1996 
and 2003. Note that these price deflators were also used to correctly deflate firm value 
added in the computation of total factor productivity (TFP). We use the index method as 
specified in the Appendix.  We compute TFP growth between 1996 and 2003.   
5. Results 
5.1  Main Results  
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 show regression results of equations (4) and (5) 
that were estimated at the level of the firm. We obtain the “mandated” wage change by 
subtracting the estimated coefficient on the unskilled labour share from that of skilled 
labour. Our initial finding is that price changes mandated positive wage increases for 
skilled and unskilled workers but no change to existing wage inequality. For the 
regressions of price changes reported in column (2), coefficients for skilled and 
unskilled workers are not significantly different from one another. By contrast, as can be 
seen from column (1) technological change has been disproportionately to the benefit of 
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firms that employ a higher share of unskilled workers. It appears as the main factor 
“mandating” a decrease in wage inequality for the period 1997 – 2003.  
Table 2 compares the performance of our framework. It reports expected wage 
changes due to changes in prices and TFP along with actual wage changes. Predicted 
skilled wages obtain adding predicted changes due to changes in prices and TFP. If we 
take, for instance, results reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1, than the predicted 
change in skilled wages is of 16% due to prices and 9% due to TFP. The predicted wage 
change is, therefore, of 25%. We find that the actual change was in fact of 34%. It does, 
however, as all other estimates fall within the 95
th
 confidence interval. Our evidence 
seems to underestimate positive impacts on skilled labour and overestimate those for 
unskilled labour. As a consequence, ours suggests a higher than actual decrease in wage 
inequality. The tendency is, however, correct and, if sampling error is taken into 
account, is supportive of the good performance of our framework.  
Existing studies focused on explaining increased wage inequality in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Haskel and Slaughter (2001) document significant price 
effects affecting the rise in inequality in the United Kingdom in the 1980s. TFP 
contributed to a significant rise in the 1970s. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) use a variant 
of the regression framework where foreign outsourcing and high-tech expenditure are 
used to indicate price and technology effects. They find significant impacts of both on 
wage inequality. Our results are quite different from these since they suggest an opposite 
tendency at least for technological change. However, it is important to bear in mind that 
we are considering both a different period and more importantly different economic 
context – the case of emerging economy Chile.  
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5.2 Robustness 
As further robustness but, also, to see how results compare if we obtain them at 
the level of industries, we compute the same results aggregating our data to the 4-digit 
and 3-digit ISIC Rev. 2 industry classification levels. Results are reported in Tables 3 
and 4. Three different results are obtained through different forms of aggregating the 
data. Columns (1) and (2) report data that are obtained taking a simple mean of firm-
level information at the industry level. Columns (3) and (4) weight information by firm 
employment shares within the industry. Columns (5) and (6) show the same for firm 
shares in industry sales. Results remain qualitatively the same and support our main 
findings as to the positive impact of technological change, if measured by TFP, on 
relative wages. This is good news for industry-level studies since, judging at least from 
this case, a similar study for Chile at this more aggregate level would have produced the 
same main conclusions. However, we also find that results differ in terms of their 
magnitude. Specifically, results are quite different depending on whether employment or 
sales shares are used to weight observations.  
 Finally, a downside to using OLS regressions is that results may be driven by 
outliers. There is no fully established procedure to how to deal with this. Trying to use a 
more scientific approach, we do a couple of regression diagnostics of our main 
specification. First, we obtain studentized residuals to identify potential outliers. Second, 
we analyse leverage points (i.e. observations with extreme values of the independent 
variable). Third, we complement both tests with two very similar analyses of residuals 
and leverage jointly, Cook‟s D and DFITS. We use conventional cut-off points to 
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exclude observations based on these criteria
115
 and do the same regressions as in Table 1 
for the resulting reduced sample. Whilst magnitudes vary somewhat, the direction of 
change is always similar. All in all we consistently find that productivity growth 
depresses wage inequality while trade-induced price changes have the opposite effect.  
5.3 How Are Findings Related to Skill-biased Technological Change? 
 Our results show that technological change had a positive impact on wage 
inequality benefitting the relative wage remuneration of unskilled workers. This does 
not, however, say anything about the nature of technological change. That is, it does not 
tell us whether new technologies have been relatively more complimentary with skilled 
or unskilled workers so as to affect their relative contributions. What it suggests is that 
technological change was more important in unskilled-intensive sectors/firms and, 
therefore, generated greater profits in those sectors/firms. This shifted profit 
opportunities to the unskilled-intensive sector/firms generating a relative increase in the 
demand for unskilled workers up to the point where profits are down to zero again.  The 
aspect that matters for overall effects is the relative effect of trade and productivity 
across firms/sectors rather than the specific nature of technological change.  
 
6. Conclusion 
There has been a decrease in wage inequality in the Chilean manufacturing 
sector from 1996 – 2003. We analyse the role trade and technological change played 
based on an empirical estimation that follows from a multi-sector model by Leamer 
(1998). The key intuition of the model is that with labour mobility across sectors and 
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 As for studentized residuals, we remove all observations with a value above and below 2.5. We remove 
all observations with a leverage value above (2k+2)/n, Cook‟s D above 4/n and DFITS above 2*sqrt(k/n) 
where k is the number of predictors and n the number of observations. The following website gives further 
detail on these tests: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/reg/chapter2/statareg2.htm  
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differences in factor intensities across sectors, it is the sector-bias of technological 
change and trade that will affect relative wages rather than the characteristics of 
technological change. Our findings suggest that the decrease in wage inequality is due to 
technological change that affected low-skill-intensive sectors. Trade, by contrast, did not 
play a role in the decrease in relative wages as price effects were broadly similar across 
sectors with different skill intensities.  
It is important to highlight several caveats to our findings that are worth 
emphasising. Most importantly, the evidence provided here relies on a stylised empirical 
model that relies on several assumptions that most likely do not hold. The most 
important case is the assumption of perfect competition in industries. This is not the case 
for Chile. But if assumptions do not hold, it is unclear whether one should expect the 
outcomes predicted by theory. Leaving questions of the underlying model aside, the 
empirical analysis relies on the unproven hypothesis that price changes are due to the 
impacts of trade and changes in total factor productivity due to those of technological 
change. There are, however, many other factors such as demand shocks that could affect 
prices beyond the impacts of trade. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 2 TFP might 
capture other aspects than technological change. Further research would be necessary to 
clearly establish whether the effects of these factors can indeed mainly be attributed to 
the impacts of trade and technological change.  Moreover, it would be useful to have a 
study on the impacts of the rise in minimum wages from 1998 to 2001 to dismiss 
concerns that they might have had an impact on the trends described here. Finally, there 
was an increase in employment of about 7% over the 1996 – 2003 period that might 
have had effects depending on its skills composition we are not capturing in this study.      
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Chapter 5: Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Mean and Median Wage Inequality in Chilean Manufacturing from 1996 to 
2003 
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Notes: Wage inequality is defined as the ratio of average skilled wages over average unskilled wages. Information on 
wages is missing in 2000 and is, therefore, not included here. Mean and median values are based on the estimating 
sample. As shown in Appendix Table 1 the results are similar to those for the complete manufacturing Census dataset.    
 
 
Table 1: Mandated Wage Equations at the Firm-Level for 1996 - 2003 
∆ ln TFP ∆ ln Price
(1) (2)
Skilled share 0.0882 0.163***
(0.074) (0.011)
Unskilled share 0.645*** 0.139***
(0.220) (0.021)
Capital share -0.224*** 0.157***
(0.068) (0.011)
Mandated % rise in wage inequality -0.557 0.024
P-value 0.04 0.34
Employment Weight No No
Observations 1701 1701
R-squared 0.06 0.14
Estimation Method: OLS 
Dependent Variables:
 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report results of estimating equations (4) and (5) for the entire sample of firms with valid 
information on prices and productivity growth. We report robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, respectively.   
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Table 2: Net Mandated and Actual Wage Changes 
∆w s mandated 0.104 0.251 0.398
∆w s actual 0.341
∆wu mandated 0.351 0.784 1.217
∆wu actual 0.514
∆(w s - wu) mandated -0.990 -0.533 -0.076
∆(w s - wu) actual -0.173
Based on Columns 
(1) and (2)
 
Notes:  We obtain “mandated” wages by adding estimates reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 for each type of 
labor where s refers to skilled and u to unskilled workers. The predicted change in wage inequality is obtained by 
subtracting the predicted unskilled wage changes from those for skilled wages. We also report actual wage changes 
computed based on the estimating sample. 95 percent confidence intervals are provided in italics.  
 
 
Table 3: Mandated Wage Equations at the 4-digit Industry Level for 1996 – 2003 
∆ ln TFP ∆ ln Price ∆ ln TFP ∆ ln Price ∆ ln TFP ∆ ln Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Skilled share -0.0447 0.171*** 0.0491 0.161*** 0.0927 0.167***
(0.190) (0.052) (0.170) (0.055) (0.180) (0.047)
Unskilled share 1.122 -0.0178 1.125 -0.00197 0.508 -0.0967
(0.970) (0.220) (0.950) (0.300) (1.630) (0.320)
Capital share -0.360* 0.180*** -0.264 0.168*** -0.201 0.177***
(0.190) (0.056) (0.170) (0.059) (0.180) (0.052)
Mandated % rise in wage inequality -1.167 0.189 -1.0759 0.163 -0.4153 0.2637
P-value 0.30 0.47 0.33 0.64 0.82 0.46
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80
R-squared 0.14 0.34 0.30 0.25 0.07 0.24
Dependent Variables:
Estimation Method: OLS 
Simple Mean Employment 
Weighted Mean
Output Weighted 
Mean
 
Notes: The table shows results of estimating equations (4) and (5) by 4-digit ISIC Rev. 2 industry. Columns (1) and (2) 
report results for industry-level observations that were obtained by taking  simple averages. Columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) 
report results for averages weighted by firm employment (Columns 3 and 4) and output size (Columns 5 and 6) 
respectively.  
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Table 4: Mandated Wage Equations at the 3-digit Industry level for 1996 – 2003 
∆ ln TFP ∆ ln Price ∆ ln TFP ∆ ln Price ∆ ln TFP ∆ ln Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Skilled share -0.038 0.088 0.068 0.124 -0.011 0.186**
-0.18 -0.067 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.081
Unskilled share 1.726* -0.036 1.765 0.006 2.248 -0.825
-0.85 -0.29 -1.08 -0.64 -1.68 -0.79
Capital share -0.454* 0.217** -0.228 0.171 -0.238 0.247**
-0.23 -0.087 -0.23 -0.11 -0.23 -0.095
Mandated % rise in wage inequality -1.764 0.124 -1.697 0.118 -2.259 1.011
P-value 0.09 0.73 0.19 0.87 0.23 0.25
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29
R-squared 0.42 0.66 0.45 0.29 0.19 0.24
Estimation Method: OLS 
Dependent Variables:
Simple Mean Employment 
Weighted Mean
Output Weighted 
Mean
 
Notes: The table shows results of estimating equations (4) and (5) by 3-digit ISIC Rev. 2 industry. Columns (1) and (2) 
report results for industry-level observations that were obtained by taking  simple averages. Columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) 
report results for averages weighted by firm employment (Columns 3 and 4) and output size (Columns 5 and 6) 
respectively.  
 
 
Table 5: Robustness: Removing Influential Outliers 
∆ ln TFP ∆ ln Price
(1) (2)
Skilled share 0.821*** 0.263***
(0.120) (0.050)
Unskilled share 1.208*** 0.161***
(0.120) (0.048)
Capital share -0.405*** 0.180***
(0.040) (0.017)
Mandated % rise in wage inequality -0.387 0.102
P-value 0.04 0.19
Employment Weight No No
Observations 1616 1616
R-squared 0.11 0.24
Estimation Method: OLS 
Dependent Variables:
 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report results of estimating equations (4) and (5) for a firm sample where potentially 
significant outliers and leverage points have been removed. These have been identified using four regression 
diagnostics tests (Cook’s D, DFITS, leverage and studentized residuals). We report robust standard errors. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, respectively.   
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Data Appendix 
 
As basic output measure we use firms‟ value-added output deflated using firm-
specific price indices obtained as specified in Section 4. The materials measure includes 
deflated expenditure on intermediate inputs, electricity and water. The materials price 
deflator is based on a weighted average of the aforementioned 3-digit output price 
deflators where the weights are given by the share that each 3-digit industry‟s output 
represents in total manufacturing intermediates used by all 3-digit industries based on an 
input-output table. For years 1996-2002 [2003-2004], the weights are based on the 1986 
[1996] Chilean input-output table. 
Capital is computed using the perpetual inventory method (PIM). The ENIA 
survey provides information on four types of capital: buildings, machinery and 
equipment, transport equipment, and land. For each type of capital we compute net 
investment flows as the sum of purchases of new capital, purchases of used capital and 
improvements to capital minus the sales of capital and deflate these by an investment 
price deflator constructed as the ratio of current gross capital formation to constant gross 
capital formation (in local currency units) from the World Development Indicators with 
base year 2002. For each type of capital, the PIM formula Kit+1 = (1 – δ) Kit + Iit is 
applied, where Iit are real net investment flows and δ is a depreciation rate. Since 
detailed studies of depreciation rates in Chile are unavailable, we use the following rates 
proposed by Pombo (1999) who studied the same type of capital goods in Colombia: 3% 
for buildings, 7% for machinery and equipment, and 11.9% for transport equipment. 
Land is assumed not to depreciate. We also experimented with alternative rates of 
depreciation but did not find this to make a substantial difference to the final capital 
stock values nor to our main results. The initial value of the capital stock needed to 
apply the PIM formula is given by the book value of each of the four types of capital in 
the first year of plant presence in the sample. Whenever the book value is available only 
in a latter year, we back out that value until the plant‟s first year in the sample taking 
into account the investment price deflator and the corresponding depreciation rate.  
Total Factor Productivity growth is the residual growth of output not explained 
by production input growth. In this framework, these inputs are the log of skilled and 
unskilled labour, capital and materials computed as described above and in Section 2. 
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Measuring the returns to capital is a well-known problem in the empirical literature 
(Hulten, 2000). In order to avoid this problem, we assume that product functions exhibit 
constant returns to scale and compute capital as the residual of the other three input 
shares.  We compute the following to obtain TFP growth:  
 itKititUititSititit KsLusLssVATFP lnlnlnln   (A1) 
where 
 
itit
itSit
Sit
VAp
Lsw
s  , 
itit
itUit
Uit
VAp
Luw
s   and UitSitKit sss 1  
where VA, L, K and M are value-added output and labour, capital and materials inputs of 
firm i at time t. Further, s denotes the shares of each in total revenue, where p is the 
general price level whereas wS and wU are wages of skilled and unskilled labour of firm i 
at time t. We compute the share of each type of labour as the share of its total wage bill 
over value-added. Using value-added instead of sales output means we already exclude 
from the output measure materials and other intermediate inputs.  
The main advantage of this approach, proposed by Solow, is that it is a 
straightforward non-parametric procedure to estimate TFP growth. All that is necessary 
for computation are price and output data, the exact production function does not have to 
be estimated. This comes at a cost, namely the assumption of marginal cost pricing. 
However, this is well in line with the competitive market hypothesis the ‟mandated wage 
equation‟ approach relies on.  
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Appendix. Table 
Table 1: Relative Wage Statistics for the Complete Firm Census and the Estimating Sample 
Panel A: Mean values
Year Census Sample Census Sample Census Sample Census Sample Census Sample Census Sample
1996 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.33 1.67 1.63 4,106   4,281     2,014     2,043    2.04 2.10
1997 0.38 0.42 0.43 0.36 1.64 1.63 4,256   4,622     2,177     2,225    1.96 2.08
1998 0.39 0.42 0.42 0.35 1.64 1.58 4,607   4,974     2,325     2,534    1.98 1.96
1999 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.39 1.60 1.54 4,710   5,131     2,468     2,617    1.91 1.96
2001 0.42 0.46 0.50 0.45 1.49 1.40 5,204   5,628     3,021     3,294    1.72 1.71
2002 0.42 0.47 0.51 0.45 1.51 1.43 5,549   5,962     3,116     3,410    1.78 1.75
2003 0.43 0.47 0.50 0.45 1.52 1.44 6,024   6,522     3,368     3,730    1.79 1.75
Panel B: Median values
Year Census Sample Census Sample Census Sample Census Sample Census Sample Census Sample
1996 0.33 0.34 0.21 0.21 1.44 1.41 3,206   3,404     1,717     1,737    1.87 1.96
1997 0.34 0.36 0.23 0.22 1.42 1.36 3,424   3,649     1,885     1,878    1.82 1.94
1998 0.34 0.36 0.23 0.22 1.43 1.37 3,766   3,993     2,037     2,050    1.85 1.95
1999 0.35 0.38 0.26 0.24 1.40 1.32 3,766   4,062     2,135     2,170    1.76 1.87
2001 0.37 0.40 0.29 0.27 1.33 1.25 4,065   4,474     2,605     2,770    1.56 1.62
2002 0.38 0.41 0.29 0.27 1.33 1.25 4,241   4,666     2,676     2,830    1.58 1.65
2003 0.40 0.42 0.30 0.27 1.35 1.26 4,656   5,015     2,870     3,002    1.62 1.67
Skilled wages in 
total 
Skilled employment 
in total
Skill premium Skilled wages Unskilled wages Wage inequality
Skilled wage share Skilled employment 
share
Skill premium Skilled wages Unskilled wages Wage inequality
 
Notes: The wage share of skilled workers is computed as the wage share of skilled workers over the joint wages of skilled and unskilled workers.  The employment 
share of skilled workers is obtained as the ratio of the number of skilled workers over overall employment. The skill premium is computed as the ratio of average 
skilled wages over average wages. Skilled and unskilled wages are reported in thousands of Chilean pesos. Finally, we compute wage inequality as the ratio of skilled 
wages over unskilled wages. The statistics for the Census dataset include all observations except for the top and bottom 1% of average skilled and unskilled wages to 
remove possible outliers. Statistics for the Estimating sample use information for all firms entering our main regressions in Table 1.  
